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Date: 6/13/2016 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :53 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 6 Case: CV-OC-2013-12890 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, etal. 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, Mariel Doyle, Libby Greaney, State Of Idaho 
Date Code User Judge 
7/18/2013 NCOC CCHEATJL New Case Filed - Other Claims Timothy Hansen 
COMP CCHEATJL Complaint Filed Timothy Hansen 
SMFI CCHEATJL Summons Filed Timothy Hansen 
8/12/2013 AMEN CCREIDMA Amended Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial Timothy Hansen 
AMEN CCREIDMA Amended Summons Timothy Hansen 
CDIS CCREIDMA Civil Disposition entered for: Greaney, Libby, Timothy Hansen 
Defendant. Filing date: 8/12/2013 
9/3/2013 NOAP CCHOLMEE Notice Of Appearance (Cantril! for University Timothy Hansen 
Health Services Boise State University) 
9/13/2013 AMEN TCLAFFSD Amended Notice Of Appearance (Cantril! for Timothy Hansen 
State of Idaho, University Health Services Boise 
State University and Mariel Doyle) 
10/2/2013 ANSW CCHOLMEE Answer to Amended Complaint and Jury Trial Timothy Hansen 
(Cantril! for State of Idaho, University Health 
Services Boise State, & Mariel Doyle) 
NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service Timothy Hansen 
10/8/2013 HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Status 11/12/2013 03:30 Timothy Hansen 
PM) 
10/31/2013 STIP MCBIEHKJ Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Timothy Hansen 
11/5/2013 HRVC DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Status scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
11/12/2013 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
11/6/2013 ORDR DCOLSOMA Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial Timothy Hansen 
HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Timothy Hansen 
11/24/2014 03:30 PM) 
HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/08/2014 09:00 Timothy Hansen 
AM) 4 Days 
11/20/2013 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Timothy Hansen 
12/5/2013 NOTS CCKHAMSA (2) Notice Of Service Timothy Hansen 
1/6/2014 NOTS TCLAFFSD Notice Of Service . Timothy Hansen 
1/28/2014 NOTS CCNELSRF Notice Of Service Timothy Hansen 
4/30/2014 NOTC CCVIDASL Notice of Taking Deposition of Raul Mendez Timothy Hansen 
5/12/2014 MOTN CCTHIEKJ Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record Timothy Hansen 
AFFD CCTHIEKJ Affidavit of Attorney in Support of Motion to Timothy Hansen 
Withdraw as Counsel 
NOHG CCTHIEKJ Notice Of Hearing 6.12.14@ 4pm Timothy Hansen 
HRSC CCTHIEKJ Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw Timothy Hansen 
06/12/2014 04:00 PM) 
5/13/2014 NOTC CCREIDMA Defendant's Notice of Non-Opposition Timothy Hansen 
5/29/2014 RESP CCVIDASL Plaintiff Response To Order to Withdraw as Timothy Hansen 
Attorney of Record 
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Date: 6/13/2016 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :53 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 6 Case: CV-OC-2013-12890 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, etal. 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, Mariel Doyle, Libby Greaney, State Of Idaho 
Date Code User Judge 
6/12/2014 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw scheduled Timothy Hansen 
on 06/12/2014 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: V. Gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 1--
7/1/2014 RESP CCSCOTDL Plaintiff Response to Order to Withdraw as Timothy Hansen 
Attorney of Record 
9/8/2014 NOTC CCMURPST Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Raul Timothy Hansen 
Mendez 
9/11/2014 AMEN TCMEREKV Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Timothy Hansen 
Raul Mendez 
10/20/2014 RQST CCHEATJL Plaintiff Request For Dismissal Of The State Of Timothy Hansen 
Idaho As A Party In This Case 
10/27/2014 HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Timothy Hansen 
11/10/2014 04:00 PM) Plaintff's request for 
Dismissal of the State of Idaho as a Party in the 
Case 
11/10/2014 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Timothy Hansen 
on 11/10/2014 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: V. Gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
11/24/2014 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Timothy Hansen 
on 11/24/2014 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: V. Gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
12/8/2014 HRVC DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
12/08/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 Days 
12/31/2014 MISC CCTHIEKJ Case Status Update Timothy Hansen 
1/5/2015 HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/05/2015 03:00 Timothy Hansen 
PM) 
DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Status scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
01/05/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: V. Gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/12/2015 03:00 Timothy Hansen 
PM) 
1/6/2015 ORDR DCOLSOMA Order Dismissing State of Idaho Timothy Hansen 
CDIS DCOLSOMA Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Timothy Hansen 
Defendant; Mendez, Raul, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
1/6/2015 
1/7/2015 MEMO CCMARTJD Memorandum Confirming Status Conference Timothy Hansen 
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Date: 6/13/2016 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :53 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 6 Case: CV-OC-2013-12890 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, etal. 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, Mariel Doyle, Libby Greaney, State Of Idaho 
Date Code User Judge 
2/9/2015 MEMO CCRADTER Plaintiff Update and Response to Defendant's Timothy Hansen 
Memorandum 
2/12/2015 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Status scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
02/12/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: V. Starr 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
2/23/2015 HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Timothy Hansen 
07/13/2015 03:00 PM) 
HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/08/2015 09:00 Timothy Hansen 
AM) 5 Days 
ORDR DCOLSOMA Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial Timothy Hansen 
6/1/2015 MOTN CCGARCOS Ex Parte Motion for Relief from Mediation, or in Timothy Hansen ,, 
the Alternative, for Extension of Time to Conduct 
Mediation 
AFFD CCGARCOS Affidavit of David W. Cantril! in Support of Ex Timothy Hansen 
Parte Motion for Relief from Mediation, or in the 
Alternative, for Extension of Time to Conduct 
Mediation 
MOSJ CCGARCOS Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment Timothy Hansen 
MEMO CCGARCOS Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Timothy Hansen 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCGARCOS Affidavit of Mariel Dahlman Doyle in Support of Timothy Hansen 
Memorandum of Defendants in Support of 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCGARCOS Affidavit of David W. Cantril! in Support of Timothy Hansen 
Memorandum of Defendants in Support of 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCGARCOS Affidavit of Sunny Wallace in Support of Timothy Hansen 
Memorandum of Defendants in Support of 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCGARCOS Affidavit of Marla S. Henken in Support of Timothy Hansen 
Memorandum of Defendants in Support of 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCGARCOS Affidavit of Elizabeth Greaney in Support of Timothy Hansen 
Memorandum of Defendants in Support of 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCGARCOS Affidavit of Andy Cover in Support of Timothy Hansen 
Memorandum of Defendants in Support of 
Summary Judgment 
6/11/2015 AFFD CCSCOTDL Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Defendant's Motion Timothy Hansen 
for Summary Judgment 
6/29/2015 MOTN CCGRANTR Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff Timothy Hansen 




Time: 11 :53 AM 
Page 4 of 6 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2013-12890 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, Mariel Doyle, Libby Greaney, State Of Idaho 
Date Code User Judge 
6/29/2015 MEMO CCGRANTR Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Motion Timothy Hansen 
to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
MOTN CCGRANTR Ex Parte Motion to Seal Exhibit 14 of Affidavit of Timothy Hansen 
Plaintiff Opposing Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Add 
Redactions to Documents 
7/6/2015 OPPO TCLAFFSD Opposition To Defendant Ex Parte Motion To Timothy Hansen 
Seal Exhibit 14 Of Affidavit Of Plaintiff Opposing 
Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment 
MEMO TCLAFFSD Memorandum Supporting Affidavit of Plaintiff Timothy Hansen 
Opposing Defendants Motion For Summary 
Judgment And Objection To Defendants Motion 
To Strike It 
7/13/2015 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Timothy Hansen 
on 07/13/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: V. Starr 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
7/14/2015 HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Timothy Hansen 
Judgment 08/04/2015 04:00 PM) and Motion to 
Strike 
7/21/2015 MODQ CCGRANTR Motion To Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen Timothy Hansen 
Without Cause 
MOTN CCGRANTR Motion to Reset Pre-Trial Conference Timothy Hansen 
7/28/2015 RSPN CCHOLDKJ Response to Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Timothy Hansen 
Hansen Without Cause 
MOTN CCMARTJD Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment Hearing Timothy Hansen 
MOTN CCMARTJD Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen With Timothy Hansen 
Case 
AFSM CCMARTJD Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Disqualify Timothy Hansen 
8/6/2015 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Timothy Hansen 
scheduled on 08/04/2015 04:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: V. Starr 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
8/14/2015 HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/17/2015 04:00 Timothy Hansen 
PM) 
NOTH DCOLSOMA Notice Of Hearing Timothy Hansen 
8/17/2015 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Status scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
08/17/2015 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: V. Starr 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
9/3/2015 MEMO DCMAXWKK Memorandum Decision and Order Timothy Hansen 
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Date: 6/13/2016 
Time: 11 :53 AM 
Page 5 of 6 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2013-12890 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, Mariel Doyle, Libby Greaney, State Of Idaho 
Date Code User Judge 
9/8/2015 HRVC DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
09/08/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 Days 
10/8/2015 NOTH TCWEGEKE Notice Of Hearing on Summary Judgment and Timothy Hansen 
Scheduling Order 
10/23/2015 MOAF CCGARCOS Motion & Affidavit to Continue Timothy Hansen 
10/30/2015 HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone Timothy Hansen 
11/06/2015 11 :00 AM) 
HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Timothy Hansen 
Judgment 11/10/2015 04:00 PM) 
11/6/2015 DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Status by Phone scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
11/06/2015 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Vanessa Star 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 50 
CONT CCNELSRF Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment Timothy Hansen 
11/20/2015 03:00 PM) 
CCNELSRF Notice of Hearing 11 /20/15 @ 3 pm Timothy Hansen 
11/20/2015 DCHH DCELLISJ Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Timothy Hansen 
scheduled on 11/20/2015 03:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: V. Starr 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
ORDR TCWEGEKE Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Seal Exhibit 14 Timothy Hansen 
of Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
12/4/2015 NOSC CCLOWEAD Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel (Skinner for Timothy Hansen 
Defendants) 
12/31/2015 MEMO DCMAXWKK Memorandum Decision and Order Timothy Hansen 
2/19/2016 JDMT DCOLSOMA Judgment Timothy Hansen 
CDIS DCOLSOMA Civil Disposition entered for: Doyle, Mariel, Timothy Hansen 
Defendant; State Of Idaho, Defendant; University 
Health Services Boise State University, 
Defendant; Mendez, Raul, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
2/19/2016 
STAT DCOLSOMA STATUS CHANGED: Closed Timothy Hansen 
2/25/2016 AFFD CCFERGLL Affidavit Of Beth Rountree In Support Of Timothy Hansen 
Defendants Verified Memorandum Of Costs And 
Attorney Fees 
MEco· CCFERGLL Defendants Verified Memorandum of Costs And Timothy Hansen 
Attorney Fees 
MOTN CCJOHNLE Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees Timothy Hansen 
3/9/2016 MOTN CCBUTTAR Motion And Affidavit For Fee Waiver Of Filing Fee Timothy Hansen 




Time: 11 :53 AM 
Page 6 of 6 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2013-12890 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Raul Mendez vs. University Health Services Boise State University, Mariel Doyle, Libby Greaney, State Of Idaho 
Date Code User Judge 
3/9/2016 MOTN CCBOYIDR Motion to Deny Defendant's Motion for Costs and Timothy Hansen 
Attorney Fees 
AFFD CCBOYIDR Affidavit of Plaintiff in Support of Motion to Deny Timothy Hansen 
Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees 
3/16/2016 ORDR DCMAXWKK Order Timothy Hansen 
4/1/2016 APSC CCWATSCL Appealed To The Supreme Court Timothy Hansen 
AFFD CCWATSCL Affidavit in Support of Fee Waiver Timothy Hansen 
NOTA TCWEGEKE NOTICE OF APPEAL Timothy Hansen 
4/20/2016 MOTN CCLOWEAD Motion to Waive Fee for Preparation of the Timothy Hansen 
Clerk's Record and Transcript 
5/2/2016 ORDR DCMAXWKK Order Re: Fee Waiver for Appeal Timothy Hansen 
6/13/2016 NOTC TCWEGEKE Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Timothy Hansen 
44090 
000012
David W. Cantrill 
ISB #1291 
NO. -~---F_"}f.~ AM._ ~
JUN O 1 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 














Case No. CV OC 1312890 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants, by and through their attorney of record, David W. Cantrill, of the firm Cantrill 
Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP, and moves this court, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, for a summary judgment in said defendants' favor, dismissing the 
complaint of plaintiff against these defendants with prejudice on the ground and for the reason that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that said defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw. 
This motion is made and based upon the records, files, pleadings in the above entitled 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
000013
action, together with the Affidavits of David W. Cantrill, Marla Henken, Andy Cover, Mariel 
Doyle, Elizabeth Greaney, Sunny Wallace and supporting Memorandum filed herein. 
These defendants request oral argument on this motion pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this pt day of June, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, LLP 
Attorneys for Defe:p_dants 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT - 2 
000014
.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 1, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated l;>elow, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
[ ] Facsimile 
[] Hand Delivery 
[x] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Email: rau1mendez2002@gmail.com 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ruDGMENT - 3 
000015
David W. Cantrill 
ISB #1291 
·.t ~ ,\-- !ti .. ?1'' 
'.,_.,,,,'\$ ... , 
JUN O t 201~ 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, UNNERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 














Case No. CV OC 1312890 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff Raul Mendez brings this action against his former employer, University Health 
Services Boise State University ("UHS") and one of its employees, Mariel Dahlman Doyle, 
alleging unlawful discrimination in the workplace during his own 12-week stint as its employee 
in 2011. Mendez claims UHS violated Idaho Code § 67-5909 of the Idaho Human Rights Act, 
("the Act" unless more specifically cited) by subjecting him to discrimination on the basis of his 
race and national origin. Mendez is Hispanic. Specifically, he claims "Plaintiff was not given 
proper training, was singled out for discipline during [his] probationary period, was chastised, 
was suspended and eventually terminated based on his race and national origin." (Affidavit of 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
000016
-.,:· 
David W. Cantrill in Support of Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment 
(hereafter "Aff. of Cantrill"), Exhibit A, Plaintiffs Answer to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 18.) 
He further claims UHS violated § 67-5911 of the Act by terminating him in retaliation for his 
reports of the claimed discrimination. Additionally, Mendez claims UHS breached the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing implicit in his employment contract and, finally, that UHS 
breached his claimed "express and/or implied employment contract" by the described alleged 
conduct. 
UHS moves for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Mendez's claims. For the 
following reasons, the motion should be granted. 
I. FACTS 
A. UBS Specifically Prohibits Discrimination and Retaliation. 
UHS is part of Boise State University's Health and Recreation Program. BSU itself is a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho and an equal opportunity employer and educator. It 
has long been the University's policy to offer equal opportunity and specifically not to 
discriminate against or harass any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, age, 
national origin, physical or mental disability, veteran status, genetic information or sexual 
orientation. Such policies were in place in 2011 during the time of Mendez's employment. See 
Affidavit of Sunny Wallace in Support of Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary 
Judgment (hereafter "Aff. of Wallace"), Exhibit A - EEO Policy Statement, Exhibit B - Policy 
on Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action, and Exhibit C - Non-Discrimination and Anti-
Harassment Policy. Under the Policy on Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action, an 
employee may bring a complaint of discrimination to the Affirmative Action Director, 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
000017
whereupon the employee's concerns or complaints will be thoroughly investigated and dealt with 
as appropriate. See Aff. of Wallace, Exhibit B; Affidavit of Marla Henken in Support of 
Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment (hereafter "Aff. of Henken"). 
As a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, UHS also has established employment 
policies governing its classified, i.e., non-exempt, employees. IDAPA 15.04.01.150 provides for 
an explicit initial probationary period for new hires consisting of the first 1,040 hours worked. 
Where, as here, the employee works straight time, this probationary period typically lasts about 
six months. Affidavit of Andy Cover in Support of Memorandum of Defendants in Support of 
Summary Judgment (hereafter "Aff. of Cover"). During this initial probationary period - the 
essential purpose of which is to permit realistic assessment of the "fit" between the candidate and 
the position - the employment relationship is purely at will. In other words, it is terminable by 
the employer or the employee at any time and for any reason: 
150. PROBATIONARY PERIODS. 
01. Probationary Period Required. Except as provided in Section 040 of these rules, 
every appointment and promotion to a classified position is probationary, or in the 
absence of adequate registers, provisional. (5-8-09) 
02. Types of Probationary Periods. The probationary period serves as a working test 
period to provide the agency an opportunity to evaluate a probationary employee's work 
performance and suitability for the position. There are three (3) types of probationary 
periods: (5-8-09) 
a. Entrance probation is the probationary service required of an employee at the time of 
his original appointment or any subsequent appointment to state classified service 
excluding reinstatement and transfer, the duration of which is one thousand forty (1,040) 
hours of credited state service. . . . (5-8-09) 
* * * 
IDAPA 15.04.01.150. Aff. of Cover. 
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Plaintiff Mendez was hired to work as a Customer Service Representative ("CSR") in 
UHS on August 24, 2011, by a committee comprised of defendant Mariel Doyle and two others. 
[ Amended Complaint, paragraph 9.] He was, of course, as Hispanic as he would ever be when 
defendants hired him - on the recommendation of Doyle herself, in fact - and he was certainly 
no more or less Hispanic a mere 12 weeks later when, on November 15, 2011, the same people 
who had hired him gave him the choice to quit or be fired for a number of unremitting 
performance issues. See Affidavits of Mariel Dahlman Doyle and Elizabeth Greaney in Support 
of Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment (hereafter "Aff. of Doyle" and 
"Aff. of Greaney"). 
B. Mendez's Employment History with UHS 
Mendez's job failures and claims of discrimination didn't begin with UHS. In 2007, Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) hired Mendez as a radiology technician at its 
clinic in Nampa, where in late 2009 he started refusing to perform assigned duties and 
complaining to coworkers about his supervisors and the work environment. (Report and 
Recommendation of federal Magistrate Candy W. Dale in Mendez v. SARMC, Case No. 1:12-
cv-00026-ELJ-CWD, attached as Appendix A.) These and other performance issues continued 
largely unabated until October of 2010 when he was fired for his continued negative comments 
about co-workers despite multiple written warnings; his continued violation of other express 
instructions from management; his refusal to perform assigned work and to assist coworkers and 
general performance issues, including wasting time on email and taking too long to perform his 
work. He promptly filed a charge of discrimination based on his race, national origin and 
religion, which the Commission rejected, whereupon he sued in federal court, whereupon his two 




different lawyers serially withdrew and whereupon, finally, Hon. Candy W. Dale on September 
12, 2014, recommended the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted - which it 
was. 
In the meantime, of course, Mendez had applied with UHS, whereupon Mariel Doyle 
interviewed and warmly recommended him, whereupon the defendants indeed did hire him on 
' 
August 24, 2011 at the rate of pay of $11. 72 per hour, which was $2.00 per hour more than other 
beginning employees - notwithstanding his ethnicity, obviously - and whereupon problems with 
Mr. Mendez began almost immediately. Aff. of Cantrill, Exhibit B; Af£ of Doyle; Aff. of 
Greaney. 
On October 5, 2011, Mariel Doyle met with Mendez in an Employee Conference 
. 
regarding the training Mendez had received and Mendez's performance issues. These 
performance issues included an indication of Documentation of Concem(s) or Incident(s) 
Involving: 
Conduct or Behavior (Interpersonal Skills [sic] 
Department or University Rules 
Work Performance (Productivity or Quality of Work) 
Customer Service 
The Record of Employee Conference Form also identified the following areas under 
"Describe performance con~em or issue (be specific, include dates and examples): 
• 10-3-2011 Raul did not check out 35 patients according to process maps. He was given 
verbal instruction to check out the patients property. He continued not to check out the 
patients, stating he was too busy. 
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• 10-4-2011 Raul continued to not load insurance information in the appointment after 
being given verbal and written instructions to do so, causing the insurance information to 
not be printed on the pink sheets. 
• 10-4-2011 Raul misinformed patient regarding discount policy. Did not follow procedure. 
Raul needs to work on his eye contact and communication with staff. 
These issues were discussed with Mendez on October 5, 2011 but Mendez refused to sign it. 
Aff. of Doyle, Exhibit A, Bates No. BSU 00509-BSU 00510. 
On October 10, 2011, Andy Cover met with Raul Mendez. Mendez told Cover he felt he 
was being trained and evaluated differently than previous Customer Service Representatives 
(CSRs) and he may be being discriminated against because of his ethnicity. Cover told Mendez 
that if he believed that he was being discriminated against he should contact Marla Henken, the 
Director of Affirmative Action / Equal Employment Opportunity at Boise State University. Af£ 
of Cover. Mendez did not contact Ms. Henken about a claim of discrimination. Aff. of Henken; 
Aff. of Cover. 
On November 1, 2011, Mariel Doyle met with Mendez to discuss his training so far and 
went over the training sheet. Doyle also documents that she "asked him to sign the document to 
confirm that we went over this, as it was one of the specific things he asked for in his response to 
his employee conference form given to him on 10/5/11 (which he has yet to return sign). He 
refused to sign stating that he did not see 'any reason to." On the "Raul's Training" document, 
Doyle noted "Discussed with Raul 11/1/11, he chose not to sign." See Aff. of Doyle, Exhibit A, 
Record of Employee Conference Form and Raul's Training (Bates Nos. BSU 00509, BSU 
00511). 
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On November 10, 2011, Mariel Doyle emailed Andy Cover seeking his advice on how to 
proceed to terminating Mendez and providing a memo with dates documenting Mendez's many 
errors and shortcomings in his performance as a CSR, his inappropriate interactions with patients 
and staff and Doyle's multiple attempts to counsel Mendez to improve his performance. Aff. of 
Doyle, Exhibit A. 
The documentation Doyle provided to Cover included the following issues: 
• September 27, 2011, Mendez's inappropriate conversation with a female patient and 
Mendez's failure to answer the phone; 
• September 29, 2011, Mendez's failure to answer the phone; 
• October 3, 2011, Me.ndez's failure to check out 35 patients in the system; Mendez asking 
Doyle about the procedure for handling crutches after he was instructed on the procedure 
by another employee immediately prior to Mendez asking Doyle for instructions 
• October 4, 2011, Mendez's failure to input insurance information for patients even after 
being told to so verbally and via email; Mendez providing incorrect discount information 
to a patient resulting in the provider having to do a no charge on the office visit; 
• October 4, 2011, Doyle received feedback from another employee, Tiffany that Mendez 
is often very short and rude with her; 
• October 4, 2011, Doyle spoke to Mary who had received feedback from her staff that 
Mendez acted inappropriately with female patients and staff members, stating that he 
"gawks, stares up and down and makes them feel uncomfortable." 
• October 5, 2011, Doyle received an email from Mary confirming the report of Mendez's 
inappropriateness towards staff; 
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• October 5, 2011, Doyle stayed late to help Mendez with closing and balancing 
procedures because Mendez did not feel comfortable enough to do it by himself; 
• October 5, 2011, Doyle met with Mendez and Dr. Libby Greaney regarding Mendez's 
performance issue and created the record of employee conference form; . 
• October 24, 2011, Doyle overheard Mendez giving medical advice to a student; 
• October 26, 2011, Mendez arrived 5 minutes late to an all staff meeting; 
• October 26, 2011, Doyle met with Mendez and discussed his arriving late to the all staff 
meeting, discussed the feedback Doyle had received that Mendez was negative and made 
negative comments, discussed the need to obtain only the basic information from a 
student when scheduling appointments, and provide the example on October 25, 2011 
where a student asked to schedule an appointment because he thought his nose was 
broken and Mendez asked if he was in a fight, discussed Mendez's inability to initiate 
conversation and inability to take initiative and communicate with others, discussed he 
needs to never give medical advice. Doyle told Mendez multiple times that he needs to 
get over the fact that we gave him a record of employee conference, which he still has not 
signed and returned. 
• October 26, 2011, Mendez did not leave until 5:40 when the last patient was checked out 
at 5:12. Doyle checked with him at 5:10 and Mendez stated that he was balanced but 
waiting for the last patient to check out. Given he was balanced, it should not have taken 
him 28 minutes to finish up required paperwork. 
• October 28, 2011, Mendez did not follow policy for employee flu shot and Doyle spoke 
with him regarding this .. Mary got involved and spoke with Mendez because this is not a 
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new policy and he has been told multiple times how to properly handle employee flu 
shots. 
• November 1, 2011, Doyle spoke with Mendez one on one and discussed training thus far. 
Went over attached training sheet and asked Mendez to make any changes needed. He 
added he was working independently at check out on August 25, one day after his start 
date. I told him that was not completely accurate and added "with supervision." Doyle 
also documents that she "asked him to sign the document to confirm that we went over 
this, as it was one of the specific things he asked for in his response to his employee 
conference form given to him on 10/5/11 (which he has yet to return sign). He refused to 
sign stating that he did not see 'any reason to." On the "Raul's Training" document, 
Doyle noted "Discussed with Raul 11/1/11, he chose not to sign." 
• November 7, 2011, Email was sent to all CSR's asking them to participate in the shooting 
of the "Buster Video." Doyle asked that anyone who felt uncomfortable being in the 
video to notify her asap. 
• November 8, 2011, at 4:35 p.m. Mendez approached Doyle and told her he did not want 
to participate in the Bronco Video. Doyle noted "This is another example of 1) lack of 
appropriate communication due to the fact that I asked everyone to notify me asap the 
day prior and 2) lack on [sic] teamwork and involvement. This was a great opportunity to 
participate in something fun and build teamwork but he chose not to be involved. I 
overheard him taking to Jacee about it and he stated it was "weird."" 
• November 9, 2011, sent all CSR's an email asking for feedback regarding Roxanne's 
phone. Received responses verbally and via email from everyone except Mendez. 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9 
000024
• November 10, 2011, Doyle had to send Mendez a follow up email regarding Roxanne's 
phone informing him that he was the only CSR she had not heard from and asked for his 
feedback. Doyle noted "Continues to display a lack of communication and teamwork." 
See Aff. of Doyle, Exhibit A, Record of Employee Conference Form and Raul's Training (Bates 
Nos. BSU 00504- BSU 00511); Aff. of Greaney. 
On November 15, after just 12 weeks on the job, Mendez was terminated, but with the 
option to quit in lieu thereof in order to permit him to apply for further employment with the 
State if he so desired. He elected to quit. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Following termination of his employment with UHS, Mendez filed a charge of 
discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission, which issued its right-to-sue letter, 
whereupon he did. As was the case with the serial withdrawal of counsel for Mendez in his 
action against SARMC, counsel by whom the instant complaint was filed has also withdrawn 
and plaintiff again proceeds pro se. Pro se litigants, of course, are "subject to the same rules of 
procedure and evidence as defendants who are represented by counsel." United States v. Merrill, 
746 F.2d 458,465 (9th Cir. 1984). 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
One of the key purposes of summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually 
unsupported claims .... " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is "not a 
disfavored procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[ ] by which factually 
insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the 




attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere 
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise 
p~operly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is ~at there be no genuine 
issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) .. 
The evidence must b.e viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, id. at 
255, and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. Direct testimony of the non-movant 
must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 
1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from .. 
circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988). · 
The moving party bears the initial burden ~f demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bane). To carry 
this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or 
deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 
party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 21~ F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2000). This 
shi~s the burden to the nonmoving party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict 
in his favor. Id. at 256-57. The nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and show "by 
[his]. affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file" that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 
However, the Court is "not required to comb through the record to find some reason to deny a 
motion for summary judgment." Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 
1029 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 
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1988)). Instead, the "party opposing summary judgment must direct [the Court's] attention to 
specific triable facts." S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The defendants' motion for summary judgment seeks dismissal of Mendez's employment 
discrimination claims and all of his "contract" claims. 
A. Claims brought pursuant to the Act are subject to the same standards of proof as 
are applicable to claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. Federal case law is accordingly persuasive. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the same standards of proof applicable to Title 
VII actions apply to actions under the Idaho Human Rights Act. Bowles v. Keating, 606 P.2d 
458, 462 (Idaho 1979); see also Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 
2004) ("[O]ur analysis of Peterson's religious discrimination claims under the Idaho Human 
Rights Act is the same as under The [Civil Rights] Act."). Accordingly, the Court can properly 
apply the myriad federal court holdings to Mendez's Idaho Human Rights Act claims, inasmuch 
as such federal claims turn on the same proofs and law as Mendez's so here. 
Both acts provide remedies to employees injured by the discriminatory conduct of 
employers. For example, they make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an 
employee "because of' the employee's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." This 
prohibition covers discriminatory discharge decisions, as well as decisions related to 
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co., 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004) The acts also prohibit an employer from retaliating against an 
employee because the employee "opposed" unlawful employment discrimination or "made a 
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j_ 
charge, .testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing" under The Act. Id. 
Mendez claims UHS violated the Act in two categorical ways. First, he alleges that when 
' 
UHS failed to give him adequate training, singled him out for discipline during his probationary 
period, chastised him, "suspended" him and untimately terminated him, UHS intentionally 
treated him differently than other employees due to his affiliation with his Hispanic race. 
Second, he claims UHS unlawfully retaliated against him after he reported the claimed 
discriminatory conduct to Andy Cover in BSU's Human Resources Department. 
B. Disparate Treatment on the Basis of Race 
To prove discrimination on the basis of race, Mendez must introduce evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could conclude, in light of common experience, that it was more likely 
than not that UHS's adverse action was motivated by consideration of his race. See McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (explaining plaintiffs burden under Title 
VII is to demonstrate that defendant's proffered explanation for an adverse action is more likely 
than not a pretext for discrimination); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 
(1983) ("The factual inquiry in a Title VII case is whether the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff.") (quotations omitted). When evaluating discrimination 
claims at the summary judgment stage, the courts employ the familiar burden-shifting analysis 
developed in McDonnell Douglas. See Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
Under McDonnell Douglas, an employee alleging disparate treatment must first establish 
a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802. If Mendez establishes a prima facie case, 
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"the burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer to articulate some 
legitim3:te, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions." Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 
Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000). If the employer meets this burden, the 
burden of production shifts back to the employee to show the employer's reason is pretextual 
"either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence." Tex. Dep 't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). Throughout the 
burden-shifting process, the employee has the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 
employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 
531 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). In other words, "[t]o survive summary 
judgment on his disparate treatment claim, [Mendez] must establish that his job performance was 
satisfactory and provide evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to support a reasonable 
inference that his termination [or discipline] was discriminatory." Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co., 358 F.3d 599,603 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, there is no evidence sufficient to make even a first 
stage, prima facie, case. 
1. Prima Facie Case 
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Mendez must show that "(1) he is a 
member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse 
employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated 
more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to 
an inference of discrimination." Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004). 
As for the first and third elements, URS does not dispute that Mendez is a member of a protected 
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class (Hispanic race) or that he experienced adverse employment actions (formal warnings and 
eventual termination with the election to quit instead). 
On the other hand, defendants contend there is no evidence that would give rise to an 
inference of discrimination and that, while Mendez appeared to be qualified for the position · 
when they hired him - on probation, as in all other classified positions - he simply didn't work 
out due to performance issues. 
2. Legitimacy ofUHS's Explanation 
Even if Mendez could make even the minimal showing requisite to a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the Court's inquiry would not then end. Moving to the next stage of the analysis 
in that event, the burden would shift to UHS to produce evidence of a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 
F.2d. 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990). Then, to suffice under McDonnell Douglas, UHS's evidence 
must explain why Mendez "in particular" was subject to adverse employment action. Diaz v. 
Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1211(9th 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1094 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
Performance-related concerns are sufficient to rebut the presumption of discriminatory 
intent, Pottenger, 329 F.3d at 746, emphasis added, as is evidence that an employee disobeyed a 
direct order from a supervisor. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 
2003). UHS had several legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for disciplining Mendez. It is 
undisputed that: 
Mendez made inappropriate conversations with patients and gave them medical advice; 
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Mendez was untimely to work and stayed past the hours that should have been required 
to complete his work; 
Mendez repeatedly failed to follow procedures to check out patients, input insurance 
information correctly, handle employee flu shots and made errors resulting in a provider having 
to do a no charge on an office visit; 
Mendez made staff feel uncomfortable with his negative comments, negative attitude and 
inappropriate "gawking" and looking at people "up and down." 
Aff. of Doyle; Aff. of Greaney. 
Therefore, UHS has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for disciplining 
Mendez and for terminating his employment. 
3. Pretext 
Given UHS' s showing, Mendez must raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning 
whether UHS' s articulated reasons for its adverse employment actions are pretextual to 
discrimination. Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1212. Mendez may demonstrate pretext by producing either 
direct or circumstantial evidence that UHS's adverse employment actions were "due in part or in 
whole to discriminatory intent." McGinest v. GTE Serv.Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 (9th Cir. 
2004). Although "very little" direct evidence is necessary, a plaintiff must present "specific" and 
"substantial" circumstantial evidence of pretext to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Godwin 
v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, Mendez can present no 
direct evidence of discriminatory motive and the only circumstantial evidence of pretext he 
offers in his deposition is the same evidence that, for the same flawed reasoning, fails even to 
make his prima facie case - that he is Hispanic and he also received adverse employment 
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actions. Moreover, "[T]he mere existence of a prima facie case, based on the minimum evidence 
necessary to raise a McDonnell Douglas presumption, [ would] not preclude summary judgment." 
Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890. Standing alone, the fact Mendez was Hispanic when he received the 
adverse employment actions does not suggest defendants' stated, nondiscriminatory reasons for 
disciplining him were mere pretext any more than the fact wearing a swimsuit often precedes 
drowning would constitute proof swimsuits cause drowning. Mendez does not dispute that his 
job performance was not what his employer required. Instead, he attempts to excuse this conduct 
by claiming he was "reported" by Doyle simply because of his race. There is no evidence in the 
record to substantiate this excuse, nor does it undercut UHS' s articulated reasons for disciplining 
and. ~ltimately discharging Mendez. Beyond his mere subjective, claimed, suspicions, Mendez 
can pre;ent no direct or real circumstantial evidence to suggest that his race was a motivating 
factor behind UHS's adverse employment actions. Moreover, Mendez "may not defeat [UHS]'s 
motion for summary judgment merely by denying the credibility of [UHS] 's proffered reason ... 
[or] ·by relying solely on [his] subjective belief that the challenged employment action was 
unnecessary or unwarranted." Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1029 n.6 
(9th Cir. 2006). After carefully considering the record, the Court should find no reasonable fact-
finder could conclude that UHS' s adverse employment actions were actually motivated in whole 
or in part by Mendez's Hispanic race. ;1 
C. Retaliation 
Mendez's other claim under the Act is that UHS retaliated against him for reporting his 
claimed suspicions of discrimination to Andy Cover in Human Resources. The McDonnell 
' . 
Douglas burden-shifting framework also applies to Mendez's retaliation claim. Yartzoff v. 
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Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987). However, to establish even a prima facie case for 
retaliation, Mendez must "show that [he] engaged in a protected activity, that [he] suffered a 
materially adverse action, and that there was a causal relationship between the two." 
Westendorf v. W. Coast Contactors of Nev., Inc., 712 F.3d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 
I 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)) (emphasis added). "An 
employee engages in protected activity when [he] opposes an employment practice that either 
violates The [Civil Rights] Act or that the employee reasonably believes violates the law." Id. 
Here, Mendez engaged in protected activity by reporting his discrimination concerns, 
substantiated or not, to Andy Cover on October 10, 2011. Additionally, it is undisputed that 
Mendez suffered a materially adverse action when UHS terminated his employment. Even so, 
Mendez must show that his protected conduct was a "but-for cause-but not necessarily the only 
cause-of [his] termination." Id. Under the "but-for" standard, Mendez must establish that the 
discipline or termination of his employment "would not have occurred in the absence of-that is, 
but for-[Mendez's claim of discrimination.]" Univ of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 
2517, 2534 (2013). Because plaintiffs entire tenure as an employee of UHS was a mere 12 
weeks, the entire universe of facts necessarily occurred within a fairly short period of time. But 
even if timing alone could establish Mendez's prima facie case of retaliation, UHS articulates 
several legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its disciplinary actions, as laid out above. 
Temporal proximity alone does not defeat summary judgment at the pretext stage of the analysis, 
Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp., LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir. 2013). Beyond his own 
"[ c ]onclusory, speculative testimony" that is "insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and 
defeat summary judgment," Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 
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2007), Mendez can present no real evidence of pretext to rebut UHS' s showing of legitimate, 
nondiscrimatory performance-related concerns as the reason for talcing the adverse actions it did. 
Thus, no genuine issue of material fact exists to preclude summary judgment on Mendez's 
retaliation claim. 
D. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Mendez's other claim under the Act is that UHS breached the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing implicit in his employment contract by retaliating against him for reporting unlawful 
discrimination. However, Mendez was, during the entire 12-week course of his employment with 
UHS, still well within the roughly six-month period of his initial probationary period. He was 
therefore a purely at-will employee. Under Idaho law, the covenant is implied into every 
employment contract, but it does not "create a duty for the employer to terminate [an at-will] 
employee only for good cause." Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 749 (Idaho 
1989) (quoting Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem 'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985)). 
Rather, a breach of the covenant occurs only through an action that "violates, nullifies or 
significantly impairs any benefit or right which either party has in the employment contract, 
whether express or implied .... " Id. Mendez's implied covenant claim fails for at least two 
reasons. First, he cannot establish a claim for unlawful retaliation. If, as the record demonstrates, 
UHS did not unlawfully retaliate against Mendez, there is no basis for arguing th~t UHS violated 
Mendez's contractual right, if any, to be free from retaliation while employed by UHS. Simply 
put, Mendez cannot save his retaliation claims by dressing it as a contract issue. Second, it is 
well-established that, "in the absence of an agreement between the employer and the employee 
limiting the employer's ( or the employee's) right to terminate the contract at will, either party to 
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the employment agreement may terminate the relationship at any time or for any reason without 
incurring liability." Id. at 746 (citing MacNeil v. Minidoka Mem 'l Hosp., 701 P.2d 208 (Idaho 
1985)). Mendez cannot argue, let alone present evidence, that he was anything but an at-will 
employee. As such, he cannot establish a breach of the implied covenant simply because he 
disagrees with UHS's reasons for terminating his employment. Therefore, Mendez's implied 
covenant claim fails as a matter oflaw. 
E. Breach of Express and Implied Contracts of Employment 
As noted above Mendez was, during the entire 12-week course of his employment with 
UHS, still well within the roughly six-month period of his initial probationary period. He was 
accordingly a purely at-will employee. He thus had no "contract," either express or implied for 
continued employment. Accordingly, those claims, too, fail as a matter oflaw. 
F. Attorney Fees For Inclusion of Defendant Doyle As An Individual 
Plaintiff's naming of Mariel Doyle as an individual was and remains unreasonable, as the 
Act does not allow for individual liability. Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921, 908 
P.2d 1228, rehearing denied (1995). As there, attorney fees should be awarded against Mendez 
for his naming of Mariel Doyle as a defendant individually. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Mendez can present no evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment under Celotex. 
Since he cannot adduce even the minimal evidence sufficient to support an inference of disparate 
treatment, it perforce follows that no rational factfinder could conclude that UHS' s reasons for 
disciplining and discharging Mendez were pretext for racial discrimination. Nor could a rational 
fact-finder conclude that he established a prima facie case of retaliation. In addition, Mendez's 
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implied covenant claim fails as a matter of law for the reasons stated above, as do his "contract" 
claims. Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted against all of Mendez's claims, and 
defendants should be awarded their attorney fees for his inclusion of Mariel Doyle as an 
individual defendant. 
DATED this 1st day of June, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, LLP 
By: 0 JLv~d 
David W. Cantrill, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 1, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 







[ ] Email: raulmendez2002@gmail.com 
C2.dUJ !JJgr:;1( 
David W. Cantrill 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a general 
non-profit corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. l:12-cv-00026-EJL-CWD 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
Plaintiff Raul Mendez brings this action against his former employer, Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC), alleging unlawful discrimination in the 
workplace. Mendez claims SARMC violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Idaho Human Rights Act, Idaho Code§ 67-5901, et seq., 
by subjecting him to discrimination and a hostile work environment on the basis of his 
race, national origin, and religion. Mendez is Hispanic and a member of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS). He also claims SARMC violated Title VII by 
disciplining him and ultimately terminating his employment in retaliation for his reports 
of discrimination. Additionally, Mendez claims SARMC breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing implicit in his employment contract. 
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SARMC filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 48), seeking summary 
dismissal of all of Mendez's claims. United States District Judge Lodge referred this case 
to the undersigned for all matters. (Dkt. 39.) SARMC's motion for summary judgment is 
fully briefed and the parties presented oral arguments on August 28, 2014. After carefully 
considering the parties' arguments and the record before it, the Court issues this Report, 




SARMC is a general non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State 
of Idaho and engaged in the business of providing medical services in the Treasure 
Valley and elsewhere in Idaho. SARMC has established policies governing the 
performance and conduct of its employees. Although SARMC reserves the right to 
terminate an individual's employment when it deems appropriate, the policy allows for a 
variety of corrective disciplinary actions. Depending on the circumstances, an employee 
subject to discipline may be offered performance counseling. The counseling process 
may include a verbal or written warning from the employee's supervisor; written 
performance counseling outlining the offense, expected changes, and consequences for 
The following facts are undisputed or, when disputed, taken in the light most favorable to 
Mendez, the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 587 (1986) (recognizing the district court's obligation to construe the record in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party on motion for summary judgment). 
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continuing the offense behavior; and final written counseling specifying a timeline for 
improvements and notifying the employee that failure to improve may result in 
immediate termination. Further, the performance and conduct policy lists conduct, such 
as "gross insubordination" or "refusal to accept a job assignment for which [ an employee 
is] properly trained," that may trigger performance counseling or result in discharge from 
employment. (Mendez Depo., Ex. 13, Dkt. 48-7 at 87.) 
It is SARMC's policy "to provide equal employment opportunity to all employees 
and applicants for employment." (Id. at 77.) SARMC's equal employment opportunity 
policy prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, religion, gender, national 
origin, disability, age, veteran or military status, or any other reason prohibited by law. 
The policy also directs any employee who believes he or she has been discriminated 
against to bring the matter to the attention of management or human resources personnel. 
In addition to its nondiscrimination policy, SARMC has created an Organizational 
Integrity Program (OIP). Through the OIP, SARMC encourages employees to report 
possible violations of law, regulations, policies, procedures, or SARMC's standards of 
employee conduct. Reports, which may include alleged discrimination, can be directed to 
an employee's supervisors, Human Resources representatives, a hotline, or to a SARMC 
Integrity Officer. Reports to the OIP are treated as confidential. Additionally, the OIP 
strictly prohibits retaliation or harassment against employees who make good faith 
reports. However, SARMC's OIP policy makes clear that non-retaliation "does not mean 
that employees or others will be shielded ... from the consequences of their actions 
under current employment policies." (Mendez Depo., Ex. 14, Dkt. 48-8 at 1-2.) 
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B. Mendez's Employment History with SARMC 
In 2007, SARMC hired Mendez as a radiology technician at a clinic in Nampa, 
Idaho (the Iowa Clinic). He initially worked part-time but moved to a full-time position at 
the Iowa Clinic on March 15, 2009. In exchange for a full-time schedule, Mendez agreed 
to perform non-radiology assignments, including DXA scans, medical record scanning, 
and backup support in the clinic laboratory. Mendez performed these duties under the 
supervision of the Lead Nurse, Rachel Croft, and Clinic Manager, Connie Miller. 
In late 2009, Mendez started refusing to perform assigned duties and complaining 
to coworkers about his supervisors and the work environment at the Iowa Clinic. For 
example, in a November 29, 2009 email to Judi Vejar, the SARMC Human Resources 
Representative responsible for the Iowa Clinic, Mendez pointed out a variety of staffing 
problems at the Clinic. Because of these problems, Mendez stated that he "refuse[ d] to 
work in the lab as phlebotomist until issues with organization and teamwork have been 
sorted out." (Mendez Depo., Ex. 26, Dkt. 48-8 at 33.) In an April 16, 2010 email to a 
coworker, Mendez complained of"backstabbing and bullshit at this facility." (Mendez 
Depo., Ex. 8, Dkt. 48-7 at 65.) And, in an October 6, 2010 email to a radiology 
technician at another SARMC clinic, Mendez opined that Croft "has no leadership 
qualities, and quite simply she is not a good RN." (Mendez Depo., Ex. 24, Dkt. 48-8 at 
27.) 
Also in late 2009, Mendez claims he told Vejar that Miller made offensive 
comments about his Hispanic race and, more generally, about members of the LDS 
Church. For example, Mendez told Vejar that Miller said: "They must not take showers 
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where [Mendez is] from." (Mendez Depo. 43:3-23, Dkt 48-7 at 13.) Mendez also alleges 
Miller at one time chided him for "not eating enough tacos at home," but it is not clear 
whether he reported this comment to Vejar. (Id. at 42:12-20.) In addition, Mendez told 
Vejar that Miller expressed her dislike for members of the LDS Church, stating they 
belong to "a cult" and have "their own God."(Jd. at 68:9-69:12.) 
Starting in February of 2010, Mendez's coworkers began complaining to Miller 
about Mendez's negative attitude and behavior in the workplace. For example, one of 
Mendez's coworkers told Miller in a February 5, 2010 email that Mendez was "rude and 
disrespectful" when he accused her of a scheduling error in front of clinic staff and 
patients. (Mendez Depo., Ex. 9, Dkt. 48-7 at 66.) Leonna McDowell, whom Mendez 
assisted in the laboratory, emailed Miller on the afternoon of May 7, 2010, stating "[t]his 
negativity with Raul [Mendez] has been going on for about a year now." (Mendez Depo., 
Ex. 7, Dkt. 48-7 at 64.) She claimed that Mendez made negative comments about the 
Iowa Clinic work environment, encouraged her to look for a new job, and referred to 
Miller as a "bitch." (Id.) McDowell also reported that Mendez propped open a laboratory 
door after Miller instructed him not to do so. Mendez denies propping the door open and 
making the statements reported by McDowell. 
Miller gave Mendez a verbal warning about his behavior on the morning of May 
7, 2010.2 Their discussion touched on at least three topics. First, Miller asked Mendez to 
2 Mendez now denies this meeting occurred (Dkt. 72 at 4), but he previously 
acknowledged it occurred in his December 13, 2013 deposition testimony. (Mendez Depo., 52:7-
9, Dkt. 48-7 at 15.) Given Mendez's earlier sworn testimony about the May 7 meeting, his later 
denial does not create a genuine issue of fact. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 
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refrain from making negative, hurtful, or otherwise inappropriate comments to his 
coworkers. Second, she expressed her expectation that Mendez address his work 
concerns through his chain of command-that is, through Croft, Miller, or Human 
Resources. Third, based on a complaint from one of the doctors at the Iowa Clinic, Miller 
requested that Mendez endeavor to complete imaging and scans more quickly. 
On the afternoon of May 7, 2010-following the warning from Miller-Mendez 
emailed a complaint to SARMC's OIP Local Integrity Officer. The complaint alleges 
Miller told staff"X-ray smells so bad and Raul doesn't take showers." (Mendez Depo., 
Ex. 11, Dkt. 48-7 at 70.) It goes on to state that Mendez and coworkers heard Miller 
make derogatory remarks about the LDS Church and its members. For example, Mendez 
alleged that Miller "hoped to someday get rid of 'those two Mormons' that work on the 
side where the lab is located."3 (Id.) Based on these allegations, Mendez's OIP complaint 
claims Miller "created a hostile work environment" and treated LDS staff unfairly 
because of their religion. (Id.) 
Following Mendez's OIP complaint, SARMC launched a confidential 
investigation of the allegations against Miller during May of 2010. The investigator 
interviewed Mendez, but Mendez did not otherwise discuss with anyone the investigation 
or his complaint against Miller. As a result of concerns raised by Mendez and others, 
U.S. 795, 797 (1999) ("[A] party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive 
summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement"). 
3 The identity of"those two Mormons" is not apparent from Mendez's May 7 email to the 
OIP. During his deposition, however, Mendez clarified that Miller was referring to two other 
Iowa Clinic employees, not to Mendez. (Mendez Depo. 68:3-5, Dkt. 48-7 at 19.) 
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Miller resigned in lieu of discharge on June 1, 2010. (Wedman Dec. 13, Dkt. 48-3 at 2.) 
Brenda McCord took over as interim Clinic Manager immediately after Miller's 
resignation. And, in August of 2010, Shane Allen, a Human Resources generalist for 
SARMC, transferred into the Iowa Clinic Manager's position. 
Before she resigned, Miller provided Mendez with a written summary of their 
May 7 meeting on May 18, 2010. While the summary was intended to "provide objective 
feedback," it also serves as a disciplinary warning in that Miller explains her expectations 
for Mendez's future conduct. (Mendez Depo., Ex. 10, Dkt. 48-7 at 68.) In addition to the 
three topics discussed above, the summary sets forth Miller's concerns about Mendez 
leaving the clinic to get film and propping the laboratory door open. The summary also 
includes a handwritten notation that Mendez "denies the accusations" but "agreed to 
communicate with [Croft] and also to let [Miller] know before going to others if [Miller 
is] doing something he feels uncomfortable with." (Id.) 
On May 25, 2010, Croft issued a formal written Disciplinary Action Record, citing 
Mendez for insubordination and retaliation. This Record indicates Mendez had disobeyed 
his managers' orders not to retaliate against McDowell, who, also on May 7, had 
complained to Miller about Mendez. Specifically, Mendez made McDowell feel 
uncomfortable for reporting her concerns to management by calling her at home and 
refusing to assist her in the laboratory. The Record also instructs Mendez to contact Chief 
Operating Officer Patti Brahe ifhe believed he had been unfairly disciplined. And it 
warns Mendez: "Any further violation of departmental or medical center policies or 
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procedures will result in immediate termination of your employment." (Mendez Depo. 
Ex. 15, Dkt. 48-8 at 5.) 
After Miller's June 1 resignation, Croft, with input from the interim Clinic 
Manager McCord, completed an annual written performance evaluation of Mendez on 
June 17, 2010. The evaluation notes that Mendez rarely makes errors in the radiology 
department but needs to improve his efficiency and time management skills. With regard 
to Mendez's performance outside the radiology department, the evaluation states Mendez 
is "not proactive" and recently resisted performing other assigned duties, "making it 
difficult to depend on him." (Mendez Depo. Ex. 17, Dkt. 48-8 at 6-7.) The evaluation 
advises Mendez to improve his communication and teamwork with his coworkers. In 
particular, the evaluation states Mendez should discuss concerns with his manager rather 
than using other staff members as a "sounding board." (Id. at 8.) 
On June 23, 2010, Mendez emailed Brahe, SARMC's Chief Operating Officer, 
requesting that the May 18 written warning, May 25 Disciplinary Action Record, and 
certain comments in the June 17 performance evaluation be "cleared" from his 
employment record. (Mendez Depo., Ex. 18, Dkt. 48-8 at 14.) In the email, Mendez 
opines that "staff at [SARMC] Iowa are treated differently and there does seem to be 
different rules for different people and this in tum lowers employee morale." (Id. at 16.) 
Mendez also acknowledges in the email that he repeatedly refused to perform additional 
lab duties "because ... there is a lack of teamwork and proper organization at this clinic." 
(Id. at 18.) On July 20, 2010, Mendez and Brahe met to discuss his concerns. 
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Brahe summarized their July 20 meeting in a letter to Mendez dated July 26, 2010. 
Although Brahe refused to remove any documentation or redact any information from 
Mendez's employment record, she counseled Mendez on how he could improve his 
employment record going forward. Brahe indicated that "a positive attitude, teamwork, 
and satisfactory performance as a radiology tech that provides other duties as assigned, 
will make the recent performance appraisal and discipline less of an issue." (Mendez 
Depo., Ex. 19, Dkt. 48-8 at 20.) 
Between late July and early October of 2010, SARMC experienced several issues 
regarding Mendez's conduct and performance. On July 27, Croft verbally counseled 
Mendez about his continued unwillingness to assist with duties outside of the radiology 
department, his poor communication with supervisors, and the fact that he stayed at the 
clinic after clocking out. On August 6, McDowell reported to Croft that Mendez recently 
had made several inappropriate remarks, including chiding another coworker about that 
coworker's religion. On September 15, Allen verbally counseled Mendez on time 
management because Mendez was taking more than double the time ordinarily required 
to process DXA scans. 
Mendez also refused to perform autoclaving-essentially, the sterilization of 
medical equipment-during this period. On July 22, 2010, two days after Mendez met 
with Brahe, Croft asked Mendez to complete a skills competency checklist. According to 
Croft, the purposes of the checklist were to identify Mendez's additional duties outside 
the radiology department and determine whether he was comfortable with those duties. 
Mendez was generally comfortable with the listed duties or indicated he could become 
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comfortable with additional training. However, the reasons Mendez gave for refusing to 
perform autoclaving were that he not trained on the procedure and he believed the task 
was more appropriate for a nurse or medical assistant. Although his managers determined 
in early October of2010 that autoclaving would not be one of Mendez's assigned duties, 
on July 22, Croft specifically instructed Mendez not to ask other SARMC radiology 
technicians whether they were required to perform autoclaving. 
But, on October 5, Mendez sent emails inquiring about autoclaving to two 
radiology technicians at other SARMC clinics. One responded that she did not perform 
autoclaving, and the other responded that he sometimes performed autoclaving and 
advised Mendez to be more flexible with respect to his job duties. Then, on October 6 
and 7, Mendez during working hours sent several replies to the same two technicians. 
Among other things, Mendez stated "I guess that I'll end up getting fired since I have no 
intention of doing autoclaving." (Mendez Depo. Ex. 24, Dkt. 48-8 at 28.) And, in an 
October 6 email to one of the technicians, Mendez disparaged Croft's leadership qualities 
and opined the technician "work[ s] in a much better environment with management that 
actually knows what they are doing." (Id.) 
After Mendez's October email exchanges with the technicians came to the 
attention of Mendez's supervisors, Clinic Manager Allen dec.ided to terminate Mendez's 
employment with SARMC. On October 15, 2010, Allen terminated Mendez's 
employment "because of his unsatisfactory work performance, including: (1) his 
continued negative comments about co-workers despite multiple written warnings; (2) his 
continued violation of other express instructions from management; (3) his refusal to 
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perform assigned work and refusal to assist coworkers; and (4) general performance 
issues, including wasting time on email and taking too long to perform his work." (Allen 
Dec. ,r 17, Dkt. 48-4 at 4-5.) 
2. Procedural History 
Following termination of his employment with SARMC, Mendez filed a charge of 
discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission. Both Commissions issued Notice of Right to Sue letters to 
Mendez, after which Mendez filed this lawsuit in January of 2012. 
The Court allowed Mendez's original attorneys to withdraw from the case in 
January of 2013. Among other issues, counsel cited strained and difficult communication 
with Mendez and Mendez's refusal to cooperate in the discovery process. Following a 
protracted process during which Mendez disputed the propriety of counsel's withdrawal 
and later stated his intention to proceed prose, new counsel appeared on Mendez's behalf 
in early June of 2013. Discovery proceeded through the end of 2013, and SARMC filed 
the instant motion for summary judgment on January 15, 2014. 
About one week later, Mendez filed a motion to compel disclosure of records 
related the OIP investigation of his May 7, 2010 complaint about Miller. The Court 
deferred consideration of SARMC's motion for summary judgment pending resolution of 
the motion to compel. Then, in early February of 2014, Mendez's second attorney of 
record sought to withdraw, which the Court allowed. Thereafter, Mendez appeared pro 
se. Finding the OIP investigation file protected from disclosure by the attorney-client 
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privilege and the work product doctrine the Court, on July 10, 2014, denied Mendez's 
motion to compel and reopened briefing on SARMC's motion for summary judgment. 
On July 28, 2014, Mendez filed an unsworn and unnotarized Affidavit in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment along with various exhibits 
(Dkt. 72). SARMC filed a reply brief and numerous objections to Mendez's opposition 
filings on August 13. Two days later, Mendez filed an objection to SARMC's reply, 
arguing it was untimely. On August 28, 2014, the Court heard oral argument on 
SARMC's motion for summary judgment, and this matter is now ripe for resolution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
One of the key purposes of summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of 
factually unsupported claims .... " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 
(1986). It is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[] by 
which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from 
going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private 
resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the 
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; 
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). 
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
id. at 255, and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. Direct testimony of the 
non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 
1159 (9th Cir. 1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable 
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inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th 
Cir. 1988). 
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(en bane). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative 
evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence 
of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato 
Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2000). This shifts the burden to the nonmoving 
party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in his favor. Id. at 256-57. 
The nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and show "by [his] affidavits, or by 
the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file" that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 
However, the Court is "not required to comb through the record to find some 
reason to deny a motion for summary judgment." Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. 
Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 
840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988)). Instead, the "party opposing summary judgment 
must direct [the Court's] attention to specific triable facts." S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of 
Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003). 
ANALYSIS 
SARMC's motion for summary judgment seeks dismissal of Mendez's federal and 
state employment discrimination claims, as well as his state contract claim. The Court 
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will first address the parties' objections to each other's filings before delving into the 
merits of this dispute. 
1. The Parties' Objections to the Summary Judgment Filings 
A. Mendez's Objection to SARMC's Reply 
Mendez objects to SARMC's reply brief on the ground that it is untimely under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it appears he has overlooked Rule 6(d). 
"When a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is 
made Rule 5(b )(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F), 3 days are added after the period would otherwise 
expire under Rule 6(a)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). Rule 5(b)(2)(C) allows service by mail to a 
person's last known address, and Rule 5(b )(2)(E) authorizes service by electronic means 
such as the Court's CM/ECF system. In addition, District of Idaho Local Civil Rule 
7 .1 (b )(3) allows 14 days for filing of a reply brief after service of the nonmoving party's 
response. Read together, these rules provide the moving party 17 days to file a reply 
when the nonmoving party serves his response by mail or through the CM/ECF system. 
Mendez served his opposition materials on SARMC's counsel electronica~ly and 
by mail on July 28, 2014. SARMC's reply was due August 14, was filed on August 13, 
and is timely. 
B. SARMC's Objections to Mendez's Opposition Filings 
In a nine-page appendix to its reply brief, SARMC raises three general objections 
to Mendez's response to its motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 74-1.) First, SARMC 
contends the Court should not consider any of Mendez's opposition filings because they 
do not comport with Local Rule 7.l(c)(2). Second, SARMC argues Mendez's "affidavit" 
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should be stricken from the record because it is neither sworn nor signed under penalty of 
perjury. Third, SARMC claims certain statements in Mendez's affidavit are inadmissible 
under the rules of evidence. 
Pro se litigants are "subject to the same rules of procedure and evidence as 
defendants who are represented by counsel." United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458,465 
(9th Cir. 1984). In this regard, it bears mentioning that SARMC presents its objections in 
a nine-page appendix, which is almost double the length allowed for such filings under 
Local Rule 7.l(d)(l). Mendez is not the only party to overlook applicable procedural 
rules. 
With respect to SARMC's first objection, it is true that Local Rule 7.l(c)(2) 
requires "the responding party [to] also file a separate statement, not to exceed ten (10) 
pages, of all material facts which the responding party contends are in dispute." The 
Court gave Mendez notice of this and the other applicable requirements the same day it 
allowed briefing on the motion for summary judgment to continue. (Dkt. 71.) Rather than 
follow these instructions, Mendez filed a single "affidavit" with no separate statement of 
disputed facts. Of course, Mendez's technical violation of a local rule is not sufficient to 
grant summary judgment in favor of SARMC. See Marshall v. Gates, 44 F.3d 722 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
But, as SARMC notes in its second objection, Mendez's "affidavit" is not in the 
proper form. "An affidavit is a sworn declaration, normally attested to before a notary 
public, stating certain facts under oath." Correa-Rivera v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1128, 1131 
(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed. 2004)). It is the oath that 
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distinguishes an affidavit from a mere assertion of fact. Mendez's "affidavit" is not 
notarized and does not purport to be made under oath. Nor does Mendez's "affidavit" 
qualify as a declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746, because it is not signed under penalty of 
perjury. Thus, the Court cannot treat Mendez's filing as an affidavit or declaration. 
Instead, the Court will liberally construe the filing as Mendez's brief-that is, argument 
rather than evidence-in opposition to summary judgment. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (directing courts to liberally construe prose filings). 
The Court also will consider the exhibits Mendez attached to his opposition. In 
determining admissibility for summary judgment purposes, it is the contents of the 
evidence rather than its form that must be considered. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 
1036-37 (9th Cir. 2003). If the contents of the evidence could be presented in an 
admissible form at trial, those contents may be considered on summary judgment even if 
the evidence itself is hearsay. Id. ( affirming consideration of hearsay contents of 
plaintiffs diary on summary judgment because, at trial, plaintiffs testimony of contents 
would not be hearsay). The Court finds the exhibits to Mendez's opposition-consisting 
of letters, email chains, deposition excerpts, and documents-are either admissible or 
their contents could be presented in an admissible form that may be considered at the 
summary judgment stage. 
When Mendez's opposition filings are viewed in this manner, the Court finds that 
SARMC's over-long list of evidentiary objections needs not be resolved-with one 
exception the Court addresses below in the context of Mendez's retaliation claim. See 
infra Part 2.C, n.13 and accompanying text. Counsel for SARMC acknowledged as much 
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during oral argument. Nevertheless, statements in Mendez's "affidavit" that contradict his 
sworn deposition testimony will not be viewed as creating a genuine issue of material 
fact.4 See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 797 (1999). And, to the 
extent Mendez's factual arguments are not specifically tied to evidence in the record, the 
Court will disregard them because it is Mendez's affirmative obligation to identify 
evidence that would preclude summary judgment. Carmen, 23 7 F .3d at 1031 ("The 
district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of 
fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references 
so that it could conveniently be found."). 
2. Title VII Claims 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides remedies to employees injured 
by the discriminatory conduct of employers. Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an 
employer to discriminate against an employee "because of' the employee's "race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This prohibition covers 
discriminatory discharge decisions, as well as decisions related to "compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment." Id. Title VII also prohibits an employer from 
retaliating against an employee because the employee "opposed" unlawful employment 
discrimination or "made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
4 For example, Mendez claims the May 7 disciplinary meeting with Miller did not occur, 
(Dkt. 72 at 4), and that "Croft would laugh about [discriminatory comments made by Miller] or 
make similar remarks." (Id.) Both of these assertions are contradicted by Mendez's deposition 
testimony. (Mendez Depo. 55:7-56:1 (discussing content of May 7 meeting with Miller); 146:24-
14 7: 1 ( denying that Croft made comments about Mendez's race or national origin), Dkt. 48-7 at 
16; 39.) 
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investigation, proceeding, or hearing" under Title VII. Id. § 2000e-3(a). In addition, the 
Supreme Court has held that "[ w ]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory 
intimidation, ridicule, and insult ... that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
' 
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, ... 
Title VII is violated." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Mendez claims SARMC violated Title VII in three ways. First, he alleges that 
SARMC intentionally treated him differently than other employees due to his affiliation 
with the LDS Church or his Hispanic race. 5 Second, Mendez claims Miller and Croft's 
conduct toward him was racially or religiously based harassment that created a hostile 
work environment. Third, Mendez argues SARMC unlawfully retaliated against him after 
he reported Miller's discriminatory conduct to the OIP. The Court addresses each claim 
below. 6 
5 Mendez also claims discrimination based on his "Hispanic national origin." (Am. Compl. 
,r 44, Dkt. 5.) However, "Hispanic" does not refer to a particular country. The Ninth Circuit has 
observed that "a claim that [the plaintiff] was discriminated against because he was Hispanic is 
actually a race based claim." Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,642 n.20 (9th Cir. 
2003). Apart from the evidence related to Mendez's race discrimination claim, there is no 
evidence of national origin discrimination. In fact, the parties' briefing does not even reference 
the nation from which Mendez originates. Accordingly, the Court finds Mendez's race 
discrimination claim subsumes his national origin claim. 
6 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the same standards of proof applicable to Title 
VII actions apply to actions under the Idaho Human Rights Act. Bowles v. Keating, 606 P .2d 
458,462 (Idaho 1979); see also Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599,603 (9th Cir. 
2004) ("[O]ur analysis of Peterson's religious discrimination claims under the Idaho Human 
Rights Act is the same as under Title VIL"). The Court does not separately analyze Mendez's 
Idaho Human Rights Act claims, as those claims turn on the same facts and law as Mendez's 
Title VII claims. 
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A. Disparate Treatment on the Basis of Race or Religion 
To prove discrimination on the basis of race or religion, Mendez must introduce 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude, in light of common experience, 
that it was more likely than not that SARMC's adverse action was motivated by 
consideration of his race or religion. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802-05 (1973) (explaining plaintiffs burden under Title VII is to demonstrate that 
defendant's proffered explanation for an adverse action is more likely than not a pretext 
for discrimination); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) 
("The factual inquiry in a Title VII case is whether the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff.") (quotations omitted). When evaluating 
discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage, the courts employ the familiar 
burden-shifting analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas. See Pottenger v. Potlatch 
Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Under McDonnell Douglas, an employee alleging disparate treatment must first 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802. If Mendez establishes a 
prima facie case, "the burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the 
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged 
actions." Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 
2000). If the employer meets this burden, the burden of production shifts back to the 
employee to show the employer's reason is pretextual "either directly by persuading the 
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by 
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Tex. Dep 't 
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of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,256 (1981). Throughout the burden-shifting 
process, the employee has the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 
(9th Cir. 1981) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). 
In other words, "[t]o survive summary judgment on his disparate treatment claim, 
[Mendez] must establish that his job performance was satisfactory and provide evidence, 
either direct or circumstantial, to support a reasonable inference that his termination [ or 
discipline] was discriminatory." Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
i. Prima Facie Case 
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Mendez must show that "(1) 
he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he 
experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside 
his protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the 
adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination." Id. There is no 
dispute that the first two elements are satisfied in this case. 
As for the third element, SARMC does not dispute that both Croft and Allen were 
responsible for adverse employment actions against Mendez. Croft issued Mendez a 
formal Disciplinary Action Record on May 25, 2010, and Allen decided to terminate 
Mendez's employment in October of 2010. However, SARMC's briefing does not 
address whether Miller was also responsible for adverse employment actions when she 
gave Mendez a verbal warning on May 7, 20 I 0, and then, on May 18, provided Mendez a 
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written summary of that warning. During oral argument, counsel for SARMC claimed 
Miller's warnings were not adverse employment actions because they were informal and 
did not change the conditions of Mendez's employment. This argument is inconsistent 
with Ninth Circuit law. 
The Ninth Circuit takes an expansive view of the term "adverse employment 
action." Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004). 
The term includes transfers of job duties, negative performance reviews, actions that 
affect an employee's compensation, and warning letters. Id. (citing Yartzojfv. Thomas, 
809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, the Court finds that Miller's May 7 
verbal warning and her May 18 written warning-both of which focused on the need for 
Mendez to improve his job performance, obey managers' instructions, and avoid negative 
or inappropriate communication with coworkers-constitute adverse employment 
actions. And, as detailed below, the Court finds these two warnings cannot be separated 
from the ultimate adverse action taken against Mendez-termination of his 
employment-although different decision-makers were involved along the way. 
With regard to the fourth element, the Court is mindful that the amount of proof 
necessary to establish a prima facie case "is minimal and does not even need to rise to the 
level of a preponderance of the evidence." Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 
(9th Cir. 1994). While Mendez provides no evidentiary basis for comparing his treatment 
to that of similarly situated non-LDS or non-Hispanic SARMC employees, he does point 
to circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. At the summary judgment 
stage, the Court must accept as true Mendez's account that Miller made discriminatory 
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comments aimed at Mendez's Hispanic race and at the LDS Church and its members.7 
Although the Court finds these alleged statements are legally insufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of fact on Mendez's hostile work environment claim, as discussed below, 
they do support the inference that Miller harbored some hostility towards Mendez 
because of his race and religion. 
Moreover, Miller disciplined Mendez by issuing verbal and written warnings 
about his behavior at work. Her warnings are the beginning of a string of disciplinary 
actions that ended on October 15, 2010, when Allen decided to terminate Mendez's 
employment. In fact, Miller warned Mendez on May 7 and again on May 18 about three 
behaviors similar to those that prompted Allen's termination decision five months later.8 
Likewise, Croft's disciplinary actions-including the May 25 Disciplinary Action Record 
and the partially negative performance evaluation completed on June 17-reference 
Miller's warnings and thus effectively continue the disciplinary process initiated by 
Miller. In other words, Miller's warnings set the stage for all of SARMC's later 
7 It is not clear whether Miller knew or had reason to believe that Mendez was a member 
of the LOS Church. SARMC emphasizes that Croft and Allen did not know Mendez's religion 
and that Mendez never personally revealed his religion to Miller. However, Mendez disclosed 
his religious affiliation to an LOS coworker, Beverly Tremaine. (Mendez Depo. 73:11-13, Dkt. 
48-7 at 20.) Thus, one could reasonably infer Miller learned of Mendez's religion through 
Tremaine or others, or harbored a belief that he was LOS. Because Mendez is the nonmoving 
party, the Court will draw this inference in his favor. 
8 In May of 2010, Miller warned Mendez verbally and in writing to (1) refrain from 
making negative comments about coworkers, (2) accept directions in a cooperative manner, and 
(3) speed up his processing ofx-rays and DXA scans. (Mendez Depo., Ex. 10, Dkt. 48-7 at 67.) 
Among the reasons for Allen's decision to terminate Mendez's employment were Mendez's (1) 
"continued negative comments about coworkers," (2) "continued violation of ... express 
instructions from management," and (3) "taking too long to perform his work." (Allen Dec. 117, 
Dkt. 48-4 at 4-5.) 
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disciplinary actions against Mendez. Although there is minimal evidence of Miller's 
motivation for issuing the warnings, a rational trier of fact could conclude, based on 
Miller's discriminatory remarks, that racial or religious animus infected her decision to 
discipline Mendez. This inference is sufficient to establish Mendez's prima facie case for 
disparate treatment on the basis of race and religion under the standards applicable to 
Rule 56 motions. 
ii. Legitimacy of SARMC's Explanation 
But Mendez's prima facie showing does not end the Court's inquiry. Moving to 
the next stage of the analysis, the burden shifts to SARMC to produce evidence of a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Rose v. Wells 
Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d. 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990). To suffice under McDonnell 
Douglas, SARMC's evidence must explain why Mendez "in particular" was subject to 
adverse employment action. Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1211(9th 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1094 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
Performance-related concerns are sufficient to rebut the presumption of discriminatory 
intent, Pottenger, 329 F.3d at 746, as is evidence that an employee disobeyed a direct 
order from a supervisor. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,641 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
SARMC articulates several legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for disciplining 
Mendez, all of which have support in the record. It is undisputed that Mendez made 
negative comments to coworkers about other coworkers and managers. It is also 
undisputed that he attempted to address perceived workplace problems outside his chain 
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of command-in direct violation of managers' specific instructions. On July 22, 2010, for 
instance, Croft warned Mendez not to contact other radiology technicians to determine 
whether they were required to perform autoclaving, an assigned task that Mendez refused 
to perform. Mendez did not comply. 
Rather, in early October of 2010, he not only emailed two other radiology 
technicians about autoclaving, but he also used one of them as a sounding board for 
complaints about Croft's leadership. By doing so, Mendez disobeyed at least four express 
instructions from management: (1) Miller's May 7 warning to avoid negative 
communications with coworkers; (2) Miller's May 18 instruction to address concerns 
through the chain of command; (3) the note in Mendez's June 17 performance evaluation 
to not use other staff as a sounding board; and ( 4) Croft's July 22 warning. 9 Even if racial 
or religious animus tainted Miller's disciplinary decisions, Mendez's clear 
insubordination after Miller's June 1 resignation establishes a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for SARMC's adverse disciplinary action. 
SARMC also offers performance-related reasons for its decision to terminate 
Mendez's employment. Miller, Croft, and Allen all noted that Mendez worked at a 
slower-than-expected pace while producing x-rays or DXA scans. Mendez admits "there 
would be some minor delays when a single person is covering multiple jobs at the same 
time." (Dkt. 72 at 5.) But he argues that other Iowa Clinic staff caused the delays by 
ordering x-rays while Mendez was working in another area. Although Mendez presents 
9 This conduct was also contrary to the written counseling Mendez received from Chief 
Operating Officer Brahe on July 26. (See Mendez Depo., Ex. 19, Dkt. 48-8 at 20.) 
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evidence that other Iowa Clinic staff did not always follow scheduling protocols 
meticulously, that does not disprove his supervisors' concerns about his slow pace. And, 
even if Mendez's evidence creates a genuine dispute as to whether his job performance 
was satisfactory, there is no genuine dispute with respect to his insubordination and 
negative communications with coworkers. Therefore, SARMC has articulated legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for disciplining Mendez and for terminating his employment. 
iii. Pretext 
Given SARMC's showing, Mendez must raise a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning whether SARMC's articulated reasons for its adverse employment actions are 
pretextual to discrimination. Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1212. Mendez may demonstrate pretext by 
producing either direct or circumstantial evidence that SARMC's adverse employment 
actions were "due in part or in whole to discriminatory intent." McGinest v. GTE Serv. 
Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004). Although ''very little" direct evidence is 
necessary, a plaintiff must present "specific" and "substantial" circumstantial evidence of 
pretext to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 
1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Here, Mendez presents no direct evidence of discriminatory motive and his only 
circumstantial evidence of pretext is the same evidence that supports his prima facie 
case-Miller's comments about members of the LDS Church and her specific comments 
about Mendez's odor and diet. "[T]he mere existence of a prima facie case, based on the 
minimum evidence necessary to raise a McDonnell Douglas presumption, does not 
preclude summary judgment." Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890. Standing alone, Miller's 
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comments do not suggest her stated, nondiscriminatory reasons for disciplining Mendez 
were mere pretext. And Miller's comments do not rebut Croft's and Allen's stated 
reasons for their disciplinary actions, several of which mirrored Miller's concerns. 
Mendez does not dispute that he made negative comments to coworkers about 
· other coworkers and managers, refused to perform duties in the laboratory, and disobeyed 
orders from his supervisors. Instead, he attempts to excuse this conduct by claiming he 
was "reported" by McDowell because of unspecified "ulterior motives" or that he was 
too busy to assist in the laboratory. There is no evidence in the record to substantiate 
these excuses, nor do they undercut SARMC's articulated reasons for disciplining and 
ultimately discharging Mendez. Mendez presents no other direct or circumstantial 
evidence to suggest that his race or religion was a motivating factor behind SARMC's 
adverse employment actions. 
Mendez also argues that, because SARMC noted no performance-related issues in 
his personnel file before May of 2010, its disciplinary actions against him must be pretext 
for discrimination. However, Mendez "may not defeat [SARMC]' s motion for summary 
judgment merely denying the credibility of [SARMC] 's proffered reason ... [or] by 
relying solely on [his] subjective belief that the challenged employment action was 
unnecessary or unwarranted." Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 
1029 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). While the written record discloses no job performance concerns 
prior to Miller's May 7 warning, it does show that Mendez began refusing to perform 
assigned duties as early as November of2009-when Mendez emailed Vejar, refusing to 
perform duties in the lab "until issues with organization and teamwork have been sorted 
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out." (Mendez Depo., Ex. 26, Dkt. 48-8 at 33.) And, critically, there is no dispute that 
Mendez disobeyed his superyisors' explicit instructions after Croft warned him on May 
25, 2010, that continued insubordination would result in immediate termination. After 
carefully considering the record, the Court finds no reasonable fact-finder could conclude 
that SARMC's adverse employment actions were actually motivated in whole or in part 
by Mendez's Hispanic race or his LDS religion. 
B. Hostile Work Environment 
Mendez also claims SARMC subjected him to racially or religiously based · 
harassment that created a hostile work environment. To prevail on his hostile work 
environment claim, Mendez must show: "(l) that he was subjected to verbal or physical 
conduct of a racial or [religious] nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that 
the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiffs 
employment and create an abusive work environment." Vasquez v. County of Los 
Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,642 (9th Cir. 2003). In particular, Mendez must prove that the 
environment at the Iowa Clinic was "both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that 
a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did 
perceive to be so." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). There is 
no dispute that Mendez found certain comments made by Miller unwelcome and 
subjectively offensive. The issue is whether the conduct was so severe or pervasive that a 
fact-finder could reasonably conclude Mendez was subjected to an abusive work 
environment. 
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To determine whether Mendez's work environment satisfies this objective test, the 
Court must examine "all the circumstances" of his environment at the Iowa Clinic. Harris 
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). Among the key factors are "the frequency of 
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee's work performance." Id. However, "simple teasing, offhand comments, and 
isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)" do not amount to a hostile work 
environment because Title VII is not intended to be a "general civility code." Faragher, 
524 U.S. at 788. Instead, the complained-of conduct "must be extreme to amount to a 
change in the terms and conditions of employment." Id. ( emphasis added). 
The only indicia of offensive conduct at the Iowa Clinic are Mendez's reports that 
the former Clinic Manager, Miller, made racially and religiously offensive remarks about 
Mendez or others. As for Mendez's allegation that Croft also made racially 
discriminatory comments, there is no evidence to support this claim. To the contrary, 
Croft flatly denied the allegation during her deposition. (Croft Depo. 158:2-19, Dkt. 48-9 
at 14.) Mendez presents no specific evidence that any SARMC employee besides Miller 
made racially or religiously offensive comments to him or others. 
While the Court accepts at this stage Mendez's contention that Miller made such 
offensive comments multiple times, Mendez provides no context that would allow the 
Court to determine when, where, to whom, or how often Miller made such remarks. It is, 
however, clear that the offensive comments ended by May 7, 2010, as Mendez conceded 
during oral argument. And it is undisputed that Mendez did not note any offensive 
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comments during the five months between May 7 and SARMC's termination of his 
employment in October of 2010. 
The Ninth Circuit has rejected hostile work environment claims in cases involving 
conduct more egregious than any alleged here. In Vasquez, for instance, the court found 
no hostile work environment where a Hispanic probation officer's supervisor stated the 
officer has "a typical Hispanic macho attitude" and told the officer to consider a field job 
because "Hispanics do good in the field." 349 F.3d at 643. Like Mendez, Vasquez 
claimed his supervisor continually harassed him, but, because he presented evidence of 
only a few isolated incidents over the course of more than one year, the court found the 
conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. Similarly, in Sanchez v. City of Santa 
Ana, the court determined that no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff Latino police 
officers experienced a hostile work environment despite allegations that the employer 
selectively enforced rules against Latinos, made racially offensive slurs, posted a racially 
offensive cartoon, characterized minority officers as "super-sensitive," assigned unsafe 
vehicle to Latino officers, and refused to send adequate police back-up for Latino 
officers. 936 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1990). By contrast, the court found an objectively 
hostile work environment where an employee experienced an "unrelenting barrage of 
verbal abuse" at least weekly and often several times a day. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. 
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Moreover, the complete cessation of offensive comments after Miller resigned 
undercuts Mendez's hostile work environment claim. See Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
10 F.3d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Of course, once Richardson was gone, any behavior 
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that might arguably have rendered Saxton's work environment intolerable was 
terminated."); Trujillo v. City of San Leandro, 2010 WL 3063164, *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 
2010) (concluding plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case of harassment because of the 
"short duration of the conduct" and "the fact that Defendant ceased using the name upon 
being informed that Plaintiff objected to it"). Far from establishing a persistent barrage of 
verbal abuse, or even a single instance of severe offensive conduct, the record contains a 
handful of isolated, racially and religiously offensive remarks made by a supervisor who 
resigned several months before Mendez's employment ended. After reviewing the record 
in the light most favorable to Mendez, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could 
conclude Miller's infrequent, albeit insensitive and unprofessional, remarks were so 
extreme that they altered the conditions of Mendez's employment. 
C. Retaliation 
Mendez's last Title VII claim is that SARMC retaliated against him for reporting 
Miller's discriminatory remarks to human resources and through the OIP. Noting a close 
temporal correlation, Mendez argues SARMC first initiated disciplinary actions against 
him shortly after he reported his concerns about Miller. 
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework also applies to Mendez's 
retaliation claim. Yartzoff v.Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987). To establish a 
prima facie case for retaliation, Mendez must "show that [he] engaged in a protected 
activity, that [he] suffered a materially adverse action, and that there was a causal 
relationship between the two." Westendoif v. W. Coast Contactors of Nev., Inc., 712 F.3d 
417,422 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 
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57 (2006)). "An employee engages in protected activity when [he] opposes an 
employment practice that either violates Title VII or that the employee reasonably 
believes violates the law." Id. Here, Mendez engaged in protected activity by reporting 
concerns about Miller's allegedly discriminatory conduct to Vejar in late 200910 and to 
the OIP on May 7, 2010. Additionally, it is undisputed that Mendez suffered a materially 
adverse action when SARMC disciplined him and later terminated his employment. 
Even so, Mendez must show that his protected conduct was a "but-for cause-but 
not necessarily the only cause-of [his] termination." Id. Under the "but-for" standard, 
Mendez must establish that the discipline or termination of his employment "would not 
have occurred in the absence of-that is, but for-[Mendez's complaint about Miller's 
racially and religiously offensive comments.]" Univ of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 
S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013 ). While "causation can be inferred from timing alone where an 
adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected activity," the adverse 
employment action must come "'fairly soon after the employee's protected expression."' 
Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F .3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) ( quoting Paluck 
v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 2000)). In addition, the 
requisite causal link exists only if the plaintiff makes "some showing sufficient for a 
reasonable trier of fact to infer that the defendant was aware that the plaintiff had 
10 Although Mendez's retaliation claim is unclear in this regard, the Court liberally 
construes the claim to include alleged retaliation for Mendez's late 2009 verbal report to Vejar 
about Miller's discriminatory comments. But the late 2009 report constitutes an independent 
basis for a retaliation claim only if Mendez establishes it was a "but-for" cause of Miller's May 
7, 2010 verbal warning-the only disciplinary action to take place before Mendez's OIP 
complaint. After May 7, any retaliation for the 2009 report would be indistinguishable from 
retaliation for the OIP complaint. 
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engaged in protected activity." Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 
1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 
1982)). 
As Mendez points out, the timing ofSARMC's disciplinary actions correlates with 
the timing of his protected activities. With respe~t to Mendez's late 2009 report to Vejar, 
at least five months elapsed between the report and SARMC's first disciplinary action-
Miller's May 7, 2010 verbal warning. Further, Mendez received a written warning from 
Miller, a formal disciplinary write-up from Croft, and a partially negative performance 
evaluation from Croft within weeks of his OIP complaint. 11 Additional adverse actions, 
including Chief Operating Officer Brahe's refusal to clear Mendez's employment record 
and Clinic Manager Allen's decision to terminate Mendez's employment, followed 
within five months of the OIP complaint. In some retaliation cases, causation has been 
inferred when an adverse employment action occurs within a few months of a protected 
activity. See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1065 (collecting cases). 
However, temporal correlation does not imply causation in this case. That is 
because the decision-makers responsible for the adverse employment actions were not 
aware of Mendez's protected activities. See Raad, 323 F.3d at 1197. Although the Court 
accepts Mendez's contention that he verbally reported Miller's discriminatory remarks to 
Vejar in late November of 2009, she was not responsible for any adverse actions and 
11 In fact, Miller's May 18 written warning and Croft's May 25 disciplinary write-up were 
issued during the OIP investigation triggered by Mendez's complaint. Croft's performance June 
17 evaluation followed just weeks after Miller resigned in lieu of discharge on June 1, 2010. 
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there is no evidence she told anyone about the report. 12 Similarly, there is no evidence 
that any decision-maker knew of Mendez's OIP complaint, because both Mendez and 
SARMC kept the complaint and the resulting investigation confidential. 
Nevertheless, Mendez urges the Court to assume that SARMC's managers and all 
of its Human Resources personnel knew about his OIP complaint.13 There is no question 
that SARMC personnel outside the Iowa Clinic knew of, and conducted an investigation 
based on, Mendez's OIP complaint. But there is no reasonable basis for inferring that any 
of the relevant decision-makers knew about it. To the contrary, the record indicates that 
SARMC insulated the decision-makers from knowledge of Mendez's complaint and the 
investigative findings. The Court found as much when it.determined that SARMC had 
not waived the attorney-client privilege and work product protections applicable to the 
investigative file and Mendez's OIP complaint. (Dkt. 66 at 7-8.) 
Mendez also asserts that Allen must have known of the OIP complaint simply 
because he worked in SARMC's Human Resources department before becoming the 
Iowa Clinic Manager in August of 2010. This assertion constitutes "[c]onclusory, 
speculative testimony" that is "insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat 
summary judgment." Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978,984 (9th Cir. 
12 Citing "exhibit 4, 8 pages," Mendez asserts: "The events prove that not only Judi Vejar, 
but HR were aware ofmy complaints even before the OIP investigation." (Dkt. 72 at 4.) There is 
no Exhibit 4 in Mendez's filings. Lacking an intelligible connection to the record, the assertion 
above is not evidence that Vejar told anyone about Mendez's late 2009 verbal report. 
13 As mentioned in connection with SARMC's evidentiary objections, SARMC specifically 
objects to such an inference. SARMC argues the inference is unwarranted because there is no 
evidentiary foundation for it and Mendez lacks personal knowledge about what SARMC's 
managers and Human Resources personnel did or did not know. 
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2007). Moreover, the assertion is contradicted by Allen's sworn statement that he has 
never seen Mendez's OIP complaint and had no knowledge of its existence or its contents 
when he decided to terminate Mendez's employment. (Allen Dec. 122, Dkt. 48-4 at 6.) 
Despite the temporal correlation between Mendez's discrimination complaints and 
SARMC's disciplinary actions, the record establishes that the relevant decision-makers 
were not aware of Mendez's protected activities. The essential causal link is absent. And, 
even if timing alone could establish Mendez's prima facie case of retaliation, SARMC 
articulates several legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its disciplinary actions. 
Temporal proximity alone does not defeat summary judgment at the pretext stage of the 
analysis, Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp., LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir. 2013), and 
Mendez presents no additional evidence of pretext to rebut SARMC's showing. Thus, no 
genuine issue of material fact exists to preclude summary judgment on Mendez's 
retaliation claim. 
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Mendez's final claim is that SARMC breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing implicit in his employment contract by ~etaliating against him for reporting 
unlawful discrimination. However, Mendez neither argues this claim nor does he identify 
the terms of his employment contract with SARMC. 
Under Idaho law, the covenant is implied into every employment contract, but it 
does not "create a duty for the employer to terminate [an at-will] employee only for good 
cause." Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 7_44, 749 (Idaho 1989) (quoting 
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem 'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985)). Rather, a 
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breach of the covenant occurs only through an action that "violates, nullifies or 
significantly impairs any benefit or right which either party has in the employment 
contract, whether express or implied .... " Id. 
Mendez's implied covenant claim fails for at least two reasons. First, he cannot 
establish a claim for unlawful retaliation. If, as the record demonstrates, SARMC did not 
unlawfully retaliate against Mendez, there is no basis for arguing that SARMC violated 
Mendez's contractual right, if any, to be free from retaliation while employed by 
SARMC. Simply put, Mendez cannot save his retaliation claims by dressing it as a 
contract issue. 
Second, it is well-established that, "in the absence of an agreement between the 
employer and the employee limiting the employer's ( or the employee's) right to terminate 
the contract at will, either party to the employment agreement may terminate the 
relationship at any time or for any reason without incurring liability." Id. at 746 (citing 
MacNeil v. Minidoka Mem 'l Hosp., 701 P.2d 208 (Idaho 1985)). Mendez does not argue, 
let alone present evidence, that he was anything but an at-will employee. As such, he 
cannot establish a breach of the implied covenant simply because he disagrees with 
SARMC's reasons for terminating his employment. Therefore, Mendez's implied 
covenant claim fails as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Mendez presented insufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. While 
Mendez's minimal evidence supports an inference of disparate treatment, no rational fact-
finder could conclude that SARMC's reasons for disciplining and discharging Mendez 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 35 
000072
Case 1:12-cv-0002"-EJL-CWD Document 78 Filed 09'1 '.2/14 Page 36 of 36 
were pretext for racial or religious discrimination. Nor could a rational fact-finder 
conclude that he established a prima facie case of hostile work environment or retaliation. 
Mendez's claims under the Idaho Human Rights Act are indistinguishable from and thus 
fail for the same reasons as his Title VII claims. In addition, Mendez's implied covenant 
claim fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that summary 
judgment be granted on all of Mendez's claims. 
RECOMMENDATION 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 48) be GRANTED. 
Written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within 
fourteen (14) days pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) and Dist. Idaho L. Rule 72.l(b), or 
as a result of failing to do so, that party may waive the right to raise factual and/or legal 
objections to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
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Case No. CV OC 1312890 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARIEL DAHLMAN 
DOYLE IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Mariel Dahlman Doyle, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I was employed by Boise State University as a Customer Service Representative 
and Technical Records Specialist at University Health Services at Boise State University from 
July 2008 through January 2015. 
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2. I am making this Affidavit in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and all statements herein are based upon my personal knowledge. 
3. In my position at University Health Services, I participated in the interview and 
was involved in the hiring process of Mr. Mendez. 
4. Mr. Mendez was hired at a $2.00 an hour higher rate of pay than other Customer 
Service Representatives, $11.72 per hour, due to his experience in the medical profession. 
5. When Mr. Mendez was hired as a Customer Service Representative, I was a team 
lead, Customer Service Representative and a Technical Records Specialist. 
6. In his position as a Customer Service Representative, Mr. Mendez had a number 
of issues with the performance of his job duties, as well instances where he made inappropriate 
comments to patients and to staff. 
7. The specific issues with Mr. Mendez's performance of his job duties included: 
• Mendez made inappropriate conversations with patients and gave medical advice; 
• Mendez was untimely to work and stayed past the hours that should have been 
required to complete his work; 
• Mendez repeatedly failed to follow procedures to check out patients, input 
insurance information correctly, handle employee flu shots and made errors 
resulting in a provider having to do a no charge on an office visit; 
• Mendez made staff feel uncomfortable with his negative comments, negative 
attitude and inappropriate "gawking" and looking at people "up and down." 
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8. I addressed these issues and concerns with Mr. Mendez on a number of occasions 
and documented them in emails, notes and a "Record of Employee Conference." 
9. On October 17, 2011, I met with Mr. Mendez, Dr. Libby Greaney and Mr. Andy 
Cover to discuss the issues on the "Record of Employee Conference" form. 
10. A true and correct copy of the "Record of Employee Conference" form is attached 
to Exhibit A as Bates No. BSU 00510. 
11. On November 1, 2011, I met with Mr. Mendez and went over the sheet 
documenting his training·. I asked Mr. Mendez to sign the document to confirm that we went 
over this, as it was one of the specific things he asked for in his response to his Employee 
Conference form given to him on 10/5/11 (which he had not yet signed). Mr. Mendez refused to 
sign the training document stating that he did not see 'any reason to." On the "Raul's Training" 
document, I noted "Discussed with Raul 11/1/11, he chose not to sign." 
12. A true and correct copy of the document "Raul's Training" I created is attached to 
Exhibit A as Bates Nos. BSU 00511. 
13. On November 10, 2011, I emailed Andy Cover seeking his advice on how to 
proceed to terminating Mendez and providing a timeline of notes with dates documenting 
Mendez's many errors and shortcomings in his performance as a CSR, his inappropriate 
interactions with patients and staff and my multiple attempts to counsel Mendez to improve his 
performance. 
14. A true and correct copy of a November 10, 2011, email I sent to Andy Cover with 
attachments is attached hereto as Exhibit A, Bates Nos. BSU 00502 - BSU 00511. 
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15. A true and correct copy of a timeline of notes I created documenting Mr. 
Mendez's performance issues is attached to Exhibit A as Bates Nos. BSU 00504-BSU 00509. 
16. The issues with Mr. Mendez's performance of his job as a Customer Service 
Representative resulting in the recommendation for his termination were not related to Mr. 
Mendez's ethnicity as a Hispanic or his skin color. 
17. To my knowledge, Mr. Mendez did not contact Ms. Henken about a claim of 
discrimination. 
18. Further your Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this 1 day of May, 2015. 
(Y\~t<_) 
· Mariel Doyle ~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1 day of May, 2015. 
Notary~ Idaho 
Residing at Meridian, Idaho 
My Commission expires: 01/14/2018 
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· CER~OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June J:, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[x] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Email: rau1mendez2002@gmail.com 
David W. Cantrill 
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B Mariel Doyle< marleldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
10111 ITATI UICIVIRIITY 
Re:RaulMendez 
1 message 
Mariel Dahlman< marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> Thu, Nov 10, 2011 at 4:16 PM 
To: Andy Cover <andycover@boisestate.edu> 
Cc: Libby ,Greaney <llbbygreaney@boisestate.edu>, "Alvord, Debi" <dalvord@bolsestate.edu> 
Andy"' 
Attached is the documentation I have put together. Raul has continued to display a lack of teamwork, 
communication and interest in his position as a customer service representative. We have decided the he 
has failed to pass his entrance probation period. I have discussed Raul's situation with Libby and she has 
offered to pay him for 4 weeks, opposed to the 15 day stated in your email below. She has offered this to 
show good faith to Raul and help him in his future employment elsewhere. I have attached a word 
document documenting Raul's progress over the last few months. I've also attached a document I went 
over with him explaining his training (per his request, which he agreed to but refused to sign). I've also 
attached an email displaying the type of communication that happens, when communication happens. You 
have a copy of Raul's response to l:lis employee conference form, which he has yet to return to me 
despite my attempts asking him to return it signed. We would like to release him prior to Thanksgiving 
break, sometime next week if possible. Please let me know how to proceed and if you need anything else. 
Mariel 
On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 4:33 PM, Andy Cover <andycover@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Mariel-
! am sorry that you have reached this employment option, but I understand that if Raul has continued to 
make mistakes that this option may need to be utilized. 
The process Is that Raul is provided a letter from the Vice President that informs Raul that he has failed 
to satisfactorily complete his entrance probationary period and that his last day will be X he will be 
provided 15 days notification of this date and be placed on Administrative Leave with Pay during this 
time. He will be allowed the opportunity to resign without prejudice as well. Raul will also be provided a 
performance evaluation that lets him know that he has failed to pass his entrance probationary period. 
If you get the opportunity to put together your documentation and send it to me, after I have reviewed the 
information, I will walk you and the Department through the process as well as prepare the letter and 
performance evaluation. 




On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Andy, 
Due to Raul's continued Inability to perform we need to know what to do to process his termination. 
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Boise State University - Apps 101' Employees Mail - Re: Raul Mendez 
Andy Cover 
Employee Relations 




CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message, including attachments, is intended only for the designated 
recipienl(s), and may contain confidential, proprietary, or privileged information. If you are not a 
designated recipient, you may not review, copy or distribute this message. If you receive this in error, 
please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete this message. Thank you. 
Join the Bronco Team .... Chock out Job opportunllles at: http://hrs.bolsestato.edu/Jobllstlngs/ 
Hire a Bronco .... Find out more at: htlp:f/careor,bolsestate,edu 
3 attachments 




~ Raul's Tralnlng.docx 
12K 
BSU 00503 
https:/ /mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&amp;ik.=08a9773 8eb&amp;view=pt&amp;q=rau... 12/19/2013 
000080
9/27/11-1 witnessed Raul Involved in an Inappropriate conversation with a female patient. He asked 
the patient how many credits she was taking, she responded 12 credits. He said she was smart for only 
taking 12 because that's easy. He asked what program she is in and she answered nursing. He asked if 
she had applied for the program yet and she answered no but she was soon. He then asked if she had a 
back up plan in case she didn't get accepted because he has heard that the nursing program Is hard. She 
became noticeable uncomfortable and answered "no, I plan on getting in the first time." He then 
proceeded to tell her she needed a back up plan and that CWI offers an associates degree and that If she 
doesn't get ln,.she should look into that so it will be easier to apply next time. She was visibly 
uncomfortable and tried to tell him that she had no interest in CWl's program. I jumped in twice and 
said reaffirming things like "you'll get It the first time, you won't need a back up plan" and "there's no 
need for CWI, you'll do just fine here." After the student left I asked Raul if he noticed that his 
conversation made her uncomfortable. He answered "no." I then explained that he needs to "use 
caution" when speaking with patients as he does not know their history or their situation. I also 
explained that from my perspective his telling her that she needed a back up plan made her noticeably 
uncomfortable. He did not respond. I encouraged for him to keep conversation between patients quick 
and professional. I spoke with Lynn later In the day and she said that she overheard this conversation 
between Raul and I and can verify. 
9/27/11-1 was working at check out with Raul and was processing multiple medical record requests. 
The phone rang, Raul was not helping a patient and did not answer the phone. He let it ring and looked 
over to me as though he wanted me to answer the phone. I stopped what I was doing and answered 
the phone. After getting off the phone I apologized to Raul for not explaining myself sooner and then 
proceeded to explained that I am a CSR and a TRS, therefore I have other job duties in addition to my 
CSR duties and would appreciate that he handle the calls and the patients if he is not busy. Instead of 
alternating turns. I asked him to not wait for me to answer the phone but to answer It when It rings if 
he Is not busy helping other customers. He replied yes. 
9/28/11- We were meeting downstairs prior to meeting with Dr. Lisa Harris. I noticed that Raul was not 
wearing his nametag but had his employee Id hanging from his shirt pocket. I asked him If he had his 
nametag here at work and asked him to go put it on prior to being introduced to Lisa Harris. He was 
noticeable upset and said and did nothing. I had to ask him twice because he looked confused after the 
first time I asked him. I explained that his ID Is not a nametag and that he is required to wear his 
nametag. He did end up putting on his nametag prior to the meeting. I met with Lynn and she 
confirmed that he was upset by me asking him to put on his nametag. 
9/29/11- Raul and Morgan were working together at check out from 1:00-5:00. At 3:30 I noticed that 
Morgan was taking all the phone calls and that Raul was not picking up the calls. At 4:30 I went out and 
asked why Morgan was taking all the phone calls and asked if they had something worked out because 
Raul was not answering the phones. Morgan answered that "no they hadn't." I explained that both 
people need to be answering the phones, not waiting for the other person to answer . 
• 
10/03/11-At 1:00pm I checked the scheduled for the day and saw that there was many people on the 
schedule that were not checked out in dashboard. I asked Raul if there was a reason why there were so 
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many people that had not been check out. He said that he was really busy and was focusing on checking 
billing workplace for any payments due and answering the phones, instead of checking them out. While 
he was at lunch I went through the pink sheets and checked out all the patients that he did not. All In 
total there were 35 patients that he did not check out. When he got back from lunch I explained to him 
that checking patients out is not an option and It is the first thing we do at check out and that it must be 
done every time, no exceptions. He said ok. 
10/03/114:lSpm Raul asked me about the procedure for handling crutches. I explained that when a 
patient takes out crutches we the CSR's are to have them complete a crutch deposit form, make a note 
In patient alerts and then put the deposit form in the red folder in the safe. When the crutches are 
returned, we have an ma check them to make sure they are not damaged and once they sign off on 
them, we pull the deposit and shred it, documenting this In patient alerts. Mary told me that she had 
just got done explaining this process to him not 10 minutes before he asked, so she was unsure as to 
why he was asking again. 
10/03/11-1 received an email from Tiffany asking why Raul was proposing a procedure change 
Involving having the providers check out their own patients as opposed to the CSR's doing so. I 
responded to her by asking If he proposed this In person or via email because I have heard nothing from 
him regarding this possibility. After speaking with Lynn, she told me that Raul did bring this proposal to 
her attention and that she told Raul to add it to the agenda for the meeting on Wednesday, so she was 
unsure as to why he was not doing so. 
10/04/11-1 was working at check out and noticed that when Raul was checking in patients that he was 
skipping the step of adding the insurance In the appointment, so It was not printing on the pink sheet. 
Around the same time Mary noticed that the CSR's are not getting an updated phone number and are 
not putting It in the patient file. Since Lynn was going to speak with Terry and Raul regarding the phone 
number Issue, I asked her to make sure Raul understands that it's Important to add the insurance, so It Is 
on the pink sheet. Lynn spoke with him in person and both Lynn and I followed up with an email. Raul 
continued to not add the insurance and created more work for both people at check out. 
10/04/114:15 - Raul told a Medicaid patient that she qualified for a 50% discount. We only offer 
discounts to noninsured patients. I've told him this many times before but I took the pink sheet to him 
and explained that Medicare, Medicaid and Tricare are the only insurance companies that we do not bill 
for and that patients with these plans are not considered noninsured. I explained that because he 
misinformed this patient our provider had to do a no charge on the office visit. I asked if he had any 
questions and he said that he would bring them up in the staff meeting, instead of asking me right then 
and there. I asked if he had a chance to add any items to the agenda and he stated that he was too 
busy. I suggested he do it right away as there was no one at the front counter. 
10/04/11 2:00 - I spoke with Tiffany and she said that Raul is often very short and rude with her. I told 
her that Lynn and I will note this and take it into consideration. 
10/04/114:17pm - I spoke with Mary and she is received feedback from her staff that they have 
witnessed Raul acting Inappropriately with female patients and staff members. Stating that he gawks, 
BSU 00505 
000082
stares up and down and makes them feel uncomfortable. I advised her to Inform Dr. Serio and Lynn and 
to handle it quickly as I think we are under a time restriction for reporting Issues like these. 
10/05/11 ;_ 8:00am I received an email from Mary confirming report of Raul's inappropriateness towards 
staff. Email was mailed to Lynn and Dr. Serio. I did not reply but looked online for BSU's policy on 
harassment and looking Into the person in HR responsible for handling these complaints. 5:00pm -
stayed late to help Raul with closing and balancing procedures because I asked him If he felt comfortable 
enoug~ to do It by himself and he said no. 
10/05/11- met with Raul, Libby and Lynn regarding Raul's performance Issue. Reviewed Issues stated 
above with Raul, created a record of employee conference form. Told him to take a few days to review 
It and respond in writing and follow up with Libby with any questions. 
10/06/11-12:00 Terri was leaving for her lunch and I asked Raul if he was comfortable being at check in 
by himself or If he would like for me to come sit with him. He said it was up to me but I said no, I need 
to know If you are ok being up here alone or if he wanted me to sit with him. He said he should be fine 
and that he would get me If he needed help. 
10/07 /11- 8:30am. Raul and I were working at check out and I got pulling into Lynn's office for a 
meeting with her and Dr. Serio, I Informed Raul that I would be stepping away and asked If he would be 
alright while I was gone. He responded yes. 8:45am - I asked Raul if he would be alright working at 
check out alone while I step into the scanning office to work on scanning, as I am behind and need to get 
It done. He responded yes and while I was. in the scanning office and was keeping an eye on him to 
make sure he wasn't getting too busy. 9:15-1 Informed Raul, Terri and Tiffany that I have a meeting 
with Libby and will be unavailable until 10:00-10:30 and informed them to speak with Lynn with any 
questions. Everyone confirmed. 
10/24/11-1 overheard Raul giving medical advice to a student, telling her to continue taking her over 
the counter meds and drinking water, Instead of having her consult with medically trained personnel. 
10/25/11- Received feedback from Jacee: Raul asked Jacee what she did prior to coming to UHS, she 
told him she worked at the print ship doing binding/deliveries. He stated "that's sounds a lot better 
then being stuck here working behind a computer all day." 
10/26/11- Raul arrived 5 minutes late to the all staff meeting. 
10/26/11 - I met with Raul and discussed the following issues: 
1. Arriving to work late, told him that It will directly effect his future employment if he is late 
again. He said that it "was only 3 minutes" I told him that it was 5 minutes and that it doesn't 
matter If It Is 3 or 5, the fact is, is that he arrived late to an all staff meeting which had already 
begun. 
2. I asked him if he likes working here and instructed him to explore other employment 
opportunities If he is unhappy here. He stated that he Is happy here and likes his job. 
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3. Discussed that I have received feedback that he is constantly negative, is making negative 
comments to others, and that I've personally overheard him making negative comments. Asked 
him to comment, he stated that he "does not feel that he has ever made any negative 
comments and that It is my interpretation. I would not give specific names or details because I 
want to protect those who have come to me. He asked for specific encounters so I referred to 
his comment that I witnessed, to Jacee regarding that she was lucky she is being trained now 
because it was so busy the last couple weeks. He denied saying that and stated that what he 
said was only in reference to how busy we've been over the last few weeks, but It had nothing 
to do with training. I explained that regardless of the specific content, comments like that are 
seen as negative and not positive. 
4. Told Raul to only get the basic Information from a student when scheduling appointments, not 
to ask unnecessary questions gave an example of the following: "10/25/11 a student asked to 
schedule an appt because he thought his nose was broken, Raul asked if he was in a fight." I told 
him the conversation should have stopped when the student stated the issue, it was not Raul's 
job to Infer or ask any futher questions when he has the reason for appt. Raul agreed. 
5. Explained that since he asked for specifics regarding his "training" that his training will formally 
end on November 15th but as far as I'm concerned his "formal training" Is over and he should be 
able to work Independently now, with the exception of something we may have missed in 
training or adapting to the constant changes of policies and procedures that happen daily. 
Explained that It was my understanding that his probation ends 6 months from his start date on 
February 24th but the probation period is specifically to see if he ls the correct fit for UHS and 
also for him to decide it this Is the place he would like to be employed at. Specifically addressed 
that fact that if the negative talk continues, it will be detrimental to his future employment and 
again invited him to search for other employment if that was the case. 
6. Discussed Raul's inability to initiate conversation with me along with his inability to take 
imitative and communicate with others. Using the example of him not having a username and 
password for the OQ. He told me that Terri had already told him how to get access, which is to 
email Karla but said that he had not done it because "I had not Instructed him to do so." I told 
him that he needs to adapt to everyday situations and take initiative and handle business 
independently and that I am not going to address every issues/concern with him, especially if he 
does not bring it to me personally. Raul stated that "we are too busy'' for him to have a simple 
conversation with me. I told him that we are not, nor will we ever be "too busy" for him to have 
a verbal conversation to ask a question or clarify a policy or send me a quick email. There ls no 
excuse for not communicating with me and it will not be tolerated. 
7. I told Raul that I am working on a written response to his conference form and that I will have it 
to him by the end of this week. 
8. I explained that we will be going over the checklist and he will be signing off on everything he 
has learned thus far and that this will be done by the end of the week. 
9. I asked him for feedback regarding his time here, he explained that he thinks I should do more 
communicating with him. I explained that I check In with all CSR's at least 3-4 times daily and If 
he does not take the opportunity/initiative to use that then it is his lack of responsibility and 
that that is on him. He agreed that I in fact do check in. 
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10. He used the example of how yesterday he needed to ask me a question but I was on the phone,. 
so as soon as I was off the phone I went to him and asked what he needed. He said that was 
good and that he liked that. I told him I do that every time with any person who needs me. I 
explained that I do not treat him differently than any of my CSR's or coworkers, he did not 
respond. 
11. Raul asked how he was doing so far. I told him to work on the things we discussed and that we 
will go from here. I reviewed our conversation stating that he can't be late, needs to not ask 
unnecessary questions of the students, needs to watch the negative comments, needs to never 
give medical advice, reviewed new process of writing down names and reasons on the pink 
sheet, instructed him to have responsibility and take initiative to ask questions and learn more 
about job duties instead of blaming me for lack of training, He also asked who he supervisor is 
going to be once I am out on maternity leave. I told him that his direct supervisor will be the 
new assistant director but that I will still be his team lead so he needs to learn how to 
communicate effectively with me. I told him that we hope to have that position filled prior to 
my departure. 
12. I told Raul multiple times during the conversation that he needs to get over the fact that we 
gave him a record of employee conference, which he still has not signed and returned to me and 
to move forward. I am tired of hearing about it and he needs to move on. He can not continue 
to go back to that situation or use others as an excuse for job performance. He tried multiple 
times to bring Terri into the conversation and I specifically told him to leave other people out of 
it and to focus on himself. Ended with asking him to communicate with me. 
10/26/11-The last patient was checked out at 5:12, Raul stated that he did not leave until 5:40. I asked 
why he stayed so late, he stated that It took him that long to balance and report the totals for the day. 
This process takes 5-10 minutes at most. I checked with Raul at 5:10 when I left and he stated that he 
was balanced but was waiting for the last patient to check out. Given that he was balanced, It should 
not have taken him 28 minutes to finish up required paperwork. 
10/27 /11- Noticed that I received an email from Raul dated 10/26/115:35pm. When I asked Raul why 
he stayed so late on 10/26/11, he said he was waiting for a patient. When it in fact looks to be that he 
was emailing me. This goes back to the communication problems we've been having. 
10/27 /11- Sent out an email to all employees with the new schedule. Raul is no longer to work the late 
shift. His hours are 8-5 M-F. Also emailed a response to his email stating that he Is not to claim 
overtime for arriving early due to the bus schedule. 
10/28/11- Raul did not follow policy for employee flu shot, spoke with him regarding this. Mary got 
Involved as well and spoke with him because this is not a new policy and has been told multiple times 
how to properly handle employee flu shots. 
11/1/11-spoke with Raul one on one. Discussed training thus far. Went over attached training sheet, 
asked him to make any changes needed. He added that he was working independently at check out on 
August 25 th, one day after his start date. I told him that it was not completely accurate and added "with 
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supervision." . I asked him to sign the document to confirm that we went over this, as It was one of the 
specific things he asked for In his response to his employee conference form given to him on 10/5/11 
(which he has yet to return sign). He refused to sign stating that he did not see "any reason to.1' 
I also went over an email he presented to me 10/27 /11 (see attached). I verbally read the entire email 
and provided clarification to any questions. I asked him to sign the form acknowledging that we 
discussed It and it and he again refused to sign stating that he did not see "any reason to." 
11/7 /11- Email was sent to all CSR's asking them to participate in the shooting of the "Buster Video." I 
asked that anyone who felt uncomfortable being in the video to notify me asap. 
11/8/11 4:35pm • Raul approached me and told me he did not want to participate. This Is another 
example of 1) lack of appropriate communication due to the fact that I asked everyone to notify me 
asap the day prior and 2) lack on teamwork and Involvement. This was a great opportunity to 
participate In something fun and build teamwork but he chose not to be involved. I overheard him 
talking to Jacee about it and he stated it was "weird". 
11/9/11-sent all CSR's an email asking for feedback regarding Roxanne's phone. Received responses 
verbally and via email from everyone except Raul. 
11/10/11- had to send him a follow up email regarding Roxanne's phone informing him that he was the 
only CSR that I had not heard from and asked for his feedback. Continues to display a lack of 
communication and teamwork. 
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BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 
RECORDOFEMPLOYEECONFERENCEFORM 
EMPLOYEE NAME: Raul Mendez I TITLE: Customer Service Representative 
DEPARTMENT: university Health services 








DOCUMENTATION OF CONCERN(S), ISSUE(S} OR INCIDENT(S) INVOLVING: 
J Conduct or Behavior (Interpersonal Skills 
J Department or University Rules 
_ Safety or Work Environment 
./ Work Performance (Productivity or Quality of Work} 
_ Attendance • Dependability 
./ Customer Service ....., _Other C: 
(1) 
"O 
Describe nerformance concern or Issue (be specific, include dates and examples}: ·c:; 
C 10-3-2011 Raul did not check out 35 patients according to process maps. He was given verbal Instruction to check out the patients - properly. He continued not to check out the patients, stating he was loo busy. s... 
0 10-4-2011 Raul continued to not load Insurance Information In the appointment after being given verbal and written Instructions lo 
-... do so, causing the Insurance lnformallon to not be printed on the pink sheets. 10-4-2011 Raul misinformed patient regarding discount policy. Did not foUow procedure. 
Cl) Raul needs to work on his eye contact and communication With staff. 
::s 
(I) 







Note follow-up review plan date(s): 
employee's Signature: Date: 
Print Supervisor's Name & Sfgn: Date.· 
2m1 Level Supervisors Name & In/fiats: Date: 
NOTE: Employeo's slgnaturo lndlcatos that this Informal/on has been discussed wllh th8 employe8, and does not necessarily mean that the employee 
a roes with n. It does acknowled e recel t of a co of the conference record. rhe em lo ea ma aUach an comments to this form for hlslher file, 




• 1 ,., 
Raul's Training 
Week I August 24th-August 26 th 
Introduced Raul to coworkers 
Toured the building 
Gave "life of a pink sheet tour" 
Introduced PS and phones 
Introduced Upay 
Provided process maps 
Observed Mariel, Terri and Eric performing job duties at check out 
Asked to be shown invoicing, was told that it is later in th~ process 
Working independently at check out on August 25th with supervision 
Week 2 August 29th-September 211d 
Continued PS training emphasized different sections including dashboard, billing workplace, 
scheduling a11d patient workplace. 
Emphasized usage of process maps 
Utilized phone headset, allowing him the ability to listen in on phone calls 
Introduced invoicing 
Had Raul answered phone and scheduled patients 
Observed Mariel, Ten-i and Eric performingjob duties at check out 
Was trained by Terrl on check out functions 
Week 3 S~ptember 5tli - 9th 
Continued PS training 
Introduction to check in 
Continued emphasizing the importance of pl'Ocess maps 
Practiced invoicing 
Week 4 Scmtember 12u1-16th 
Continued PS training including scheduling, check in and check out 
Scheduling, answering phones 
Access to Marketplace and Peoplesoft Backoffice 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 
UNIVERSITY; MARIEL DOYLE 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 













Case No. CV OC 1312890 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID W. CANTRILL 
IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
David W. Cantrill, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho and am admitted to 
practice before this Court. I am also one of the attorneys responsible for representation of the 
Defendants in the above-entitled matter. 
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2. I am making this Affidavit in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and all statements herein are based upon my personal knowledge. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of "Plaintiffs Answer to 
Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff' 
without the attachments which contain Plaintiffs transcripts and income tax information. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of an email dated August 
11, 2011, from Lynn Swanson to Tiffany Trader, Bates No. BSU 00189. 
5. Further your Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this 1st day of June, 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of June, 2015. 
, .......... ,,,,, 
" .. ••' ~ -t\\ R O(J ;;##1 
1,.~~~~ 
!Sf -Ao'fA~-y \~\ =~, ~ ' : : -·- • * -:*' 11& : = ~ ~ l'UB\,\v I S 
~ • • 0 .. 
,:. <J> •• ···~ ! ...... J>_,, .......... 'to- ~ .. . 
,,,,, 1'.e OP \~ , ...... ,,, ,, .. ....... ,,,, 
Residing at vN\e,vi &lJ ttM.--- , Idaho 
My Commission expires: O) .. J~,. 2.Q I f' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 1, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 







[ ] Email: raulmendez2002@gmail.com 
o~~ 
David W. C \rm 
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GREG LAWSON 
Hammond Law Office. PA 
811 E Chicago Street 
Caldwell. Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 453-4857 
Facsimile: (208) 453-4861 
l.S.B. #9076 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




Case No. CV OC 1312890 
STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 
UNIVERSITY; MARIEL DOYLE 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF 
Defendants 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff hereby responds to Defendants' First 
Discovery as follows: 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. The plaintiff objects to discovery requests to the extent they seek responses in addition to, 
or d_ifferent from. the requirements set forth in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure due to 
scope or length. 
2. The plaintiff objects to the discovery requests to the extent they call for the production of 
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documents and infonnation that are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
3. The plaintiff objects to the discovery requests to the extent they seek confidential 
infonnation. proprietary information, trade secrets, or business info1mation. 
4. The plaintiff objects to the discovery requests to the- extent they seek responses and 
information that is protected from disclosure by the attorney/claimant privilege and the 
attorney work product doctrine. The plaintiff claims such privileges and protections to 
the extent implicated by each request. Any disclosure of such privileged or protected 
info1mation in response to any discovery response is inadvertent and not intended to 
waive those privileges or protections. 
5. The plaintiff objects to the discovery requests to the extent that they call for the disclosure 
of each fact or factual basis responsive to the request. Discovery has recently begun in 
this action, and the plaintiff has not completed his investigation into the events 
smTounding the claims and defenses asserted in the lawsuit. The plaintiff has made a 
diligent effort to comply with discovery requests. The plaintiff, however, expressly 
reserve the right to supplement any answer or request once additional information 
becomes available. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please state your date and place of birth, address and 
telephone number. social security number. the identity. address and telephone number of all 
persons to whom you have been married, the duration of each such marriage and the identity. 
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address and telephone number of all children to each such marriage. 
RESPONSE: O~jection as far as the Interrogatory is not likely to lead to discoverable 
evidence. Without waiving that objection Raul Mendez. 2712 N. Goldeneye Way, Meridian, ID 
83646. Ph: 208-871-8550 has not been married. Last four of social is
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please identify each and every educational institution 
attended by plaintiff, indicating the following: periods of attendance at each; whether or not 
plaintiff graduated or othe1wise completed the course of studies, major course of study pursued; 
and degrees, diplomas and/or certificates of completion received, if any and the dates on which 
lht:) v,:ere awarded. 
RESPONSE: Boise State University, see provided transcript. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Please describe and identity in chronological order all 
employment. occupations and/or self-employment of plaintiff from 2004 to date, stating for each 
th~ nature of the employment, the identity of the empJoyer, the first and last date of such 
employmc:-nt. plaintiffs job title and job description, plaintiffs immediate supervisor, plaintiffs 
gross income for each year. plaintiffs annual net income. the cause for termination of each such 
employment. all professional and occupational licenses, certificates, ratings and the like issued to 
or securrtd by plaintiff in connection with such employment, whether a physical or mental 
examination was required for or dm-ing such employment or self-employment or whether written 
representations were required of plaintiff regarding physical or mental condition before or during 
such employment or self-employment and identify all such employment records. 
RESPONSE: Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to lead to discoverable 
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evidence. Without waving that objection: 
1) Boise State University 
1910 University Dr. 
Boise. ID 83725 
8/24/11 to 11/15/11 
Customer Service Representative 
Full time at 11. 77 per hour, plus benefits 
Mariel Doyle 
Let go. 
2} A WDS 
456 N Kimball Pl 
Boise. Idaho 
11/2011 to 12/2012 full time 
Customer Service/Tech support 
$9 per hour no benefits 
Plaintiff had three different supervisors 
Plaintiff left to take job with Valley Regional Transit 
3) Valley Regional Transit 
700 E. 2nd St.. ste. 100 
Meridian. Idaho 
12/2012 to 8/2013 
Customer Service 
$13 .23 per hour, full. benefits 
Jennifer Smith. Supervisor 
Left for job as X-Ray Tech 
4) Boise Arthritis Clinic 
8/2013 to present 
X-Ray Tech-part time (20-22 hours per week) 
$18 per hour. no benefits 
Linda Feil. Supervisor 
Currently employed 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please state whether you have ever previously been a party 
to a l;.iwsuit or judicial proceeding, whether civil. criminal, or administrative, and as to each such 
action stat.e: the names of each party to the action, the caption and case number of the action, the 
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wun nr tribunal in ,1,·hich the action was pending and the date it was filed. the nature of the 
nction. the disposition of the action. and the lawyers who represented each pa11y. Identify all 
d1)t:t1m(:!11ts rdating to your response. 
RESPONSE: Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to lead to discoverable 
evidence. Without waving that objection: Plaintiff is currently a party in CV-SC-2013-16203 
and has only been a party to minor traffic offenses in criminal court. See attached for details. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please state the name, address, and telephone number of 
cnch and every person kno~n to you or your present or former attorneys who have any 
kno,vledge ot: or who purport to have any knowledge or. any of the facts of this case. (By this 
inti..'tTogatory ,,ve seek the names. addresses, and telephone numbers of all possible witnesses who 
havt: any knowledge of any fact pertinent to both damages and liability.) As to each such person, 
stale whether you. or your attorneys or agents, have taken a statement (whether written or oral) 
regarding any facts or matters which relate to the present action. If so. state the date on which 
said statement was taken. by whom. and who has custody thereof 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff reserves the right to call all witnesses of parties and records 
provided and or received in communication or discovery with the Defendant or their Agents or 
Attorneys. Plaintiff is aware of Eric Quintero 208-713-1436, Terri Lee 208-459-0365, Sophia 
Luna. Lynn Swanson, Dr. Libby Greaney. Because discovery is ongoing in this case, plaintiff 
r~serves the right to supplement this interrogatory when new persons and contact information are 
discovered. See attached documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please state the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 
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all \\'itnesses you intend to call or may call at the trial of this cause, and specify the facts to which 
thL'y will testify. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff has not decided which witness to call. Plaintiff reserves the right 
to call all witnesses of parties and records provided and or received in communication or 
discovery with the Defendant or their Agents or Attorneys. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Have you. your present or former attorneys, or any person, 
Jinn or corporation acting on your behalf, engaged any expe11s in connection with this litigation? 
If so. please identify and disclose all information relative to said expert(s) as required by Idaho 
RulL' of Civil Procedure :26(b)(4), including but not limited to the following: 
(a) The name and address of the school or university where he received special 
c<lucc:1tion or training in this field, the dates when he attended each school or university and the 
na111L' or description of each degree he received, including the date when each was received, and 
the name of the school from which received; 
(b) Did he test, analyze or examine any physical evidence related to this litigation'? If 
so. during what datt!s did he make this test, analysis or examination and did anyone assist him? If 
he did have assistance. please state the name and address of each person who gave assjstancc, the 
typ~ or amount of assistance given and the inclusive dates that each person guve assistance; 
(c) Were any results or conclusions reached as a result of his test, analysis or 
examination; 
(d) Please state the subject matter on which the expe11 is expected to testify and state 
the suhstance of the facts and opinions to '\.Vhich the expert is expected to testify; 
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( e) What is the name or other means of identification, and address of the person who 
has pn:scnt i:-ustody of each item that was tested, analyzed or examined: 
(l) Did he submit a report of his objective fin<lings'? If so. please state the date this 
rcporl was submitted. the name or other identification of the person to whom this report was 
suhmitted. the name and address of the person who has present custody of the same and if you 
will do so without a Motion to Produce, please attach a copy of said report to your Answers to 
these [nterrogatories. 
(g) Did he submit a report of his opinions or conclusions? If so. please state the date 
this report was submitted. the name and address of the person who has present custody thereof: 
and if you will do so without a Motion to produce, please attach a copy of said report to your 
;\nS\\'Crs to these Interrogatories; and 
(b) Is the expert compensated for his work and efforts in connection with this action? 
ir so. please state how much he is to be paid. If he is to receive any additional compensation if 
you are successful in this action, please state the terms and conditions of this additional 
r.:onsideration. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff has not yet engaged any expert witnesses. Plaintiff gives notice 
that each and every witness listed by either party may be called as an expert to the claims 
identified in Plaintiffs Complaint and Motion filed herein and to refute the affim1ative defenses 
and claims of the Defendant. Plaintiff will comply with the IRCP as to experts that will testify 
upon receipt from the witnesses. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please identify and describe in detail and all drawings. 
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illustrntions. photographs. movies or videotapes. emails, texts, electronic or written documents or 
t)lher memoranda of ,:-.1hich either you or your present or former attorneys are aware which 
pertuin to any of the issues in this litigation. fn answering this inten·ogatory, describe the nature 
nnd su~ject matter of the item. its date, if applicable , the name, address. job title. and capacity of 
each person who prepared it or with knowledge of it. and for each such item, please specify 
whether or not you intend to utilize it at trial as an exhibit. 
RESPONSE: Please see records provided. As discovery has just begun plaintiff reserves 
the right to supplement this response with any additional communications as they become 
available. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please set forth in detail a complete itemization. specifying 
th·~ amount and method of computation of all economic/special damages claimed by you, or to 
which you claim entitlement. including, but not limited to alleged damages for past and future 
medical. lllt'ntal care and related expenses, extraordinary living expenses. lost wages and other 
incom~ both past and future. lost or diminished earning capacity. tuition assistance and any other 
claimed economic/special damages lost, and identify each document that supp011s this claim. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiffs damages include but are not limited to lost wages, he worked full 
time at $2. 77 an hour less for 13 months with no medical benefits, tuition assistance, or other 
benefits. Diminished ability to find future employment, plaintiff was unable to continue his 
education due to loss of tuition assistance. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please describe in detail plaintiffs complete medical 
history prior to the illness or injury complained of in the complaint, to include the following 
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infi.wmation: the nature and extent of all physical and mental injuries. disabilities, deformities. 
and illnesses. all routine health care and preventative care; when, where. and how the same 
o~curred: a description or the consequences resulting from any identified condition and whether 
any disability r~sulting therefrom persisted to the date of onset of symptomatology or diagnosis 
or th~ injury or incident which you claim in your complaint; and the identity and address of each 
practitioner of the healing arts. each hospital. clinic or other medical institution or any kind which 
prm·ided such mental and medical health care; and identify all such medical records and 
documents. 
RESPONSE: Not applicable or Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to 
lead to discoverable evidence. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please describe in full and in detail all ofthe particulars of 
hl1dily injuries, symptoms, complaints, impairments. and disabilities relating to plaintiffs 
physical and mental health and well~being which plaintiff allegedly sustained from the incident 
rdcrred to in the complaint. including 
(a) the date of onset of symptoms and a description of the nature, type. and bodily 
location of each such injury, complaint. impairment or disability: 
( b) the date and identity of individual making diagnosis and the treatment received by 
plaintiff in connection therewith; 
(c) each and every physician, medical practitioner . mental health care practitioner, 
and medical or mental care institution by whom plaintiff was treated or provided consultation in 
n.-gar<l to the i 11i uries. complaints, impainnent, or disability plaintiff claims to have suffered; 
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(d) \.Vhether plaintiff has fully recovered from such injury, complaint, impairment.. or 
disability. and if not how such condition is currently affecting plaintiff and identify any injuries. 
complaints. impaim1ents or disability which are contended to be of a permanent nature and how 
said condition affocts plaintiff; and 
(e) identify all documents and records from each such health care provider and health 
car~ institution. 
RESPONSE: Not applicable or Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to 
lead to discoverable evidence. Without waving that objection: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please state whether plaintiff has received compensation 
for injuries or damages claimed in this suit from any third patty or sources other than the pmties 
in this suit. If so. please state the name~ address and telephone number of each such person or 
entity. identify the amount of compensation paid and the iqjuries or damages to which it relates. 
state whether the compensation was paid under statutory or contract obligation, and for each such 
stiurce state ,,,hether a subrogation right exists by Jaw or contract and whether such right has been 
exercised: Identify all documents relating to your response. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has not received any compensation for this suit from a third 
party. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please state the dates of Plaintiff's employment with 
Defendant. 
RESPONSE: See answer to Interrogatory No. 3 
INTERROGATORY NO 14: Please describe your qualifications for employment 
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with Defendant in the position of Customer Service Representative. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff has worked in areas involving customer service and has been 
trained as an XMray technician. 
INTERROGATORY NO 15: Please describe any education, training, or other 
4uulilications which may bl:! relevant to your employment with Defendants. 
RESPONSE: See answer to Interrogatory No. 14. 
INTERROGATORY NO 16: Please state whether you believe your pertormance 
evaluations accurately reflect your job performance relative to your employment ,vith 
Oetendants. and the basis of that belief. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff does not believe his performance evaluations reflect his job 
perfonnance accurately as Plaintiff was not receiving fair discipline or proper 
training/supervision. as reflected in his complaint. 
INTERROGATORY NO 17: With regard to the prior employment positions 
identified in your Answer to Interrogatory No. 3 herein, plea5e state: 
1. Details. dates and reasons for any demotions. involuntary transfers or disciplinary actions; 
Name. title. address and telephone number of your immediate supervisor; 
2. Awards or other recognition received for job performance: 
3. Training received; and 
4. Reasons for leaving each employer. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff is not aware of any demotions or disciplinary actions in regard to 
his employment identified in Interrogatory No. 2. 
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INTERROGATORY NO 18: Please describe in detail any activity -vvhich Plaintiff 
daims constituted discrimination. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff was not given proper training, was singled out for discipline 
during probationary period. wac:; chastised, was suspended and eventually terminated based on his 
race and national origin. 
INTERROGATORY NO 19: Please state as to whether Plaintiff contends that the 
alkged discrimination affected Plaintitrs psychological well-being. and, if so, describe the effect. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, embarrassment and depression, but has 
not sought treatment for such due to his loss of medical benefits and income after he was 
terminated by Defendants. 
INTERROGATORY NO 20: Please describe the means by which Plaintiff 
cont~nds Defendants influenced decisions affecting Plaintiffs employment. 
RESPONSE: See answer to interrogatory No. 18. 
INTERROGATORY NO 21: Please describe any tangible economic detriment, 
\\'bic:h Plaintiff contends he suffered because of the alleged discrimination or his refusal to 
tolerate it. 
RESPONSE: See answer to interrogatory No. 9. 
INTERROGATORY NO 22: Please state whether you have ever filed a claim 
charging employment discrimination on the basis of age, race, sex. national origin, religion, or 
disability othl!r than the claim at issue in this case. And, for each such claim state: 
A. Date filed; 
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B. Parties nmm:d.: 
C. Description of allegedly discriminatory conduct; 
D. Description of proceedings: 
E. Outcome of proceedings. 
RESPONSE: January 2012 Plaintiff filed against Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center complaining of Discrimination based on Race/National Origin, Religion, 
Retaliation and the outcome of such proceedings are still pending. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Identify the user name and email address for any current or 
pust Facebook. MySpace. Linkedln. Instagram and/or Twitter or other social media account or 
blog maintained by you from August 2011 through the present. 
RESPONSE: Defendant does not currently maintain any social media accounts or biogs. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTfON NO. 1: Please produce ~ copy of all written or recorded 
statements obtained from any person relating in any way to the incident and injuries which are 
the subject of this litigation and produce all documents identified in your Answer to Interrogatory 
Numbt!r 5. 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please produce the most current curriculum 
vitae !<)r any experts retained by plaintiff in this matter~ provide a statem~nt. pursuant to Rule 
26{ bl( 4 )(A) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, on the subject matter on which each such 
expert is expected to testify. including the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert 
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is expected to testify. including the substance of the facts and opinions to which tbe expert is 
~xp~cted to testify. attaching a copy of any and all reports of such experts upon ·which the 
:-:wh.·ment ofth~ substance of the facts and opinions is based and produce all documents identified 
in your Am,\.vcr to Inten-ogatory Number 7. 
RESPONSE: No experts have yet been retained, Plaintiff will comply with IRCP 
regarding expert disclosures. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please produce all dot.:mnents which pertain to 
any of the issues (including liability and damages) in this litigation, including those which 
plaintiff intends to utilize at trial as an exhibit, and documents identified in your Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 8. 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION N0.4: Please produce the original or a certified true 
copy of the birth certificate for Raul Mendez. 
RESPONSE: Objection not likely to lead to discoverable evidence. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please produce the original or a certified and 
trw: copy of any man·iage certificate for any man-iage in \.Vhicb Raul Mendez was a party. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff has not been married. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Please- produce certified true copies of any 
divorce decrees terminating any marriage of Raul Mendez. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff has not been married. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce a true and correct copy of both 
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sides of R.iul Mendez's name latest driver's license. 
RESPONSE: Objection as not likely to lead to discoverable evidence. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Please produce true and correct copies of any 
and all records conccming Raul Mendez 's name attendance at any educational. vocational or 
true.le schools or institutions, including but not limited to, any and all records, related to academic, 
medical or counseling information, official transcripts, test scores. application(s) for admission. 
medical ret:on..ls. placement records, and/or advisor notes and all documents identified in your 
i\nsvver to Inte1Togntory No. 2. 
RESPONSE: Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to lead to discoverable 
evidence. Without waving that objection, see attached transcript. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Please produce copies of any and all 
employment or self-employment records for any employment or self-employment of Raul 
ivkndez from '.!004 to' present, including but not limited to the following: information concerning 
sulari~s or wages paid, W-2 or 1099 forms, any information concerning termination of 
-:mployment or self-employment, and each and every health questionnaire and/or the results of 
any m~dicul examinations or treatments in any such employment or self-employment file. and all 
documents identified in your Answer to Interrogatory No. 3. 
RESPONSE: Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to lead to discoverable 
evidence. Without waving that objection, see attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce certified true and complete 
cnpies of any and all state and federal income tax and gift tax returns, and all attachments and 
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sl'hedules thereto. filed by or on behalf of plaintiff. jointly or separately for the last five years. 
RESPONSE: Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to lead to discoverable 
evidence. Without waving that objection, see attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce each and every table or similar 
calculation of lite and \'\1ork lite expectancy, intended to be used by plaintiff at trial to establish 
lifo and work life expectancy for Raul Mendez. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff does not anticipate using life or work-life expectancy tables. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce all documents regarding the 
diagnosis and treatment of the physical. mental and emotional illness and injury you allege in 
yNir complaint to have been caused by the incident referred to therein. Include all documents 
idcnti tied. refe1Ted to, or relied upon in responding to Interrogatory No. 11. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff was unable to seek any treatment because of lack of insurance 
benefits. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce all documents regarding your 
examination and treatment by each doctor or other practitioner of the healing arts whom you have 
consu ltecl or been treated by during the last ten years for any reason ( other than in regard to the 
i!lnl;!::-S or injury of which you complain in your complaint which should be produced in response 
to Rl!qucst for Production No. 12. Include all documents identified. referred to, or relied upon in 
responding to Interrogatory No. 10. 
RESPONSE: Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to lead to discoverable 
evidence. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Please produce all documents regarding each 
o,:~nsion you have been hospitalized since birth (other than in regard to the illness or injury of 
which you complain in your complaint. which should be produced in response to Request No. 12. 
RESPONSE: Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to lead to discoverable 
evidence. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Please produce all documents regarding any 
lrcalmcnl or care you have received for dependency on or abuse of alcohol and/or drugs. 
RESPONSE: Objection overly broad, burdensome. and not likely to lead to discoverable 
evidence. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: Please produce a copy of each application for 
medical insurance you have made within the last ten years. and a copy of each health insurance 
policy owned by plaintiff from 2004 to date. 
RESPONSE: Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to lead to discoverable 
evidence. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Please produce all documents regarding any 
and all money expended or expenses incurred for hospitals, doctors, nurses, x-rays, medicines, 
tests. care, and appliances in collection with the illness or injury of which you complain in your 
complaint. Include all documents identified, referred to, or relied upon in responding to 
Interr~gatory No. 9. 
RESPONSE: Objection overly broad, burdensome, and not likely to lead to discoverable 
evidence. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: Please produce all documents regarding all 
other losses or expenses incuned for which you claim compensation in this action. Include aIJ 
documents identified. referred to, or relied upon in responding to Interrogatory No. 9. 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: Please produce each document that contains, 
refers to. or relates to any admission you contend any defendant has made regarding the subject 
matter of this action. 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: Please produce each document that contains. 
rcfors to or relates to any declaration against interest you contend any defendant has made 
regarding the subject matter of this action. 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21: Please produce all documents or other tangible 
evidence idendfied in or relating to your answer to Interrogatory No. 4. 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22: Please produce copies of all documents 
regarding requests by you for reimbursement or compensation for your alleged illness, disease, or 
i11jury and all documents identified in your answer to Interrogatory No. 12. 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: Please produce copies of any and all records 
or logs of alleged discrimination maintained by Plaintiff. 
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RESPONSE: See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24: Please produce copies of all documents related 
to prior charges of employment discrimination as referenced to in your Answer to Interrogatory 
No. 2:2 herein. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff will supplement response as documents become available to him. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 25: Please produce pay stubs, tax returns. 
employee benefit manuals or statements and other documents reflecting Plaintiffs earnings and 
benefits in employment ohtained after separation from Defendant. 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTJON NO. 26: Please produce all applications for 
employment, letters, resumes. col1'espondence or other docwnentation reflecting Plaintiffs 
attempts to become employed from November 2011 to present. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff secured employment shortly after his termination. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTJON NO. 27: Please produce all applications, receipts, and 
documentation reflecting the tuition assistance made and/or received by Plaintiff from 2004 to 
pr1?:-i.::11t date at any educational institution. 
RESPONSE: NIA 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28: For each Facebook account maintained by you, 
please produc~ your account data for the pe1iod of August 1, 2011 through the present. You may 
download and print your Facebook data by Jogging onto your Facebook account, selecting 
"Account Setting" under the ''Account" tab on your homepage, clicking on the "Download a 
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copy" link nt the bottom of the General Account Settings. and following !he directions on the 
"Download Your Information" page. 
RESPONSE: Defendant does not currently maintain any social media accounts or blogs. 
REQl IEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.29: For each MySpace, Linkedin, Tnstagram and/or 
Twitter or. otb~r social media account or blog maintained by you identified in InteJTogatory No. 
23. data for the period of August I. 2011 through the present. 
RESPONSE: Defendant does not currently maintain any social media accounts or blogs. 
DATED This~day of November, 2013. 
Hammond Law Office, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~ ~2-···· . 
·· Gwson 
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Permission to Hire 
1 message 
Mariel Doyle< marleldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
Lynn Swanson< lswanso@bolsestale.edu> Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 4:07 PM 
To: Tiffany Trader <tiffanytrader@boisestate.edu> 
Cc: Jordan LePlane <JordanLePiane@bolsestate.edu>, Libby Greaney <LibbyGreaney@boisestate.edu>, 
"Dahlman, Mariel" <MarlelDahlman@boisestate.edu> 
HI Tiffany, 
Per our telephone conversation, I would like permission to to hire Raul Mendez from hiring list #35253. We 
still need to interview one more person from that register tomorrow at 3:30, so I can't close it out yet, but 
would like to offer him the job by tomorrow or the first of next week. 
After talking with Libby Greany, our E. Director, we would like to offer him 20% above the beginning salary 
($9. 77) which would be $11. 72 because of all the medical experience he brings to this position. Libby, 
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Case No. CV OC 1312890 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUNNY WALLACE IN 
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Sunny Wallace, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am employed by Boise State University as Policy Manager and have been 
employed in that capacity since May 2014. 
2. I am making this Affidavit in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
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Judgment and all statements herein are based upon my personal knowledge. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Boise State University's 
EEO Policy Statement that was in effect during the period of time to include August 2011 to 
November 2011, when Mr. Mendez was employed by Boise State University. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Boise State University's 
Non-Discrimination and Anti-Harassment Policy #1060 that was in effect during the period of 
time from 1997 to October 31, 2011, when Mr. Mendez was employed by Boise State 
University. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Boise State University's 
Non-Discrimination and Anti-Harassment Policy #1060 that was in effect during the period of 
time from November 1, 2011 to April 2012, when Mr. Mendez was employed by Boise State 
University. 
6. Further your Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this 1st day of June, 2015. 
Residing at Meridian, Idaho 
My Commission expires: 01-14-2018 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 1, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 







[ ] Email: rau1mendez2002@gmail.com 
David W. Cantrill 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUNNY WALLACE IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 




Boise State University 
EEO POLICY STATEMENT 
It is the policy of Boise State University (the "University".) to not discriminate against any employee or applicant for 
employment because of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, genetic Information, disability; or 
veteran status, or any other status protected by state or local law, and to provide equal employment opportunity 
and affirmative action for qualified individuals. This policy statement is Included in this Affirmative Action Program. 
and Is posted on University bulletin boards. · 
The University will endeavor to recruit, hire, train, and promote persons in all job titles In accordance with this 
Affirmative Action Program. All other personnel actions are administered without regard to race, color, religion, 
gender, national origin, age, genetic information, disability, or veteran status, or any other status protected by·. 
state or local law, and all employment decisions are based ·only on valid job requirements. 
Marla Henken has been assigned overall responsibility for the implementation of affirmative action activities as 
re.quired by law. 
Marla Henken's responsibilities include designing and Implementing an audit and reporting system that will: 
•:• Measure the effectiveness of the University's Affirmative Action Program. 
•:• Indicate any need for remedial action. 
•!• Determine the degree to which our objectives have been attained. 
•!• Determine whether Individuals with known disabilities arid covered veterans have had the opportunity to 
participate iri all University-sponsored educational, training, recreational, and social activities. 
•:• Measure compliance with the Affirmative Action Program's specific obligations. · 
' 
Employees and applicants shall not be subjected to harassment, intimidation, threats, coercion, or discrimination 
because they have engaged in any of the following activities: 
•!• Filing a complaint. 
•!• Assisting or participating in an investigation, compliance review, hearing, or any other activity related to 
the adrr:ilnistration of Executive Order 11246, Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 
Section 4212 of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, the Veterans 
Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 _or any other Federal, State or local. law requiring equal 
opportunity for Individuals regardless of rac~, color, religion, gender, national origin, ~ge, disability, or 
veteran status. 
•!• Opposing any act or practice made unlawful by Executive Order 11246, Section 503 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, or its implementing regulations, Section 4212 of the, Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment 
Assistance Act of 1974, the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 or any other Federal, State or 
local law r~quir_ing equal opportunity for individuals regardless of their race, color, religion, gender, 
national origin, age, disability, or veteran status. 
· •:• Exercising any other right protected by Executive Order 11246, Sect.ion 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, or Its Implementing regulations, or Section 4212 of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment 
Assistance Act of 1974 or the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998. 
1/1/2011 
Pablo Coblentz, Assistant Vice Preside11t, Human Resource Services 
EXHIBIT 
I A 
1 . THOMAS HOUSTON associates, inc. 
AA/EEO Compliance Consultants 
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BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 
Effective Date: March 1, 1984 
BSU 1060 
Revised On: July 1, 1995 
May 5, 1997 
POLICY ON NONDISCRIMINATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
PURPOSE: To establish an affirmative action/nondiscrimination policy at Boise State 
University. 
I. Foreword 
A. Boise State University has always been a community-reflective institution, 
opening its doors to the needs of citizens and responding with academic, 
vocational, and special programs designed to support the local and state demands 
for educational opportunities. 
B. The admissions policy at Boise State University and other general policies in 
all of its programs, as well as its personnel employment practices in relation to 
recruiting, hiring, training, and promotion, operate under a philosophy that no 
person shall be subjected to unlawful discrimination in any manner. . . 
II. Non discrimination 
A. Boise State University is committed to maintaining a working and educational 
environment which supports equal rights for all individuals. Decisions affecting 
the education, employment or access to services and facilities of faculty, staff, and 
students will be based only on merit, performance, and legitimate occupational or 
educational criteria. 
B. It is the policy of Boise State University not to discriminate against any 
individual in matters of admission, employment, housing, services or in the 
educational programs or other activities based on non-meritorious factors 
including, but not limited to, discrimination on the basis of age, race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, disability, veteran status, or political 
affiliation. 
C. It is the policy of the university not to discriminate against any individual on 
the basis of sexual orientation in the following areas: personnel decisions, 
housing, student admissions and evaluation, facilities, or in educational programs 
or other activities. · 
D. Boise State University will apply this policy consistently with its obligation to 
continue to provide Reserve Officer Training Corps programs under federal law. 
To the extent this policy conflicts with contractual obligations, state or federal 
laws, or regulations those obligations and laws or regulations will prevail. 
-r 










legally recognized marriage. This policy does not cover matters which are outside 
of the control of the university. 
E. It is the responsibility of each and every member of the university community 
to ensure that meaningful equal employment and educational opportunity exists. 
The university will continue to cooperate with agencies of the federal and state 
governments in fulfilling its obligations. 
III. Nondiscrimination Objectives 
The objectives of the Boise State University Nondiscrimination Program are: 
A. To further develop and maintain equal employment and educational 
opportunities for all personnel and students; 
B. To eliminate all traces of unlawful discrimination in employment practices and 
education programs and activities. This includes, but is not limited to, 
discrimination on the basis of age, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
ancestry, disability, veteran status, sexual orientation, or political affiliation. 
IV. Affirmative Action Objectives 
The objectives of the Boise State University Affirmative Action Program are: 
A. To develop a work force which reflects an equitable employment distribution 
of some previously under- represented group members at all levels of 
employment and throughout all departments of the university based upon the 
availability of such groups within the appropriate labor market(s); 
B. To provide resources for affirmative action programs to implement the policy; 
and 
C. To meet state and federal requirements to engage in affirmative action for 
women, racial minorities, veterans and the disabled. 
V. Legal Basis of Nondiscrimination AND Affirmative Action Program 
The practice of active or passive exclusion of persons on the basis of personal 
characteristics not related to job competency has brought about legislation at the state 
and federal levels. Antidiscrimination laws and policies include specific guidelines 
for assuring equal employment opportunity. Some laws include specific guidelines 
for compliance and create boards and commissions to enforce compliance. The 
following are some of the applicable state and federal laws: 
A. Idaho Human Rights Act 
B. Idaho Civil Rights Act, as amended. 
C. Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 
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D. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended. 
E. Civil Rights Act of 1968. 
F. Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 
G. Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972. 
H. Age Discrimination Act of 1975, as amended. 
I. Equal Pay Act of 1963. 
J. Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986. 
K. Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
L. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
M. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988. 
N. Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
0. Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended. 
P. Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1974, as amended. 
Q. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 
R. Executive Orders 
1. 1. Executive Order 11246, as amended by Executive Orders 11375 and 
12086. 
2. 2. Executive Order 11141. 
3. 3. Executive Order 12250. 
VI. Non discrimination and Affirmative Action Policy 
A. Dissemination of Revised/Updated Policies: Each time a substantive or 
procedural change is made to the Policy on Affirmative Action and 
Nondiscrimination, these actions will occur. 
1. Copies of this policy will be disseminated by the Affirmative Action 
Director with a cover letter from the President to all employees upon 
official adoption of the policy. Thereafter, each new employee shall be 
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given a copy of the current Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action 
brochure. 
2. To ensure effective implementation, deans, directors or heads of 
administrative units will brief their staff on the changes. 
3. Policy changes will be distributed to all Boise State student organizations, 
the campus newspapers, and the faculty/staff newsletter. 
4. This policy will be sent to each association representing university 
employees upon adoption of changes. 
B. Ongoing Implementation of the Policy on Nondiscrimination and Affirmative 
Action: 
1. To ensure effective implementation, deans, directors, and department 
chairs will explain the intent of the policy and individual responsibility 
during at least one staff meeting each year. 
2. A statement on Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action will be 
annually distributed by the Affirmative Action Director to all Boise State 
student organizations and published in campus newspapers and the 
faculty/staff newsletter. 
3. Posters stating the university's commitment to nondiscrimination will be 
displayed throughout the entire campus directing students, staff, and 
faculty to the appropriate office if they have a complaint of unlawful 
discrimination. 
4. This entire policy will be included in all supervisory and management 
manuals, procedure manuals, and employee handbooks. A summary of the 
policy will appear in the Student Handbook and Catalog each year. 
5. This policy will be discussed thoroughly in ASBSU training, employee 
orientation, and employee training programs. 
6. Special meetings will be conducted at least once a year by the Affirmative 
Action Director with deans and directors at all levels to explain the intent 
of the Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Policy and individual 
responsibility for effective implementation. 
7. Community organizations, employment agencies, news media, secondary 
schools, universities, colleges, and recruiting sources will be informed 
annually about the university's policy on Nondiscrimination and 
Affirmative Action by the Affirmative Action Director. 
8. At a minimum the Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Committee 
shall thoroughly review the policy on Nondiscrimination and Affirmative 
Action every third year in order to ensure its completeness and accuracy in 
light of changing legislation and conditions. 
VII. Responsibility for Administration and Implementation 
A. The President of the university has overall responsibility for the administration 
and implementation of the Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Policy. The 
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Affirmative Action Director will report directly to the President and will have the 
necessary top management support to execute the assignment. 
B. In consultation with all university employing officials and the 
Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Committee, the Affirmative Action 
Director is responsible for overall coordination of programs directed at employing 
individuals from under represented groups. 
C. Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Committee:: 
1. Membership: The Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Committee 
is appointed by the President of the university and shall consist of 
individuals representing the various constituencies of the university, 
including minority groups, women, students and the disabled. One 
member will be appointed by the Chairperson of the Faculty Senate, and 
two members each will be appointed by the Chair of the Association of 
Professional Staff, Association of Classified Employees and the 
Associated Student Body of Boise State University (ASBSU). The 
Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Committee shall have no less 
than 9 and no more than 15 voting members. The Affirmative Action 
Director and the Director of Human Resources are ex-officio, nonvoting 
members. The Chairperson of the Nondiscrimination and Affirmative 
Action Committee shall be a voting member. A term on the 
Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Committee shall be two years. 
Members may be reappointed for consecutive terms. 
2. Meetings: Meetings will be held at least once monthly during the 
academic year to ensure continuous attention to the affirmative action 
purposes detailed in this policy. 
3. Duties of the Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Committee: 
(a) To annually review the university's Affirmative Action Plan and 
annual reports and to make recommendations which further the 
goals of affirmative action and nondiscrimination at Boise State 
University. 
(b) To assist the Affirmative Action Director in establishing 
recommended target dates and goals for each administrative unit 
and academic department of the university in order to implement 
the Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Policy. These plans 
shall include unit recruitment plans for hiring of faculty and 
exempt personnel. The Committee shall review the unit plans for 
compliance with affirmative action and nondiscrimination every 
two years. 
(c) To make recommendations for appropriate university-wide 
initiatives or programs which will strengthen affirmative action 
and nondiscrimination at Boise State University. 
( d) To review the content of publications, handbooks, brochures, 
posters, letters, training programs, etc., at least every third year, 
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beginning in academic year 1993, to ensure compliance with 
current policy. 
(e) To study and investigate all matters related to affirmative 
action/nondiscrimination practices which relate to equal 
employment or education at Boise State University. Based on the 
results of study, the Committee shall recommend appropriate 
courses of action to the President. 
(f) To serve as a grievance committee for those cases involving 
discrimination claims. 
(g) To study and investigate all matters related to equal employment 
and educational opportunities at Boise State University. Based on 
· the results of studies and investigations, the Committee shall 
recommend appropriate courses of action to the President. 
4. Each dean, department head, and supervisor of Boise State University 
employees is responsible for full implementation of the Nondiscrimination 
and Affirmative Action Policy within his/her area. 
5. The Director of Affirmative Action, under the direction of the President, 
has the responsibility for ensuring compliance with federal and state 
regulations regarding equal employment and educational opportunities. 
The Director coordinates the Affirmative Action Program and advises the 
President and other administrators and faculty concerning statements of 
policy, the identification of problem areas, and methods of arriving at 
solutions to problems. The Director is an ex-officio member of the 
Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Committee. The Director has 
the overall responsibility of educating the university community regarding 
affirmative action. Other duties may be assigned from time to time by the 
President of the university, except the Affirmative Action Director may 
not serve on any hiring committees as a voting member. 
6. Duties of the Director of Affirmative Action: 
(a) Submit an Affirmative Action Annual Report each January to the 
University President. 
(b) Identify and research problem areas in relation to discrimination 
and develop and recommend appropriate solutions and policies to 
address those problems. 
( c) Implement and conduct audit and reporting procedures and 
systems in accordance with established Boise State policy. 
( d) Serve as liaison officer for Boise State University with appropriate 
federal and state agencies and community action groups concerned 
with problems of discrimination against women, minorities, and 
persons with a disability. 
( e) Assist complainants in channeling their discrimination complaints 
through appropriate grievance channels and lend technical 
assistance to grievance committees. 
(f) Conduct regular meetings with supervisors and employees and, as 
appropriate, with groups of students for the purpose of explaining 
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the Boise State University policies and procedures related to 
nondiscrimination and the applicable laws and regulations. 
(g) Ensure compliance with federal and state requirements for 
reporting and notifications whenever appropriate. 
(h) Coordinate activities aimed at motivating and counseling 
minorities, women, and disabled employees to seek training th~t 
would enhance their promotional opportunities. . 
(i) In consultation with the Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action 
Committee, monitor and certify institutional practices related to 
advertising, recruiting, selection, hiring, interviewing, salary 
analysis, promotion, and dismissal for compliance with the internal 
affirmative action program and the external requirements of state 
and federal governments in accordance with Boise State University 
policies. 
G) Monitor and certify institutional practices related to student 
recruitment, selection, and treatment for compliance with the 
internal affirmative action program and the external requirements 
of state and federal governments in accordance with Boise State 
University policies. 
D. Affirmative Action Planning Process: 
1. The Affirmative Action Director will assist each unit in conducting a work 
force analysis to determine if there are under represented groups in that 
unit's composition. Each unit will have a work force analysis on file in the 
Affirmative Action Office. The work force analysis will be updated every 
year. 
2. Based upon the work force analysis units which do not have members of 
under represented groups employed will create a recruitment plan which 
specifies how that unit will attempt to get more members of under 
represented groups into the hiring pool. 
3. After a position is filled, the department or unit head will complete a Unit 
Position Vacancy Folder which reports the success of the recruitment plan 
for each faculty or professional position filled. The Unit Position Vacancy 
Folder will be maintained in the Affirmative Action Office. 
4. Records and reports will be maintained and prepared in strict compliance 
with Executive Order 11246 as amended. Employment records, including 
tenure and promotion records and applications received for open positions, 
shall be maintained for a period of not less than two years. 
5. Annually, the Affirmative Action Director will analyze the number of 
minority group and women employees by organizational unit and job 
category and progress toward affirmative action goals will be reported. 






E. Recruitment for Employment: 
1. Applicants for employment are considered and placed with regard to their 
job skills, education, performance, and other bona fide occupational 
qualifications. Non-meritorious factors, such as age, race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin, ancestry, veteran status, sexual orientation, political 
affiliation, or the presence of any disability may not be considered, except 
where such is a bona fide occupational qualification or when the 
university is operating under an Affirmative Action Plan submitted to 
federal and state reviewing authorities. 
2. Recruitment sources will continue to be advised in writing of the 
university's policy and commitment to equal employment opportunity and 
must acknowledge their compliance with the program. 
3. The Affirmative Action Director will develop contacts with such 
recruitment sources as Veterans Employment Service, the Idaho State 
Department of Employment, the Idaho State Department of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, the University Placement Office, ethnic minority 
community groups, and women's caucuses of various professional 
organizations in an effort to increase the number of minority group and 
women applicants for all job openings. These contacts will be used in the 
recruitment process. 
4. When recruiting for academic and administrative exempt positions, the 
university will advertise openings in newspapers and in publications of 
minority and women's groups when appropriate. Advertisements will be 
approved by the Affirmative Action Director prior to publication. 
5. The employing officials of the university will focus on the creation of an 
atmosphere conducive to attracting and retaining minority group members 
and women. 
6. Employing officials of the university will keep written records of: 
(a) Efforts to locate minority and women candidates where these 
individuals are underutilized in the work force. 
(b) Correspondence and interviews with all candidates considered for 
each position to be filled. 
( c) Reasons for selecting the person who is offered a position. These 
records shall be submitted to the Affirmative Action Director for 
review and sign off approval before employment offers are 
extended and shall be maintained for a period of at least three 
years. 
7. Every university employing official must be prepared to justify to the 
Affirmative Action Director the nonselection of any applicant. 
8. The Department of Human Resources will continue to serve as the central 
recruiting office for all classified staff employment activities. While 
departments may have candidates whom they wish to consider for 
appointment, all such candidates must be referred to Human Resources for 
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subsequent referral to the department through the Idaho Personnel 
Commission. Records for classified staff concerning efforts to locate 
minority and women candidates and correspondence and interviews of 
candidates and certification documents shall be made available to the 
Affirmative Action Director and the Nondiscrimination and Affirmative 
Action Committee for continuous review. 
F. Employment and Placement: 
1. Applicants for employment are considered and placed with regard to their 
job skills, education, performance, and other bona fide occupational 
qualifications. Non-meritorious factors, such as age, race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin, ancestry, veteran status, sexual orientation, political 
affiliation, or the presence of any disability may not be considered, except 
where such is a bona fide occupational qualification or when the 
university is operating under an Affirmative Action Plan submitted to 
federal and state reviewing authorities. 
2. All non-classified proposed position descriptions and qualifications for 
university employment positions will be submitted for review to the 
Affirmative Action Director by employing officials of the university prior 
to the time the employment opportunity is announced. 
3. In filling vacant positions, the university will place a priority on internal 
promotions from among women, minorities, and persons with disabilities 
holding lower-level jobs. 
4. Employing officials will make reasonable efforts to improve employment 
opportunities for disabled employees and disabled applicants for 
employment. These efforts may include restructuring jobs, improving 
access to facilities, and making equipment changes. 
G. Employment Conditions: Benefits and employment terms such as salaries, 
accrual of seniority, and reinstatement rights shall be the same for pregnancy as 
for other temporary disabilities. 
H. Training: The Affirmative Action Director shall be responsible for the 
development of appropriate training and educational programs for minorities, 
women, and persons with disabilities and otherwise facilitate promotional 
opportunities for minorities and women. 
I. Termination Interview for Minorities and Women: The university employing 
officials should notify the Affirmative Action Director when termination of 
minority or women employees is anticipated. Minority and women employees 
who are being terminated from employment may, at the employee's discretion, be 
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interviewed by the Affirmative Action Director in an effort to reduce unnecessary 
turnover, to assist the university in becoming more responsible to the needs of 
individual employees, and to help attain the overall affirmative action goals of the 
university. 
J. Facilities and Activities: The university will not discriminate against any person 
in the operation or maintenance of the facilities, activities, or services of the 
university. This includes, but is not limited to, discrimination on the basis of age, 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, veteran status, sexual 
orientation, political affiliation, or the presence of any disability. 
K. Labor Union and Association Relations: While Boise State University is not 
now engaged in collective bargaining, it will include a nondiscrimination 
statement in any written agreement with unions or associations which in the future 
may be certified for representation for the purpose of collective bargaining at the 
university. 
L. Student Placement Services: The university will not make its placement 
services available to firms and school systems which request that the university 
violate equal opportunity laws. 
M. Salary Review: The university will, as a part of its annual budget preparation 
activities, undertake a salary review to determine if sex, race, age or other non-
legitimate factors impact salary levels. A report indicating the results of this 
review will be forwarded to the President and Vice Presidents. Results of the 
Salary Study will be included in the Annual Affirmative Action Report. 
N. Sexual Harassment In accordance with the EEOC guidelines the university 
defines sexual harassment as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: 
1. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term 
or condition of an individual's employment or education; 
2. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the 
basis for employment or educational decisions affecting that person; 
3. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual's work or educational performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive working or educational environment. (See BSU 
Policy 1070) 
0. Grievance Procedure: 
1. Grievance Procedures for Boise State Nondiscrimination and Affirmative 
Action Committee: 
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1) Purpose: To state clearly the means through which individual 
employees and students at Boise State University may forward and 
resolve grievances or complaints filed under this policy. 
(b) Rationale: All employees and students of Boise State should have 
the right to redress possible injustices or wrongs done to them. The 
accessibility, simplicity, speed, and high standards of fairness of 
the university's grievance procedures will encourage employees 
and students to choose internal means of redress and resolution 
rather than resorting to external means in seeking to overturn 
perceived injustices. 
(c) Statement of the Policy: Boise State University herewith affirms 
that it has procedures to deal with any grievance which may arise 
in matters of general personnel administration or student . 
participation in university programs. These may involve rights 
provided for under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its amendments, 
those rights guaranteed under Title IX of the Higher Education 
Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, pertinent state codes and 
rights provided for under the Boise State Policy or which directly 
affect the personal interest and well-being of an individual 
employee or student. These grievance procedures deal with 
possible discrimination that is not related to bona fide occupational 
qualifications such as job skills, education, and performance. This 
includes, but is not limited to, discrimination based on the basis of 
age, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, disability, 
veteran status, sexual orientation, or political affiliation. These 
procedures do not apply to complaints of harassment. (See BSU 
Policy 1070) 
( d) Implementation: 
a) Coverage is as stated above. 
2) Grievances which are covered under provisions of the 
Faculty Handbook, Administrative Handbook, Classified 
Staff Handbook, Idaho State Statutes, or student policies 
and procedures remain subject to those provisions. 
3) Grievances which do not involve the personal interest and 
well-being of an individual employee or student, and which 
are not otherwise covered by these procedures shall be 
referred to the appropriate administrative officer at the 
university. 
4) On eligibility, any employee, job applicant, or student who 
believes that he or she has been discriminated against, as 
noted above, through the action of one or a group of 
employee(s), supervisor(s), faculty member(s), or other 
person or persons acting for the university, may bring an 
informal or formal grievance under these procedures. 
5) Where a dispute exists as to whether a particular matter is 
subject to coverage by these grievance procedures, the 
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Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action Committee shall 
make an initial judgment on such matters of coverage. In 
making that judgment, the Nondiscrimination and 
Affirmative Action Committee will interpret the coverage 
of these procedures liberally. They will deny application of 
the procedures only where the matter in question clearly 
concerns issues of broad policy in which the complaining 
party has no direct interest, where the Committee has good 
reason to believe that a grievance has been brought in bad 
faith for political or similarly inappropriate reasons, where 
the grievance is covered under provisions of the items 
listed in item O.1.b. or in other circumstances in which use 
of these procedures would clearly endanger their 
effectiveness as an instrument for the redress of grievance. 
2. A variety of grievance procedures are available to all members of the 
campus community: faculty, professional staff, classified staff, and 
students. 
(a) Faculty members as defined by the Faculty Constitution may 
utilize the Faculty Grievance Procedure, BSU Policy 4480, 
outlined in the Faculty Handbook. 
(b) The professional staff may utilize the grievance and appeals 
procedure outlined in BSU 5450-C, Professional Staff Employees 
Grievances and Appeals, of the Administrative Handbook of 
Policies and Procedures. 
(c) Classified staff members under the State of Idaho Personnel 
Commission may utilize the grievance procedure as outlined in the 
BSU Handbook for Classified Employees and BSU policy 7440 
( d) Students should contact either the Assistant Director of Student 
Activities or the Affirmative Action Director to activate the 
grievance procedure as outlined in the BSU Student Handbook. 
Should students, for whatever reason, not wish to access the above 
mentioned offices, they may initiate contact with their Advisor or 
Department Chair. 
(e) Employees or students who feel they have been subjected to sexual 
harassment, any unwelcome sexual advance or verbal or physical 
abuse which interferes with an individual's ability to work or study 
on this campus may contact the Affirmative Action Director for 
assistance in processing a grievance under BSU Policy 1070. 
3. In any case involving a claim of discrimination any employee, applicant 
for employment or student may present his/her complaint directly to the 
Affirmative Action Director or to the chair of the Nondiscrimination and 
Affirmative Action Committee. The following procedure shall be followed 
by the Affirmative Action Director when handling a grievance. 
(a) Informal Grievance: 
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1) The employee, applicant, or student may first discuss his or 
her grievance with the individual who is the alleged cause 
of the grievance. 
2) If the employee, applicant or student is unable or unwilling 
to face the individual who is the alleged cause of the 
grievance, he/she may request to begin the informal process 
with the appropriate administrative official or department 
chairperson or with the Affirmative Action Director. 
3) If the grievance involves a question of judgment of opinion 
not covered by the Nondiscrimination and Affirmative 
Action Committee, the appropriate administrative official 
and the Affirmative Action Director shall counsel with the 
employee or student, the supervisor, and the department 
head to resolve the grievance, if possible. 
. 4) 4) If the grieving party chooses not to try the informal 
procedure, if the alleged perpetrator is unwilling to 
participate in the informal procedures, or if the informal 
procedure ends with no agreement, the grieving party may 
proceed to mediation or filing a formal grievance. 
(b) Mediation: 
1) The employee or student may choose to have the grievance 
mediated by a trained mediator. 
2) Procedures for mediation: 
... 
1) Submit to the Director of Affirmative Action a 
written request for mediation along with a 
description of the grievance and the name of the 
. alleged perpetrator. 
b) The Director of Affirmative Action will contact the 
alleged perpetrator to notify them of the complaint 
and explain mediation. 
c) If both parties agree to try mediation, a mediator 
will be chosen from a list of trained campus 
mediators. The mediator must be acceptable to both 
parties. The mediator selected will be notified by 
the Affirmative Action. 
d) Within five working days of the agreement on a 
mediator, the mediator will convene the first 
mediation session. 
e) If the parties are able to reach agreement through 
mediation in a reasonable amount of time (to be 
decided by the mediator), the agreement will be put 
in writing and signed by the parties. The original 
copy shall be kept on file in the Affirmative Action 
Office. 
f) If the parties are not able to reach agreement 
through mediation in a reasonable amount of time 
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(to be determined by the mediator), the mediation 
will be closed with a letter to that effect being filed 
with the Affirmative Action Office. 
3) If the grieving party chooses not to try mediation, if the 
alleged perpetrator is unwilling to participate in mediation, 
or if mediation ends with no agreement, the grieving party 
may proceed to filing a formal grievance. 
(c) Formal Grievance: 
1) If the aggrieved employee or student's grievance has not 
been resolved after informal steps, or mediation, or ifhe or 
she does not wish to use informal procedures, he or she 
may submit a request, in writing, for a formal investigation 
and/or grievance hearing to the Nondiscrimination and 
Affirmative Action Committee. 
2) Procedures: 
a) File a written request for a formal 
investigation/hearing with the Director of 
Affirmative Action or the Chair of the 
Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action 
Committee, stating the nature of the grievance, who 
the alleged perpetrator is and remedy needed to 
correct the situation. 
b) The Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action 
Committee will accept or not accept the request. 
The Committee will determine if the complaint falls 
within the guidelines of the Committee 
responsibility as defined by this policy. If the 
request is not accepted by the Committee, the 
Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action 
Committee chairperson shall state the reasons in 
writing. If accepted, the chairperson will convene 
the Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action 
Committee within 10 working days. A copy of the 
grievance will be forwarded to the accused party 
immediately upon approval of the grievance by the 
Committee. 
c) The Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action 
Committee shall conduct a formal 
investigation/hearing and shall reach a decision on 
recommendations in a timely manner after the close 
of the investigation or hearing. The procedures for 
hearings shall be: 
3 .1 The Chairperson will advise each party of 
the date, time, and place of the hearing. 
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3.~ The Committee may call such witnesses as it 
deems germane to the grievance. 
3.3 The Committee may request additional 
written statements and documents from each 
party. 
3 .4 The Committee will request the names of 
witnesses to be brought by each party and will 
request the witnesses to appear at the date, time, 
and place of the hearing. 
3.5 All parties are entitled to be accompanied by 
a counselor of their choice. 
3.6 The Committee reserves the right to close 
the hearing to the public and other witnesses. 
d) At any time during the investigation and/or hearing 
the complainant may withdraw his/her complaint. In 
that event, the proceedings will be terminated. 
e) The Committee chairperson, at the direction of the 
Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action 
Committee, shall recommend appropriate action to 
the President based on the findings of the 
investigation and/or hearing. A copy of the findings 
and recommendations will be given to the parties of 
the grievance as well. 
3) Appeal: 
a) The decision of the committee may be appealed in 
writing to the President within five ( 5) working 
days after receiving the decision. 
b) The President in turn will be expected to relay his 
decision on the appeal in writing to the aggrieved 
employee or student and the alleged perpetrator 
within 10 working days, with a copy to the Director 
of Affirmative Action and the Chair of the 
Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action 
Committee. 
c) With regard to formal grievance appeals, the 
decision of the President shall be final unless 
1) the grieving employee is a classified 
employee in which case that individual may 




2) The decision of the President is for 
termination, in which case the employee 
would have full right to due process as 
provided under university policy, State 
Board of Education policy, and Idaho Code. 
4) Nothing in this directive supersedes or amends grievance 
procedures set forth by valid contractual agreement. 
5) The grievance procedures spelled out above are in no way 
intended to limit the rights of employees or students under 
applicable federal and state laws. 
( d) Retaliation: Any retaliatory action of any kind taken by an 
employee of the university against another employee, applicant, or 
student of the university as a result of that person's seeking redress 
under these procedures, cooperating in an investigation, or other 
participation in any proceedings under these procedures is 
prohibited and shall be regarded as a separate and distinct 
grievable matter under these procedures, including the same range 
of sanctions applicable for the original grievable action(s). 
( e) Confidentiality: Confidentiality in the investigation is of the utmost 
importance to protect complainant and the university. Lack of 
confidentiality may lead to damaged careers/reputations and may 
undermine confidence and trust in the university. 
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Boise State University BSU Policy#: 1060 
July 1, 1995 
May 5, 1997 
November 1 , 2011 
NON-DISCRIMINATION AND ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICY 
Purpose: 
This Policy describes the University's commitment to provide a working and learning 
environment that is free of unlawful discrimination and harassment and how the 
University will address such allegations. 
Additional Authority: 
Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972; The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1976; the Equal Pay Act of 1963; 
sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; The Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990; Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 1008; The 
Vietnam Era_ Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act; Executive Order 11246, The 
Idaho Human Rights Act; as well as other applicable State and Federal laws. 
Scope: 
This Policy applies to all University employees, students, contractors, vendors, 
customer, or visitor to the University and anyone participating in a University sponsored 
activity (collectively "Members of the University Community"). 
Responsible Party: 
Marla Henken, EEO/AA Director 208-426-1979 
Blaine Eckles, Interim ADA/Section 504 Coordinator 208-426-1527 
POLICY 
I. Policy Statement 
11. 
Boise State University ("University") is committed to maintaining a working and 
learning environment that is free of unlawful discrimination and harassment and 
in which every employee, student, contractor, vendor, customer, and visitor is 
treated with dignity and respect. The University strives to create an environment 
that supports, encourages and rewards career and educational advancement on 
the basis of ability and performance. Accordingly, the University prohibits to the 
extent permitted by applicable law, discrimination and harassment against an 
individual on the basis of that person's race, color, religion, gender, age, sexual 
orientation, national origin, physical or mental disability, veteran status, genetic 
information, or any other status protected under applicable federal, state, or local 
law. 
Definitions EXHIBIT 
Page 1 of 6 I V 
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A. Protected Class: Protected class is a term used in anti-discrimination law 
to describe characteristics or factors which cannot be targeted for 
discrimination and harassment. For purposes of this Policy, the following 
characteristics are considered "Protected Classes" and, to the extent 
permitted by applicable law, individuals cannot be discriminated against 
based on these characteristics: race, color, religion, gender, age, sexual 
orientation, national origin, physical or mental disability, veteran status, 
genetic information, or any other status protected under applicable federal, 
state, or local law . 
B. Discrimination: Discrimination occurs when an individual or group of 
individuals is treated adversely (i.e. denied rights, benefits, equitable 
treatment, or access to facilities available to all others) based on the 
individual's or group's protected class. 
C. Harassment: Harassment is a form of discrimination. Harassment 
consists of unwelcome behavior that is based upon a person's protected 
class. Harassment includes conduct that demeans or shows hostility or 
aversion toward an individual because of his or her protected class and is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an intimidating, hostile or 
offensive environment for academic pursuits, employment, or participation 
in University sponsored activities. Harassing conduct may be verbal, 
written, visual or physical in nature. It includes, but is not limited to: 
1. Verbal abuse or hostile behavior such as insulting, name calling, 
teasing, mocking, degrading or ridiculing another person or group; 
2. Conduct that is physically offensive, harmful, threatening or 
humiliating such as impending or blocking movement, leering or 
staring; 
3. Unwelcome or inappropriate physical contact such as kissing, 
hugging pinching, patting, grabbling; 
4. Physical assault or stalking; 
5. Unwelcome or inappropriate sexual advances, flirtations, 
propositions, requests for sexual favors, comments, questions, 
epithets or demands; 
D. Sexual Harassment: Sexual Harassment is a form of sex discrimination. 
Sexual harassment is unwelcome sexual advances or behavior which 
affects employment decisions, makes the job or academic environment 
offensive or hostile, or unreasonably interferes with work performance or 
participation in a University program or activity. For purposes of this 
policy, sexual harassment includes (in addition to the examples provided 
above in paragraph C), but is not limited to: 
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1. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: 
a) Submission to the conduct is either an explicit or implicit 
term or condition of employment, basis for participation or 
advancement in an academic program, or basis for 
participation in a University activity or benefit, or basis for a 
vendor, contractor customer's ability to do business with the 
University; 
b) Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual 
influences employment decisions affecting the individual 
such as salary, wages, or performance evaluation, benefits, 
grade, \ or academic advancement in the case of an 
employee or student or business decisions affecting the 
individual or his/her company in the case of a vendor, 
contractor or customer; or 
c) Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an 
individual's work performance and is sufficiently severe and 
pervasive that it creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
environment. 
Ill. Reporting Responsibilities 
A. Management's Prevention and Reporting Responsibilities 
•·. 
1. Members of the University Community who (a) supervise other 
employees or students, contractors or vendors; (b) teach or advise 
students; or (c) have management authority related to a University 
sponsored program or activity must: 
a) Engage in appropriate measures to prevent violations of this 
Policy; and 
b) Promptly notify the Equal Employment 
Opportunity/Affirmative Action Office after being informed of 
or having a reasonable basis to suspect that there has been 
discrimination against, harassment of, or retaliation against a 
member of the University community; or 
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c) Promptly notify the Office of Students Rights and 
Responsibilities, if the alleged policy violator or the person 
who is the subject of the conduct is a student. 
B. Individual Responsibilities 
1. All Members of the University Community are responsible for 
participating in creating a campus environment free from prohibited 
discrimination and harassment and for following this policy. The 
University expects all Members of the University Community to 
avoid any behavior or conduct that could reasonably be interpreted 
as unlawful discrimination or harassment. 
2. All Members of the University Community are expected to treat 
each other with courtesy, consideration and professionalism as 
outlined in the University's Statement of Shared Values. 
3. Individuals who observe or are otherwise aware of discrimination, 
harassment or other inappropriate conduct that could be in violation 
of this Policy should report such conduct in accordance with this 
Policy. 
4. Members of the University Community are expected to cooperate 
with the University in any investigation of allegations under this 
Policy. 
5. Individuals who engage in personal social networking or other off-
duty activities could violate this Policy if such conduct creates or 
contributes to an intimidating, hostile or offensive work or campus 
environment. 
IV. Investigation Process 
A. Investigating a Complaint 
1. The Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action (EEO/AA) 
Office will promptly investigate all complaints of discrimination and 
harassment, in a manner it deems appropriate, based on the 
information available about the circumstances. Once an allegation 
is brought to the University's attention, the University will evaluate 
the need to investigate and take action, even if the complainant 
may not want to commence an investigation. 
2. During an investigation, the EEO/AA Office will take appropriate 
measures to ensure that any alleged discrimination or harassment 
does not reoccur. 
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3. The EEO/AA Office has the discretion to engage an outside 
investigator to conduct the investigation, depending on the 
circumstances giving rise to the investigation. 
4. The parties to the complaint will each have an opportunity to be 
heard during the investigation, and to provide witnesses and other 
evidence to the investigator. The parties to the complaint will also 
be informed of the status of the investigation as deemed 
appropriate. 
5. The University will use its best efforts to complete the investigation 
within thirty (30) days of the report of discrimination or harassment. 
Depending on the circumstances and nature of the complaint, 
extensions of time may be necessary to complete a thorough 
investigation. If additional time is needed, the University will notify 
the parties to the complaint of the extension. 
B. Investigation Findings 
1. The findings of the investigation will be communicated to the parties 
to the complaint. 
2. If based on the investigation the University determines that a 
violation of the Policy has occurred, the University will take action 
commensurate with the conduct to ensure that any discrimination, 
harassment or inappropriate behavior (if any) does not reoccur. 
The nature of the action and its implementation will depend upon 
the particular facts and circumstances. Corrective action may 
include a range of disciplinary measures up to and including 
immediate termination. 
3. If corrective action involves disciplinary action, appropriate 
disciplinary procedures will be followed. Sanctions imposed may 
be appealed through the appropriate appeals process depending 
on the status of the alleged policy violator. 
V. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality of complaints will be maintained on a "need to know" basis to the 
extent permitted by the circumstances and applicable law, and consistent with 
the University's obligations to thoroughly investigate the incident and 
circumstances 
VI. Retaliation 
A. The University prohibits any retaliation against an individual (by any 
Member of the University Community) who has made a good faith 
complaint under this policy or anyone who has cooperated in good faith in 
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the investigation of a compliant. The University will take every step 
necessary to protect the complainant and any witnesses against retaliation 
for bringing a complaint or for participating in its investigation. 
B. Any Member of the University Community who retaliates against an 
individual who complains of or witnesses discrimination or harassment or 
participates in the investigation of a complaint will be subject to 
appropriate disciplinary action. 
C. Complaints of retaliation should be reported under the reporting 
procedures set forth in this Policy. 
VII. Consequences of Policy Violations 
Any Member of the University Community who violates this policy will be subject 
to appropriate disciplinary action which in the case of an employee may include 
disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment. 
VIII. Contact Information 
Marla Henken 
EEO/AA Director 
191 O University Drive 
Administration Building, Suite 215D 




Interim ADA/Section 504 Coordinator 
1910 University Drive 
University Suites, Room C103 
Boise, ID 83725-1370 
208-426-3489 
beckles@boisestate.edu 
Page 6 of 6 
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JUN O 1 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 

















Case No. CV OC 1312890 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARLA S. HENKEN IN 
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Marla Henken, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I was employed by Boise State University as the Affirmative Action/ Equal 
Employment Opportunity Director from around October 2010 until June 2013. I am an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARLA HENKEN IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS 
IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
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2. I am making this Affidavit in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and all statements herein are based upon my personal knowledge. 
3. When I was the Affirmative Action, Equal Employment Opportunity Director, the 
policy existing at that time provided that allegations of discrimination or harassment should be 
brought to the Affirmative Action/ Equal Employment Opportunity Office or Title IX/Section 
504 Coordinator, as appropriate. At that time, The AA/EEO Director or Title IX/Section 504 
Coordinator investigated complaints of discrimination (as necessary), and in a manner it deemed 
appropriate, based on the information available. 
4. When I was the Affirmative Action/ Equal Employment Opportunity Director, 
Mr. Mendez did not contact me regarding an allegation of discrimination of his race and/or skin 
color during his employment with Boise State University's University Health Services. 
5. Further your Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2015. 
~>/IU-----
Marla Henken 
Residing at Meridian, Idaho 
My Commission expires: 01/14/2018 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARLA HENKEN IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS 
IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 1, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 







[ ] Email: rau1mendez2002@gmail.com 
~ 
David W. Cantrill 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARLA HENKEN IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS 
IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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JUN O 1 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
DEPUTY 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 
UNIVERSITY; MARIEL DOYLE 
Defendants. 
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS ) 
ss. 













Case No. CV OC 1312890 
AFFIDAVIT OF ELIZABETH 
GREANEY IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Elizabeth Greaney, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I was employed by Boise State University as the Executive Director of University 
Health Services at Boise State University from February 2011 to April 2013. 
2. I am making this Affidavit in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
AFFIDAVIT OF ELIZABETH GREANEY IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
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Judgment and all statements herein are based upon my personal knowledge. 
3. In my position at University Health Services, I was responsible for the day to day 
operations of University Health Services. This included ensuring all policies of Boise State 
University were followed, including policies for Equal Employment Opportunities and Non-
Discrimination and Anti-Harassment. 
4. I met Mr. Mendez briefly prior to his being hired and supported his hiring due to 
his technical skills as a lab tech and x-ray tech training. 
5. Mr. Mendez was hired at a $2.00 an hour higher rate of pay than other Customer 
Service Representatives, $11. 72 per hour, due to his experience in the medical profession. 
6. At the time Mr. Mendez was hired as a Customer Service Representative, I asked 
' 
Mariel Doyle, a lead Customer Service Representative and Technical Records Specialist to 
participate in the interview and hiring process, and supervise Mr. Mendez. 
7. In his position as a Customer Service Representative, I learned that Mr. Mendez 
had a number of issues occurred during the probationary period of Mendez's employment 
regarding the performance of his job duties, and I was personally aware that two employees had 
complained he was "looking them up and down." 
8. On October 5, 2011, I met with Mr. Mendez, Mariel Doyle and Mr. Andy Cover 
to discuss the issues on the "Record of Employee Conference" form. 
9. I was copied on an email from Mariel Doyle to Andy Cover dated November 10, 
2011, which contained attachments where Doyle had documented Mendez's employment issues 
and requested direction to proceed to terminate Mendez's employment. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ELIZABETH GREANEY IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY WDGMENT - 2 
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10. The issues with Mr. Mendez's performance of his job as a Customer Service 
Representative resulting in the recommendation for his termination were not related to Mr. 
Mendez's ethnicity as a Hispanic or his skin color. 
11. To my knowledge, Mr. Mendez did not contact Ms. Henken about a claim of 
discrimination. 
12. Mr. Mendez came to my home in Boise, Idaho, in October 2013 one evening at 
approximately 6:00 p.m. Mr. Mendez did not call me prior to coming to my home. His 
appearance at my home surprised me and made me very uncomfortable. 
13. Mr. Mendez told me he had hired a private investigator to find my address. 
14. I did not allow Mr. Mendez into my home; we spoke for over an hour on my front 
porch. 
15. At that time, Mr. Mendez asked me if I thought he had been discriminated 
against. I told him that I did not believe he had been discriminated against. 
16. Further your Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this~ day of May, 2015. _,, 
$¼MA~<~ 
Elizabeth Greane~ (j 
"& 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of May, 2015. 
,._, 
" ~Jg : 
I~ ~i,-.-~;gi -~-
rn er ... li(f 
Io ~o.11 a o~- < zf .I . o·· 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 1, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 







[ ] Email: rau1mendez2002@gmail.com 
Qdu4J;;Jj 
David W. Cantrill 
AFFIDAVIT OF ELIZABETH GREANEY IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
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' David W. Cantrill 
ISB #1291 
JUN O 1 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 
UNIVERSITY; MARIEL DOYLE 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 













Case No. CV OC 1312890 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDY COVER IN 
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Andy Cover, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I was employed by Boise State University as a Senior Human Resources 
Specialist from September 15, 2005 until April 30, 2015. 
2. I am making this Affidavit in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDY COVER IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
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Judgment and all statements herein are based upon my personal knowledge. 
3. As a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Boise State University and 
University Health Services. UHS has established employment policies governing its classified, 
i.e., non-exempt, employees. IDAPA 15.04.01.150 provides for an explicit initial probationary 
period for new hires consisting of the first 1,040 hours worked. Where the employee works 
straight time, this probationary period typically lasts about six months. 
4. During the probationary period, the employment is purely at will and is 
terminable by the employer or the employee at any time and for any reason. 
5. On October 10, 2011, I met with Raul Mendez. Mr. Mendez told me he felt he 
was being trained and evaluated differently than previous Customer Service Representatives 
(CSRs) and he may be being discriminated against because of his ethnicity. 
6. I told Mr. Mendez that if he believed that he was being discriminated against he 
should contact Marla Henken, the Director of Affirmative Action I Equal Employment 
Opportunity at Boise State University; as the Director of Affirmative Action I Equal 
Employment Opportunity at Boise State University was the University's official point of contact 
for the receipt and investigation of discrimination complaints. 
7. On October 17, 2011, I met with Mr. Mendez, Dr. Libby Greaney and Ms. Doyle 
to discuss the issues on the "Record of Employee Conference" form. 
8. To my knowledge, Mr. Mendez did not contact Ms. Henken about a claim of 
discrimination. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDY COVER IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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9. The issues with Mr. Mendez's performance of his job as a Customer Service 
Representative resulting in the recommendation for his termination were not related to Mr. 
Mendez's ethnicity as a Hispanic or his skin color. 
10. Further your Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this _J__ day of May, 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this it_ day of May, 2015. 
Residing at ~ JJ'tut.J Idaho 
My Commission expires: D l,. \ Y ~ 'LO /g 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDY COVER IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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.. 1 • I, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 1, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 







[ ] Email: raulmendez2002@gmail.com 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDY COVER IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
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I I,_--;_ ,\· I• ,i_,r 
--Iv--'"- " .. ., .1~ \ 
. -. ·\ \ . ., '.o"' '/ . 1;--. 
. ·_;-V- ~I J 
\ \"' l \ Raul Mendez 
V, 
2712 N Goldeneye Way 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 
Telephone: (208) 860-5037 
Rmendez79@hotmail.com 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES BOISE 
STATE UNIVERSITY, MARIEL DOYLE 
Defendant. 
I, R{lu/ Mendez, swear under oath: 
Case No. CV OC 1312890 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF OPPOSING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. Plaintiff understands that according to IRCP 56(C), a 
response must be filed 14 days prior to the Summary Judgment hearing. However, there is no such 
hearing set in either of the two "Orders governing proceedings and setting trial" therefore he will respond 
to Defendant's Motion within 14 days since it is not clear what the timeframe to respond is. Plaintiff 
takes issue with the fact that Defendant is now asking this case to be entirely dismissed when the matter 
has been unnecessarily delayed- as Plaintiff previously stated during hearings. The case has not been 
delayed due to any additional discovery in the fonns of depositions or interrogatories. Plaintiff believes 
that if Defendant intended to file for a dismissal of all claims that it should have done so on September 
2014. In fact, Defendant previously asked Plaintiff to Vacate the original trial date because it was not 
ready for Trial (Exhibit 1, 2 pages), but nothing has changed in the interval and only Plaintiff deposition 
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has been taken plus Requests for Interrogatories and Admissions were submitted all the way back around 
December 2013. 
PLAINTIFF BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff is a native of El Salvador in Central America. He moved to Idaho about 19 years ago with his 
parents and siblings. His parents felt that because of the family's affiliation to the Mormon Church that 
Idaho or Utah would be ideal places to live. His parents also believed that these would be good places to 
get away from the recently ended Civil war and the subsequent chaos of rampant organized crime. Indeed, 
Boise seemed like the ideal place to start a new life. 
Plaintiff learned a new language and did his best to integrate to a new country and a different way of life. 
Plaintiff went to college at BSU and was accepted into the X-ray program which is one of the most 
competitive programs nationwide. Subsequently, Plaintiff started to work in this society but it is the 
workplace where Plaintiff found out just how difficult Idaho is of a place to live for minorities. 
Plaintiff also served in the US Army for about a year prior to being discharged for a medical reason. This 
was one of my best experiences in life because in many ways the military has succeeded where the civil 
side has not in creating a sense of unity and camaderie among people of many different backgrounds. In 
the Army, I was exposed to a true melting pot and I realized just how different white Americans can be 
from different paiis of the country. 
Defendant is trying to portray Plaintiff as someone who accuses employers of discrimination since they 
felt it was appropriate to bring the SARMC case into this matter. Plaintiff objects to Defendant's use of 
that case for purposes of a Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. Nonetheless, Plaintiff believes it 
is relevant to include in his Affidavit an article from the Sociology department at Boise State that talks 
about the history of racism against Latinos in Idaho (exhibit 2, 5 pages). You can skip the entire article 
and go to the last paragraph which is striking because it sheds light on the root of the problem. In 2008, 
an Idaho Statesman staff wrote a column extolling Boise's tolerance and good will only to be bombarded 
000151
with letters and emails recounting acts of discrimination and racism. Furthermore, the article points to 
some stats from 2012 in which it mentions that Hispanics are disproportionately overrepresented in Idaho 
prisons with about 16 percent. The problem is that the white majority and colored minority live in the 
same country and society, but living in two different worlds. Whites and minorities see issues such as 
discrimination thru different lenses. Some Sociologists and Civil Rights Activists see it as white privilege 
not wanting/needing to hear the truth of colored people. Most people in Idaho like the Statesman 
I 
columnist claim there is no issue with discrimination while having little or no contact with minorities. 
Plaintiff has found thru talking with other minorities and refugees in Boise that most of their complaints 
of discrimination are usually related to the workplace; where it might be the only place white people are 
in contact with other ethnic groups. Plaintiff is far from a malcontent complaining about discrimination 
in the workplace, but the reality is far different out there for minorities. Sociologists believe that the 
issue persists because the organizations and policies against discrimination have been largely ineffective. 
Indeed, Plaintiff has learned from his own experiences and talking to Lawyers that discrimination cases 
are one of the most difficult to prove/win, the EEOC issues the majority of findings with no probable 
cause, and the Courts are very biased towards corporate/wealthy/affluent as shown on Court repositories. 
In America, of course that the concentration of wealth and power is heavily on white America. No 
wonder many of the people that I talked prefer not to do anything about their discrimination complaints 
because the procedures and remedies are largely ineffective. 
Plaintiff has enjoyed working in healthcare because it has allowed him to meet people from all different 
spectrum of society. I had the opp01iunity to meet good/kind white people that were nice and 
appreciative but for the most prui it has been difficult to succeed in Idaho due my experiences at SARMC 
and UHS. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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Plaintiff understands that Prose litigants are held to same rules of procedure and evidence as Defendants 
who are represented by counsel. However, Plaintiff takes issue with Defendant bringing up the 
withdrawal of Attorneys in an unrelated case or the findings of Judge Candy Dale on the SARMC case. 
Plaintiff has chosen to represent himself because he finds that in a corrupt Legal system that American 
Attorneys are unreliable to the people, and some former Judges/Lawyers suggest as much on the internet 
(remorse perhaps?). Plaintiff realized among other things that the Hawley Troxell, Givens Pursley, 
Holland & Hart, and even the medium size Firms of this country represent exclusively the insurance 
companies, corporations, government, and the affluent, which is a good indication· of how the system 
really works. My only mistake was wasting so much money on Lawyers that did nothing for me. 
Plaintiff understands that to fight Summary Judgment he must support his response with Affidavits, 
depositions, answer to interrogatories, or admissions on file. Plaintiff has chosen not to spend more than 
a thousand dollars on each deposition knowing how biased the Courts are towards the wealthy/affluent 
and how common it has become for Comts to Grant Summary Judgments. Plaintiff cannot provide 
suppo1ting Affidavits from witnesses because they are scared of Lawyers/Courts, but they will testify on 
Plaintiff behalf during Trial. However, Plaintiff is supporting his Affidavit with Defendant's responses to 
interrogatories and admissions on file (exhibit 3, 8 pages). Plaintiff believes that the Court cannot make a 
proper adjudication/evaluation for Summary Judgment based on a single deposition. Plaintiff has to be 
given the opportunity to present witnesses at trial. 
MENDEZ EMPLOYMENT HISTORY WITH UHS 
Plaintiff sta1ted to work with Defendant on 8/24/2011 and upon hire he was given information such as the 
"classified employee action form" in which it was understood that he would have a probationary period of 
1,040 hours and the evaluation would be around 2/24/2012. According to IDAPA 15.04.01.150 "the 
probationary period in any classification must be completed within a single agency uninterrupted by 
termination or dismissal." According to ID APA 15.04.01.152 "if a probationary employee does not serve 
satisfactorily, the appointing authority, must no later than thirty calendar days after the expiration of the 
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probation period, provide the employee and the Division of Human Resources a perfonnance evaluation 
indicating unsatisfactory performance." The key phrase being after the expiration of the entrance 
probation period which is defined as one thousand forty (1,040) hours of service. Furthermore, Plaintiff 
was informed on l 0/27/2011 that the "anticipated date for the completion of the probationary period is 
February 24, 2012" but because of overtime worked that it would end before that (exhibit 4, 6 pages). 
UHS was very short-staffed during the time Plaintiff was there and he stayed late helping out where 
needed as letters of recommendation show that he was an excellent team player and performing his job 
(exhibit 5, 2pages). Ms. Swanson who was my first supervisor at UHS states that "in working closely 
with him during a very busy closing time one afternoon, I learned that he took his work seriously and 
would go to great lengths to make sure all responsibilities were covered." Another Hispanic coworker at 
UHS states that "Raul is flexible and willing to work on any project or hours assigned to him. He is great 
at multi-tasking as evidenced by the many times he worked by himself when the facility was short-
staffed." 
When p~ople talk about racial profiling, they think about Law enforcement but a google search defines it 
as follow: 
Racial profiling is the act of suspecting or targeting a person on the basis of observed 
characteristics or behavior. Racial profiling is often based on prejudice, which is defined as the 
formation of preconceived judgments or opinions without just grounds or before obtaining 
sufficient knowledge. 
Eric Quintero was the only other Hispanic male at Boise State's UHS. He was also accused and targeted 
by the institution of the exact same "issues" namely: poor performance, negative attitude, issues with 
interpersonal skills, and inappropriate interaction with patients, tardiness, and alleged issues with sexual 
harassment. In short, UHS is a place that seeks to intentionally exclude/alienate minorities and it's an 
unwelcoming place for diversity and inclusion. Mr. Quintero warned me about the undercurrent of anti-
Hispanic bias at the facility and he also pointed out to the Idaho Human Rights Commission that he felt 
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there was sex discrimination towards males. He felt discriminated but like many others feels that the 
procedures and remedies against discrimination are mostly ineffective. In fact,just like with Plaintiff the 
Defendant talks about the "many issues" with Mr. Quintero and "his behavior" while checking out 
females, which Defendant attributes to culture (exhibit 6, 2 pages). Likewise, Defendant talks about 
gathering extensive documentation about the "issues" but there is no mention anywhere about creating a 
performance improvement plan as outlined on Defendant's policy. Mr. Quintero and Plaintiff were 
subjected to racial profiling and Defendant seemed more concerned of documenting "issues" rather than 
follow their own policies by creating a performance improvement plan for them. Quite frankly the entire 
doc~mentation submitted as response I 1 (oflnterrogatories) is negative and biased. 
On 11/10/201 I, Ms. Doyle send an email to multiple recipients including Ms. Greaney and Mr. Cover in 
which she states that "we have decided that he has failed to pass his entrance probation period" and sent 
supporting documentation. However, it appears that Ms. Doyle started gathering documentation as early 
as 9/27/2011; not even a month into my employment with UHS on which by Defendant's own admission 
Plaintiff was still in training. Most people would agree that it's questionable for an employer to be 
gathering such extensive documentation Uust like with Mr. Quintero) rather than providing an adequate 
training and supervision of the job of a new employee in the training/probationary stage. What was really 
the purpose behind such documentation? Because it appears that all along the intent was to not allow 
Plaintiff the opp01iunity to complete the probationary period that is provided by State policies. In fact, 
email communication between agents suggest that the decision to terminate Plaintiff employment arose as 
early as I 0/4/2011 in which Ms. Doyle states that "he was just hired and is on probation" and she asks 
about what steps "we need to release him"(exhibit 7, 10 pages). Around the exact same time on 
I 0/7 /20 I I, Defendant is also discussing steps to take against Eric Quintero (see page 2, exhibit 6). 
It is worth noting that Ms. Doyle noted the following on I 0/26/2011, "his training will formally end on 
November I 5th" on paragraph 5 of her documentation. She also acknowledge that "his probation ends 6 
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months from his staii date on February 241h", and "I invited him to search for other employment". 
Plaintiff believes that his termination on November 151'\ 2011 to have been premeditated all along. 
Defendant has a performance management team in charge of: 1. Creating a review of the job description 
and duties, 2. Setting performance expectations, 3. Keeping performance on target, 4. Realigning 
performance, and 5. Ensuring a comprehensive performance evaluation. Furthermore, Defendant has a 
very detailed "performance action/improvement plan" guidance for supervisors that feel that an 
employee's perfonnance or conduct is deficient (exhibit 8, 8pages). Yet, Plaintiff was never given a job 
description, performance expectation, new employee orientation, or institutional policies when he first 
started to work on 8/24/2011. 
On October 25, 2011 Dr. Greaney discusses the fact that UHS is still refining new employee check lists 
for all employees. On October 26 2011 Ms. Doyle is requesting "new employee orientation handbooks" 
for Jacee who had just started and for Raul- two months after he started. On October 28,2011, Ms. Doyle 
informed Plaintiff that "I have not finished the CSR check list. I am still working on it." On November 9, 
2011 the job description for CSR ( customer service) was still being discussed during Staff meetings. The 
CSR checklist/job description was not signed because UHS was still working on it long after Plaintiff was 
terminated! (Exhibit 9, 5 pages). 
Despite the fact that the University has paid staff in charge of creating job descriptions, performance 
expectations, and improvement plan; Plaintiff was denied training, subjected to higher standards of 
employment, disciplined, suspended and discharged when there was not even a job 
description/expectations in place. 
He was given policies and orientation package two months after starting date. Furthermore, rather than 
focusing (following its own policies) in providing an adequate training/supervision/improvement plan; 
Defendant seemed intent on document "deficiencies" with the goal of terminating employment months 
before the end of probationary period. Discussion on steps to release him were taking place little over a 
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month into his employment on 10/4/2011 (see exhibit 7, page 8) and the final determination to discharge 
him was made on l 0/27/2011 the same day Plaintiff finally received the "new employee orientation 
package." (See exhibit 7, page 9-10). 
Also, on 10/27/2011 @ 940am Mr. Cover states the following: 
"while it is difficult to treat everyone the same, we will want to make sure we try very hard to provide the 
same information to everyone and treat everyone consistently ..... if Raul eventually can't make his 
probationary period due to the work related reasons you have outlined, we will want to make sure it is 
because ·of his inability to perform, not because we didn't put forth the effort." (Exhibit I 0). 
Of course, this was the day Plaintiff was finally provided with the new employee orientation package. 
Defendant displays concern in making sure Jacee (who is white) the recently started employee gets the 
orientation package right away while also praising her work as being promising. Later on the same day 
I 0/27/2011 @ 2:55pm Ms. Doyle writes the following: 
"Due to Raul's continued inability to perform we need to know what to do to process his termination" and 
Mr. Cover replies with "I am sorry that you have reached this employment option." (See exhibit 7, 9-10) 
So, sh01tly after Plaintiff is provided with information that he should have been given on 8/24/11 and just 
a few hours after talking about treating everyone the same consistently, Defendant is talking about ending 
Plaintiff employment. 
Defendant claims that Plaintiff never complained of discrimination with the University's EEOC Officer. 
However, Defendant has admitted that Mr. Cover was notified of Plaintiff discrimination claims on 
10/10/2011. Defendant's policy #1060 state under investigating a complaint (Exhibit 11, 4pages): 
Once an allegation is brought to the university's attention, the university will evaluate the need to 
investigate and take action, even if the complainant may not want to commence an investigation. 
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In addition, Mr. Quintero also raised the same concerns with Human Resources. It appears that not only 
was Plaintiff complaint not investigated but the alleged issues with sexual harassment leveled against him 
and Quintero were also not investigated as well. I was certainly never made aware of any concerns with 
females being uncomfortable and I only became aware of it during the Commission proceedings. Now, 
whether Defendant took my complaints of discrimination seriously by conducting an investigation /taking 
action is open to question-as proven by the lack of a developed performance improvement plan and the 
lack of additional training/supervision that plaintiff requested. 
Defendant also claims that they never received a response to the 10/5/2011 disciplinary memo. However, 
that response was provided to Mr. Cover on 10/10/2011 when I raised my concerns with discrimination 
and later on the same day Mr. Cover met with UHS agents to discuss Plaintiff concerns/response. On 
10/24/2011, Ms. Doyle acknowledge that she was still working on a reply to Plaintiff response, but as the 
evidence shows only three days later the decision was made to terminate Plaintiff. (Exhibit 12, 3 pages). 
Defendant has admitted that Plaintiff was hire at a higher pay due to his experience in the medical field 
and Plaintiff does not dispute that fact. Plaintiff claims arise out of the fact that Defendant did not follow 
their own policies, refused to provide adequate training and supervision while often leaving Plaintiff 
alone or refusing to provide assistance to him, other staff made the same mistakes but only Plaintiff was 
singled out for discipline, he was formally disciplined without any verbal warning, he was retaliated 
almost immediately after complaining of discrimination. Furthermore, the other Hispanic employee was 
subject of the same accusations/treatment by Defendant. 
My Attorney told me to hire an investigator to track down Dr. Libby Greaney around the time she was 
included as a Defendant on this case on July 2013. I talked to Dr. Greaney in July 2013. She told me that 
part of the reason she had been asked to leave was because she was against the student health insurance 
charging hidden fees to students, she was opposed to the President aggressively trying to sell UHS to St 
Luke's Health systems and St Luke's bringing their own people to UHS, etc. She asked me to have the 
Attorney remove her from the claim and in return "everything would come out". She also made it clear 
000158
that my termination from UHS was related to the SARMC claim in Federal Court and it was Mr. 
Fearnside (BSU Lawyer) who had recommended all along to terminate Plaintiff. Mr. Fearnside wife is a 
Lawyer for SARMC. SARMC requested employment/mitigation efforts as part of discovery around the 
same time Plaintiff was working at UHS and the hospital knew I was employed there so I wouldn't doubt 
Dr. Greaney assertions. 
Defendant claims that Plaintiff was terminated for a number of unremitting performance issues. 
However, they have admitted the only disciplinary memo is the one provided to Plaintiff on 10/5/2011 
(exhibit 13) that addresses issues on the previous TWO days and without any kind of prior verbal 
warning. Frnthermore, that memo states at the bottom: "describe agreed upon solutions or course of 
action" and "note follow up review plan". However, those guidelines for performance improvement plan 
(exhibit 8) were never followed. Furthermore, Defendant has admitted on emails as part of answers to 
interrogatory #11 that: "we are refining our employee checklist, I'm still working on the CSR checklist, 
and on 10/27/2011 Plaintiff was finally provided with an orientation handbook containing policies; two 
months after he staited (exhibit 9). In shmt, what was the criteria used to create formal discipline when 
Plaintiff was unaware of policies at the time, there was no description/expectations of the job. 
Plaintiff was asked to submit a response to the memo which was provided to Defendant on 10/10/2011 
and to which Ms. Doyle was asking for another copy of it on I 0/24/11 ( exhibit 12). However, on 
I 0/27/2011 Defendant had already made the final decision to end Plaintiff employment only a few days 
after he raised complaints of discrimination on his written response (exhibit 7, page9). The admissions on 
file by Defendant only help to prove plaintiff was right about feeling discriminated; for example on 
I 0/4/2011 which was the day before the Disciplinary memo, Defendant was talking about how to release 
him ( exhibit I 0, page8). Notably, it was only after Plaintiff response and complaint to Mr. Cover in HR 
that Defendant provided him with a new employee orientation package and steps were taking to work on 
a CSR job description. 
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It is a great contradiction for Defendant to discipline plaintiff on 10/5/2011 for not having proper eye 
contact and not looking at people, then file for Summary Judgment claiming Plaintiff was gawking and 
staring at females up and down just as the same accusation leveled at the other Hispanic employee. Also, 
Plaintiff was disciplined for not loading insurance, yet on 10/4/11 and 10/6/11 emails were sent to all staff 
because that step was being forgotten by everyone but only Plaintiff was singled out and chastised with 
formal discipline. Defendant admits that on those days "it is very busy with flu shots." Plaintiff also 
provides samples of encounter forms where the other staff were not downloading insurance information 
on the same day Plaintiff was formally disciplined (exhibit 14, 9pages). The employee creating the form 
can be verified on the electronic chart system. 
On 11/15/2011, Plaintiff was told that he would be terminated if he didn't resign- which is a constructive 
discharge. He was given an evaluation on the same day stating that: he does not achieve performance 
standards and he had failed to complete the entrance probation period. He was told that he was suspended 
on administrative leave from 11/15/2011 to 11/30/2011. (Exhibit 15, 5 pages). However, according to 
IDAPA 15.04.01.152 "if a probationary employee does not serve satisfactorily, the appointing authority, 
must no later than thirty calendar days after the expiration of the probation period, provide the employee 
and the Division of Human Resources a performance evaluation indicating unsatisfactory performance." 
The reason for termination was because of not serving satisfactorily and the expiration of the probation 
period ended on February 24, 2012. The evaluation was to be provided 30days after 2/24/2012. 
According to IDAPA 15.04.01.150 ''the probationary period in any classification must be completed 
within a single agency uninterrupted by termination or dismissal." However, admissions on file by 
Defendant prove that the decisions to terminate Plaintiff took place months before the end of probation 
(see exhibit 7 page 5 and page 8). Defendant admissions focus entirely on steps to end Plaintiff 
employment rather than providing Plaintiff with training, supervision, and a performance improvement 
plan per policies. Indeed, the evaluation given to Plaintiff with a zero rating state that: "this requires a 
special follow up evaluation and performance improvement plan". The 10/5/2011 memo also state that a 
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performance improvement plan is required but Defendant withdrew the disciplinary memo on 10/17/2011 
and he was also told that he would be provided with an orientation package/training (exhibit16 and see 
paragraph 22 amended complaint). Even if Defendant now denies that the formal reprimand was 
removed, they have admitted that on 10/24/11 they were still working on a reply to Plaintiff own response 
(see exhibit 12, page 1) and on 10/27/11 they made the final decision to terminate Plaintiff employment 
(see exhibit 7, pages 9-10). 
Plaintiff swears under oath never to have seen the "Mendez training sheet" that Defendant alleges was 
provided to him on November 1, 2011; in part because as evidence shows that Defendant was still 
working on refining training, skills, and job description for the position even after Plaintiff was 
terminated (exhibit 9). Furthermore, it has to be noted that Defendant claims Plaintiff refused to sign it on 
11/1/2011 after they had made the final determination to terminate Plaintiff employment (exhibit 7, pages 
9&10). 
B. DISPARATE TREATMENT ON THE BASIS OF RACE 
It is pretty damning for Defendant to admit that the other Hispanic employee was subjected to identical 
hostile/discriminatory treatment. As part of response 11, they submitted emails talking about Mr. 
Quintero's negativity, performance issues, and his behaviors in particular while checking out females 
(exhibit 6). All of this around exactly the same time that Plaintiff was equally being racially profiled and 
the institution admitted that they felt it was an issue with culture. For example: on 10/7/2011, there was a 
discussion about documenting the many "issues" of Quintero while simultaneously, on 10/4/2011 
Defendant was talking about terminating Plaintiff (exhibit 7, page8). 
Of course that Defendant's "steps to release him" resulted in the 10/5/2011 Formal discipline for issues 
on the previous two days. Notably, there was a lot of discussion about documenting the "issues" for both 
Hispani,c employees but not a single mention of how to formulate a plan to improve performance as 
outlined on Defendant's policies (exhibit 8) 
000161
Defendant claims that their legitimate reasons are as follow: 
*Mendez made inappropriate conversations with patients and gave them medical advice----However, the 
10/5/2011 formal reprimand does not address this issue, nor is there any other documented warnings. 
Plaintiff denies this pretextual reason. 
*Mendez was untimely to work and stayed past hours----the 10/5/2011 makes no mention of this issue 
and there is no evidence of further warnings. Defendant has admitted that facility was short-staffed and 
were busy during flu-shots and as a result Plaintiff was asked to stay later to be able to complete tasks 
(exhibit 5). 
*Mendez repeatedly failed to follow procedures to check out patients, input insurance information 
correctly, handle employee flu shots and made errors resulting in a provider having to do a no charge on 
an office visit----Plaintiff has proven that Defendant did not provide him with an orientation package until 
two months later on 10/27/2011 when the new CSR (who is white) received her orientation package 
immediately (exhibit 9, page2). The same day on 10/27/2011 Defendant made determination to terminate 
Plain ti ff ( exhibit 7, pages 9& 10). Plaintiff has proven that Defendant did not even have a defined job 
description/expectation of the job while he was employed ( exhibit 9). Plaintiff has proven that other 
employees similarly situated were making the exact same mistakes on the same day Plaintiff was 
disciplined (exhibit 14). Plaintiff has proven that Defendant refused to provide him with the training, 
supervision, and opp01tunities to address the alleged "issues"(exhibit 8), since there is no evidence that 
Defendant even made the attempt to provide Plaintiff with a performance improvement plan, instead the 
evidence shows that the focus was on documenting "issues" soon after Plaintiff had complained of 
discrimination. 
*Mendez made staff feel uncomfortable with his negative comments, negative attitude and inappropriate 
"gawking" and looking people ''up and down"----there is no evidence that during his entire employment, 
Plaintiff was disciplined or informed about such serious allegation, but Plaintiff was disciplined on 
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10/5/201_ 1 for not having eye contact which was explained on my response as part of my discrimination 
complaint to Mr. Cover that in my culture like so many others, it is a sign of respect for authority/elders. 
UHS felt that this warranted discipline on 10/5/2011, ignoring the cultural implications but now they are 
claiming that I was "Gawking". Notably, Defundant relates the alleged inappropriate "Gawking" by the 
two Hispanic employees to culture. Plaintiff believes that Defendant own admissions raise issues of 
material fact. 
C. RETALIATION 
On 10/5/2011, Plaintiff received a formal reprimand for alleged issues taken place on the TWO days prior 
and for which other staff were making the same mistakes. Plaintiff met with Dr. Greaney and Ms. Doyle 
and he was told that he had the right to respond to it. On 10/6/2011, Plaintiff contacted Mr. Cover to set 
up an appointment after Ms. Swanson gave him the HR contact. 
On 10/10/201 1, Plaintiff provided Mr. Cover with a response to the formal reprimand and he told Mr. 
Cover that he felt that he was being discriminated due to the fact that as outlined on his response: 
1) Plaintiff never received any kind of verbal warning prior to a formal reprimand as outlined on 
Defendant's policies (exhibit8). The policies have a very detailed step by step to follow for 
disciplinary procedures and performance improvement. However, Defendant claims issues arose 
in the past two days. 
2) Plaintiff pointed out that other staff were making the same mistakes but only he was formally 
disciplined (exhibit 14). Terri Lee and Eric Quintero felt that I was not being provided adequate 
training and supervision. The two CSR's felt that it was rotten for UHS to be giving Plaintiff a 
write up soon after starting and while in training. 
3) Plaintiff told Mr. Cover that Ms. Doyle had to attend to other duties leaving Plaintiff by himself 
most of the time. 
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4) Plaintiff asked Mr. Cover if it was normal for institution to formally discipline employees while 
in training. Indeed, Defendant has admitted that Plaintiff was still in training when he was 
formally reprimanded. Defendant told Plaintiff on 10/27/2011 that "his training will fonnally end 
on November I 5th" (exhibit 7, page5). Notably, later on the same day after providing Plaintiff 
with the orientation package; there was an email where agents had taken decision to tenninate 
Plaintiff (exhibit 7, page 9&10). Defendant told Plaintiff his training would end on 11/15 
because that was the day they would tenninate him; long before his probation was over (exhibit 
15). 
Plaintiff was told by Mr. Cover that he would discuss my concerns of discrimination with UHS 
management. Indeed, emails between agents and Mr. Cover show that they were going to meet with 
Mr. Cover later on 10/10/2011 (exhibit 12 page 3). 
Plaintiff met with Dr. Greaney, Mr. Cover, and Ms. Doyle on 10/17/2011 (exhibit 16). In the meeting 
plaintiff concerns with discrimination were discussed. Plaintiff was told that the fonnal reprimand 
would be removed, he would get a new employee orientation package, UHS would fonnulate a CSR 
job description and he would get better supervision. There was no mention of a performance 
improvement plan because the formal reprimand was removed. I was told that my concerns on my 
response would be addressed in writing. 
Indeed the evidence shows that Plaintiff finally received the orientation package two months later and 
steps were being taken to work on a CSRjob description only after Plaintiff rose concerns of 
discrimination (exhibit 9). Fmihermore, the very same day that Plaintiff received orientation package 
and policies on 10/27/2011, Defendant made the decision to terminate employment (exhibit 7, 9&10); 
just a few days after he had complained of discrimination and had met with UHS management and 
Mr. Cover. 
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Plaintiff believes the evidence on record shows there is enough issue of material fact relating to his 
retaliation claim. 
D AND E. IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. BREACH OF 
IMPLIED CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT. 
It is understood that BSU is a political subdivision of the State of Idaho and as such it has to comply 
with the rules of the Division of Human Resources & Idaho Personnel Commission. Those rules 
provide that a State employee is to complete a six month probationary period uninterrupted by 
termination. Those same rules state that if an employee is terminated due to poor performance that an 
evaluation is to be provided after the expiration of the six month probation. Defendant clearly acted 
in bad faith when they did not follow State policies to terminate Plaintiff for alleged poor 
performance months before the end of his probation. Plaintiff was provided with a classified 
employee action form stating that his probation period would end on February 24, 2012 (exhibit 4). 
Furthermore, Defendant broke the most basic relationship of trust and confidence that is implied on 
an employment relationship when they failed to provide Plaintiff with an orientation package, 
policies,job description and expectation of the job at the start of his employment like it would be 
expected. For example: Jacee (who is white) received the information on the same day as Plaintiff on 
10/27/2011. Later on the same day the determination to terminate Plaintiff was made. 
Defendant formally disciplined Plaintiff without following their own internal policies and while other 
employees similarly situated wer~ making the same mistakes. Plaintiff was not given a performance 
improvement plan and instead Defendant focus was on taking steps to end Plaintiff employment long 
before the end of probation in violation of both State and their own policies. 
Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff by making the decision to terminate him on 10/27/2011 just 
days after he raised his concerns of discrimination on 10/10/2011 and again on 10/17/2011. 
000165
Plaintiff believes that in the absence of an actual contract that Defendant was still obligated to follow 
the most basic employment conditions afforded to other employees like Jacee (who is white) and not 
engage in discriminatory conduct. 
F. DEFENDANT FEES FOR INCLUSION OF DEFENDANT DOYLE AS AN INDIVIDUAL 
Plaintiff also named Dr. Greaney as a Defendant on the original complaint plus the State of Idaho 
because his previous Attorney recommended it. Dr. Greaney, told me on 07/2013 that she was not 
represented by Mr. Cantril!. On July 24, 2013 it appears that Mr. Cantrill was under contract with the 
State of Idaho only to later determine that the State of Idaho was not a proper party and therefore 
dismissed (exhibit 17). I'm sure that Ms. Doyle is not being represented by Mr. Cantrilljust like Dr. 
Greaney and the State of Idaho were not. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff believes that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and this matter 
should be allowed to proceed to Trial. The court cannot make a proper adjudication for Summary 
Judgment based on a single deposition despite the fact that Defendant had enough time to do more 
discovery after requesting the matter to be delayed. The admissions on file as part of interrogatory 
# 11 prove there are enough issues of material fact to be tried. Furthermore, there is proof that another 
Hispanic employee was targeted and subjected to the same discriminatory treatment at UHS. 
Dated: June 11, 2015 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on June 11, 2015 I served a copy to: 
David Cantril! 
1423 Tyrell lane 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Raul Mendez 
D By mail 
D By fax to 208-345-7212 
'&J3y personal delivery 
D Overnight delivery/Fed Ex 
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Outlook.com Print Message Page 1 of2 
Print 
RE: Mendez v. State of Idaho 
__ ,_, __ ,. .. _.... ..... - ...... ,--... ··--- ----~---·-.. ··-·- .. ------..-~-- .. -·---·---- ---··~ - ...... ·~-. --··------· --- -· 
From: Raul Mendez (rmendez79@hotmail.com) 
Sent: Wed 1/14/15 5:14 PM 
To: cantrill@cssklaw.com 
I read it. I do not agree with it. i did not appear in person at the hearing because I did not receive a 
14 day notice to status hearing as required by IRCP ( but I did make an appearance by phone, 
nonetheless!). it looks as if there is a desire to delay this case for whatever reason and it is certainly 
not my wish to delay this matter. If the Judge wishes to recuse himself then he should it'have done 
so that day. I pointed out obvious inconsistencies. I'm just wondering at what point is this case 
going to be reset for trial and I'm following the procedural rules regarding reaching out to the other 




Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2015 17:01 :09 -0700 
Subject: Re: Mendez v. State ofldaho 
Just read the document I filed with the court 
Sent from my iPad 
On Jan 12, 2015, at 3:53 PM, Raul Mendez <rmendez79@hotmail.com> wrote: 
Mr. Cantrill, 
I see that according to the Idaho rules of civil procedure there had to be a Stipulation to 
Vacate Trial and an Order vacating Trial but none of those have been filed. I see that 
there has to be an stipulation to set a new Trial date and I was wondering if you have a 
particular preference so that I can contact the clerk to see what dates are available. Raul 
From: Cantrill@cssklaw.com 
To: rmendez79@.hotmail.com = 
Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 10:29:40 -0700 
Subject: Mendez v. State ofldaho 
https://blu 176.mail.live.com/ol/mail.mvc/PrintMessages?mkt=en-us 2/6/2015 
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Outlook.com Print Message Page 2 of2 
Mr. Mendez: This matter is set for a jury trial in about a month. I believe you will agree 
it is not ready for trial. Will you agree to vacate and reset? If not I will file a formal 
motion and get a hearing ASAP. Tony Cantrill 
!SIG:54b45e84197961487118232! 
https://blul 76.mail.live.com/ol/mail.mvc/PrintMessages?mkt=en-us 2/6/2015 
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Latinos Continue to Fight Raci"'TI in Idaho - The Blue Review I The Blu,. ~eview 
Latinos Continue to Fight Racism in Idaho 







Page 2 of 8 
Tags : Antonio Rodriguez, David Adler, Hispanic, Human Righs Commission, Isidro "B lackie" Lopez, Latino, Maria Salazar, Phil! Batt, TBR 4 
The fight for LGBT rights in Idaho is the latest in a half-century struggle for state protection from discrimination and bigotry. From small towns to 
major cities to the legislative chambers, racism in Idaho has certainly been a long struggle for the growing Hispanic community, which now 
comprises 11.5 percent of the state ' s population. In a recent Idaho Statesman editorial, nationally renowned and respected constitutional historian 
David Adler took Idaho 's political leadership to task for tolerating bigotry and racism. He challenged Gov. C. L. ''Butch'' Oner to recognize it as a 
serious problem and address it in his 2014 State of the State speech. 
TBR Research presents insights and excerpts from peer-reviewed scholarship. 
In his column, Adler mentions a sign affixed to a fence surrounding a house in a predominantly Hispanic neighborhood in Burley that arrogantly 
proclaims "No Mexicans." This contemporary example reminds us of "Whites Only" signs that tarnished the South in the pre-civil rights days. In 
fact, racist placards declaring "No Mexicans" at restaurants, bars and many other commercial enterprises in Southern Idaho led to the passage of 
Idaho' s first anti-discrimination law in 1961 , the Idaho Fair Employment Practices Act. Though Adler's example may be apocryphal , examples of 
overt racism bound in Idaho, from the Twin Falls gym teacher accused of trashing a Mexican flag to the Coeur d'Alene man picketing taco trucks 
with racist signs. Examples of violence and discrimination against Hispanic people in Idaho date back to the beginning of the 20th century in 
Burley and Caldwell. This type of behavior even forced the Mexican government to remove Idaho from the list of states importing Mexican farm 
laborers under the World War II-era Bracero program. 
Courtesy of the foreign relations 
archive in Mexico City 
Luis Colunga, then deputy consul at 
the Mexican Consulate in Salt Lake 
City, took pictures of the Driggs labor 
camp in 1930. He was so scandalized 
by the camp that he sent copies to the 
Idaho governor. 
https ://thebluereview .org/latinos-fight-racism-in-idaho/ 4/6/2015 
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Fed up with the way Idaho treated Mexicans and other minority groups during and after WWII, some fought back- including Antonio Rodriguez, 
a barber and owner of a small restaurant in north Nampa. Rodriguez 's friend, Isidro "Blackie" Lopez, remembered coming home after the war in 
1945 dressed in his military uniform and the respect local residents showed him . However, "when I put on civilian clothes," Lopez told writer 
Maria Salazar years later, "the Anglos saw me as just another Mexican, worthless in their eyes. " Lopez eventually left the state to make his home 
in Washington. In the 1950s, signs at Canyon County businesses told Mexicans and other minorities to stay out. 
Angered and frustrated by the anti-Mexican sentiment in Canyon County and elsewhere in the state, Rodriguez and his wife, Maria, joined others 
to form the Idaho Citizens Committee for Civil Rights. Armed with support from the Idaho Advisory Committee to the National Commission on 
Civil Rights, they helped craft legislation banning discrimination in public accommodations and employment and, according to one account in the 
Lewiston Morning Tribune, "won the enthusiastic and watchful support of several members of the Legislature." Despite arguments that the bill was 
not needed in a state like Idaho, it passed the House and Senate in February 1961 with only a modicum of opposition. Lacking enforcement power, 
media accounts and minutes of the debate indicated that opponents to the law considered it harmless enough. 
Courtesy of the foreign relations archive in 
Mexico City 
Housing from the Driggs labor camp, 1930. 







Woodwonh-Ncv & SmoakThe editor of the Lewiston Morning Tribune heralded the new law as "one of the substantial accomplishments" of the 
1961 legislative session. But he also knew the statute would be reluctantly obeyed, ifat all , by the city 's business class. Still , he hoped it would 
"encourage a man of good will in business to resist the pressures of prejudice and bigotry," even ifhe merely retreated behind the new law that 
compelled him to serve everyone. The editor 's message to the community was clear; be a racist or bigot, but the law now forces equal treatment for 
all . 
Despite Rodriguez's assertion that the offensive signs in Canyon County came down after passage of the law, Idaho's new anti-discrimination law 
did little to transform the climate of intolerance in the state toward people of color. It took the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. to force Idaho to chip away at its granitic block of bigotry. 
The 1964 U.S. Civil Rights Act put the full force of the federal government behind the enforcement oflaws against discrimination in employment, 
housing, education, public accommodations and other areas of daily life. The power of federal law and actions ofldaho ' s progressive religious 
institutions empowered migrant farm workers to have a greater role in self-help organizations which tackled problems of ignorance and poverty. 
King's murder in 1968 and the clumsy manner that Idaho's government officials handled protocols of respect for the death ofa national leader 
brought angry citizens of every racial hue and national origin together to demand change. During a peaceful rally on the Statehouse steps, 
participants called for the creation of a state human rights commission. In the following months , they formed Citizens for Civic Unity and crafted a 
bill to create an official human rights commission for Idaho. Then-state Sen. Phil Batt, a powerful Canyon County farmer, agreed to introduce the 
measure as SB 1221. Batt, a Republican regarded by many as a champion for minority rights - and a fine clarinet player - served as vice 
chairman of the Senate's State Affairs Committee, which held extensive hearings on the bill . 
Republican Gov. Don Samuelson's advisers also scrutinized it and, concerned that it created a quasi-judicial agency with broad powers, drafted an 
alternative bill that granted the proposed commission only investigative and advisory powers in areas of employment opportunities, housing, 
education and public accommodations. In essence, this served to create a commission to oversee the provisions outlined in the earlier 1961 anti-
discrimination act. And, like that act, the commission would be powerless on its own to enforce the law. 
The so-called "governor's bill" appealed more to State Affairs Committee members who thought the original Citizens for Civic Unity bill vested 
too much power in a commission that might be " inclined to go on witch hunts, condemning innocent people in its zeal for securing the rights of 
minorities." Some committee members, "frightened by civil rights activism," were convinced that Idaho had no serious problems with 
discrimination. These lawmakers believed that neither the Legislature nor the voters "would stand for a ' strong' civil rights commission," 
according to I 971 interviews with Batt and with Stan Crow, a Boise attorney who helped draft the "governor' s bill ." The weakened bill went to the 
full Senate and passed unopposed, 33-0, on March 15, 1969. The House approved it 11 days later, 51-7. 
https :/ /theb l uereview .org/latinos-fight-racism-in-idaho/ 4/6/2015 
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Idaho's Commission on Human Rights (ICHR) was not what Citizens for Civic Unity envisioned and was much weaker than human rights 
commissions in other states. A 1971 study, showed that the body lacked direct enforcement and subpoena powers, was woefully underfunded and 
had no "statutory assurance" allowing for "effective complaint processing procedures." Legislative attempts the following year to grant it powers 
similar to those exercised by state commissions elsewhere proved unsuccessful. Governance rules forced the commission to rely on county 
advisory committees - appointed by county commissioners - and county prosecuting attorneys who often presented multiple obstacles and delay 
tactics to attempts at solving communities' discrimination problems. 
The ongoing controversy in Idaho over the lack of equality for the state's lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender residents - as well as failed 
attempts to include them in the 1969 act creating the Idaho Commission on Human Rights - puts Idaho in the category of a state whose male-
dominated, Republican Legislature clings to an outdated vision of pre-civil rights America. Astonishingly, the Idaho Human Rights Commission 
itself voted in 2009 against including "sexual orientation" and "gender identity" in the Idaho Human Rights Act, echoing the long-held position of 
lawmakers. State legislators ' steadfast refusal to grant equality to LGBT citizens prompted 86-year-old former Republican governor and longtime 
civil rights champion Phil Batt to call them '"fools.,. 
Although Idaho's Mexican American community found representation on the commission with Jesse Berain's appointment as a commissioner and 
its first and only full-time investigator, serious civil rights abuses continued. Many Idaho farmers and agribusinesses violated migrant farm 
workers' human rights by failing to provide them with decent housing or even with portable toilets in the fields. Complaints are in Records of the 
Human Rights Commission, AR 60, Box 3, Idaho State Historical Society Library and Archives. Shortly after examining these case files, the 
Human Rights Commission ordered them closed to the public.A large food processing company in Caldwell refused to promote Mexican 
Americans to management positions despite their demonstrated competence and seniority. This practice of ethnic discrimination appeared to be 
widespread where Mexicans concentrated. Complaints brought before the Il-IRC in 1970 and 1971 accused owners at some eating and drinking 
establishments of denying service to people of Mexican heritage or demanding that they not speak Spanish on the premises. Many expressed 
frustration that their children, in whom they placed all hope for a better future, failed in an educational and social environment that was 
unresponsive to their needs, thereby leading to high drop-out rates and a bleak future. 
Via Idaho State Historical Society c/ippingfi/e 
Chicano leaders from Southwest Idaho and 
Eastern Oregon meet, and eventually form the 
Idaho Migrant Council in 1971. Left to right: 
Pedro Lopez, Tony Solis, Juan Rivas, Humberto 
Fuentes, Lucia Pena Hunt. 
Since the early 1970s, there have been positive changes to improve Idaho's civil rights record and mitigate overt incidences of racism toward 
Mexicans and other Hispanics. Civil rights activists fought to create the Idaho Migrant Council (now Community Council of Idaho). See also: 
Errol D. Jones and Kathleen R. Hodges, The Hispanic Experience in Idaho. Boise, ID, Boise State University, 1998. Idaho's progressive religious 
community continually promoted tolerance and acceptance. The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (!RCA) of 1986 enabled 
thousands of undocumented workers to legalize their status and become eligible for citizenship. The 1987 creation of the Idaho Commission on 
Hispanic Affairs brought Hispanic concerns to the attention of legislators. Mexican activists succeeded wringing from the Legislature a series of 
laws in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s forcing farmers and agribusinesses to place mobile toilets in fields, provide workers compensation 
insurance, pay minimum wage and make sure labor contractors obtained licenses and posted bonds. 
Pointing to these accomplishments, Idaho's leaders comfort themselves with assurances of progress and the eradication of racial and ethnic 
bigotry. On closer examination, however, the record of these gains reveals that every one of them came about through struggle and political fights 
waged by Mexicans and their supporters against the same political and economic elites who take credit for these achievements today -
achievements which remain under constant threat. For example, why did Idaho's current governor, faced with an ailing economy and budgetary 
shortfalls in 2010, earmark the Idaho Commission on Hispanic Affairs and the Human Rights Commission (along with other small agencies 
receiving state funds) for elimination over a four-year period? 
Dumping these commissions would have little or no impact on the state's budget. The proposal promised to be a huge mistake, as political pundit 
Randv Stapilus pointed out. "The Human Rights Commission ... works in an area where Idaho 's reputation - many around the country still 
know it (or think they do) best as a haven for Aryans - is shakiest," Stapilus wrote. The Twin Falls Times-News foresaw the possible damage, 
writing in a January 2010 editorial : "We can see the headlines across the country now: ' Idaho joins Alabama, Arkansas and Mississippi in nixing 
rights commission."' If little money was to be saved at the expense of further damaging Idaho 's national image, what was the real reason for 
singling out these agencies for elimination? One can only speculate, but an awareness of the historic resistance to creating the Human Rights 
Commission and the Commission on Hispanic Affairs in the first place indicates that the state's political leadership may have been eager for a 
chance to eliminate these bodies. 
https://thebluereview.org/latinos-fight-racism-in-idaho/ 4/6/2015 
000175
Latinos Continue to Fight Racism in Idaho - The Blue Review I The Blue Review Page 5 of 8 
Racism toward Hispanics in Idaho clearly continues. Sociologist Richard Baker, in Los Dos Mundos, called it institutionalized racism. Statesman 
columnist Tim Woodward learned this after he published a column in 2008 extolling Boise's tolerance and good will. So many letters and emails 
recounting acts of discrimination and racism flooded his mailbox that he was forced to write an apology. Moreover, Mexicans/Hispanics are 
disproportionately overrepresented in Idaho prisons (16 percent) and underrepresented among the ranks ofK-12 teachers and administrators (I 
percent). See Hispanic Profile Data Book, 2012. The time has come for Idaho's leaders to meet Bait's challenge: to step forward and remove 
institutional barriers that hinder all Idaho's residents from equal treatment. Instead, in his most recent State of the State, Otter gushed with 
optimism about Idaho's economic and educational future. That future does not currently apply equally to all groups within the state, but changing 
demographics, pressure to raise wages and education reform will eventually force institutional change, whether politicians get behind it or not. 
Errol D. Jones, a native of Utah, is professor emeritus in the History Department at Boise State University. Jones joined the faculty of Boise State 
University in 1982 after teaching at universities in Texas, Utah, Mexicq and Brazil. Trained in Latin American history, he specialized in the history 
of Mexico upon arriving at Boise State. 
The views and opinions expressed here are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of Boise State University or the College of 
Social Sciences and Public Affairs. 
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In addition to the pmticular objections specified in responses to the individual responses, 
Defendants make the following general objections: 
1. Defendants object to the discovery requests to the extent they may be construed as 
calling for information or documents subject to a claim of privilege otherwise 
immune from discovery, including, but not limited to information protected by the 
attomey-client privilege or work-product doctrine. 
2. Defendants o~ject to the discovery request-; to the extent that they call for 
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information that is in the hands of plaintiff or third parties with respect to whom 
Defendant,:; has no control and/or has not yet completed dif:c-overy. 
'51,c:;-
3. Delendants object to these discovery requests to the extent that they seek documents 
and/or information already known or equally available to Plaintiff. 
4. To the extent Defendants respond to any discovery request that may be subjectto one 
or more general or specific objections, Defendants' answer does not constitute a 
waiver of Defendants' objections stated herein. Any and all answers provided by 
Defep.dants are subject to these general objections and. any additional specific 
objections asserted. 
COMES NOW Defendants STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES 
BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY; MARIEL DOYLE, by and through their attorneys· of record, 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP, and responds to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production ofDocwne11ts as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please identify by title, date and author all documents which 
relate, in any way, to the claims, affirmative defenses and/or other defenses in this matter. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Objection. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule 
26(b)(l), Defendants object to this intetTOgatory on the gl'ounds tbat the information sought is 
premature prior to the completion of discovery in this matter. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule. 8(c), 
Defendants ;n-e required to assert affimmtive defenses in their fir~t responsive pleading, or said 
defenses will be dee111ed waived. Without waiving said o~iection, Defendants provide the following 
answer: See documents produced herewith as BSU l -560 including training manuals, emails and 
Plaintiff's personnel manual. This response may be supplemented ptasuant to the Court's 
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scheduling order and theldaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
lN'i'ERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify and list the job title of each person known to you or 
your attorneys who has any knowledge of, or who purports to have any knowledge of, any facts of 
this case. By this interrogatory; we seek the identity of all possible witnesses who Q:1.ay have any 
knowledge of any fact pertinent to damages, liability, defenses, affirmative defenses, etc. Also, 
ple88e provide the substance of the facts and information of which such person has knowledge of. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Objection. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule 
26(b)(l), Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that the informatio11 sought is 
premature prior to the completion of discovery in this matter. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule 8(c), 
Defendants are required to assert affirmative defenses in their first responsive pleading, or said 
defenses will be deemed waived. Without waiving said objection, Defendants provide the following 
answer: 
Mariel Doyle, Technical Records Specialist 2, formerly Customer Service Representative, 
Boise s1ate University, contact through Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
Andy Cover, contact through Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
Lynn Swa11s011, contact through Cantril! Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
Libby Greaney, contact through Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sore11set1, LLP 
Marla Henken, contact through Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
Mary Kenworthy, Nurse, University Health.and Recreation Services, Boise State University, 
contact through Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
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Lisa Harris contact through Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
Jacee Tucker. Customer Service Representative, Boif!e State University, contact through 
Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen, LLP 
Tim Feamside, Associate Attorney, Boise State University, contact through Cantrill Skinner 
Lewis C'.asey & Sorensen, LLP. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Please identify and list the job title of each employee and 
agent of the Defendants who supervised, worked with, or who were otherwise involved in the hiring, 
discipline a:nd termination of the Plaintiff; Please includ.e but do not limit your answer to the 
employ~c who replaced Plaintiff, all employees of Defendants who worked as a Customer Service 
Representative (CSR) or who supervised CSRs from August 24, 201 I to November 15, 2011. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Mariel Doyle and Libby GTeaney. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4i Please describe and provide copies of records of all 
disciplinary action taken against CSR' s employed by the Defendant for the last four ( 4) years. Please 
include but do not limited your an_sw~to the type of conduct that lead to the disciplinary action, the 
tenure of the employee, wh~ actions were taken (tennination, probation, etc.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Objection. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule 
26(b )(1 ), Defendants object to this interrogatory 011 the grounds that the info11nation sought is overly 
broad, vague and undqly burdensome, and/or the information.sought is not admissible in evidence or 
reasonably calculated to .lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Further, Defendant is 
prohibited from disclosing personnel infom1ation of other employees. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please list, identify, and provide cont.act information for all 
employees terminated or disciplined in the past four ( 4) years and provide tne reason for their 
terminations. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Objection. Pursuant to IR.CP, Rule 
26(b )(I), Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that the infonnation sought is overly 
broad, vague and unduly burdensome, and/or the infonnation sought is not admissible in evidence or 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Further, Defendant is 
prohibited from disclosing personnel information of other employees. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Have you, your attorney, or any person, firm or corporation 
actiQ.g on your behalf, consulted with or engaged any experts, including but not limited to physicians 
conducting independent medical exams and/or pa,nel exmns, in connection with this litigation? Tf so, 
please state their names and addresses, and for each, please state the following: 
(a) The name and address of the school or university where he/she received special 
education or training in this field, the dates when he/she attended each school or university 
and the name or description of each degree he/she received, including the date when each 
was received, and the name of the school from where received; 
(b) Did he/she test, analyze or examine any physical evidence related to this litigation? If 
so) during what dates did he/she make this te~, analysis or examination and did anyone assisl 
him/her? 
( c) State the subject matter on which he/she is expected to testify; 
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(d) Were any opinions or conclusions reached as a. result of this test, analy&is or 
examination? If so, please state the substance of the facts, conclw:iions and opinions to which 
he/she is expected to testify; 
(e) What is the name or other means ofidentification of the person to whom tjiis report 
was submitted and the name and address of the person who has present cust9dy of the same? 
and, 
(f) Did he/she submit a report setting forth his/her findings, opinions or conclusions? If 
so, please state the date this report was submi~ and the name and address of the person 
who has present custody thereof. 
(g) Please include the subject matter upon which such expert witness is expected to 
testify, the substance of the facts to which such expert is expected to testify, and the 
substance of the opinions to which sm;h expert witness is expected to testify as required by 
Rule ~6(b )( 4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, together with all the underlying facts 
and data as required by Rule 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Objection. Purstiant to IRCP, Rule 
26(b)(l), Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that the information sought is 
premature prior to the completion of discovery in this matter. Without waiving said objection~ 
Defendants prQvide the following answer: Defendants have not yet retained an expert in this matter 
to date. This response may be supplemented pursuant to the Court• s scheduling order and the Idaho 
Rules q[Civil Procedure. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please provide a list of all contacts·and communications you, 
your employees, attorneys or any agents have had with the Plaintiffvia oral) written, etc. with the 
dates and names, phon.e numbers, and addresses of such persons making such contact and 
communications. Also, please include details of the contents and nature of each contact and 
commwiication. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Objection. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule 
26(b )(1 ), Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that the information sought is overly 
broad, vague and unduly burdensome. Further, Defendants object to this inte1mgatory in that no 
temporal or geographic limitation is specified in the request. Without waiving said objection, 
Defendants provide the following answer: Plaintiff had daily oral communications with Defendant's 
agents during the time of his employment Documentation and written communications during his 
emp1oyment and regarding Plaintiff's dismissal is provided hert::with. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Pleas separately identify each person whom you may and/or 
will call as a witness at the trial of this action and state the substance of the facts and opinions to 
which each witness is expected to testify. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Objection. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule 
26(b)(l), Defendants object to this interrogatory on the ground'.! that the information sought is 
premature prior to th~ completion of discovery in this matter. Without waiving said objection, 
Defendants provide the following answer: See Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please separately identify each exhibit that you may and/or 
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will offer into evidence at the trial of this action for any reason including impeachment. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9; Objection. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule 
26(b)(l), Defendarits object to this interrogatory on the grounds that the information sought is 
premature prior to the comp1etion of discovery in this matter. Without waiving said objection, 
Defendants provide the following answer: See do~uments produced herewith. l)efendants reserve 
the right to utili'.le imY document at trial produced by any party in discovery or depostion. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10; Please provide each and every supporting reason why the 
Plaintiff's employment was terminated. Include but do not limit your answer to the application of 
disciplinary polici~s and procedures. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Plaintiff was employed as "classified 
staff' and was under a six-month probationary period. He was hired as a Customer Service 
Representative ("CSR'') on August 24, 2011. Mariel Doyle, who was training him, started to 
docum~nt problems with his perfonnance on September 27, 2011. Ms. Doyle and Dr. Greaney, and 
Ms. Swanson met with him to discuss his performance on October 5, 2011. Ms. Doyle met with him 
again on October 26, 2011 to discuss his tardi11es_s and his attitude and other issues; specifically, he 
made inf.lppropriate remarks to patients and did not communicate well with staff. Even after six 
W!!!!ks of training, he had difficulty with the processes and procedures and continued to make the 
same errors repeatedly. Additiop.ally, see documents produced herewith as BSD I - 560 for training 
materials for CSR, emails and Plaintiff's personnel file. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11.: Please lis.t eaph and every email, correspondence, document, 
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video, photo, au~io or other item in your possession related to Plaintiff ~d this matter. 
~PONSE TO TNTERROGATO&Y1'f0, 11: See documents producedhorewilh a.,BSU 
l -560 for training materials for CSR, emails and Plaintiffs personnel file. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please identify and describe each action taken by the 
Defendant to resolve the concerns or complaints issued by the Plaintiff regarding his employment 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: See Answer to Interrogatory No. I 0, as 
well as docwnent<i produced herewith as BSU 1 - 560 including training manuals, emails and 
Plaintiff's personnel manual .. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: With reference to each affinnative defense pleaded by you or 
your attorneys in-the answer to the complaint, and with reference to each denial plead in the Answer 
to the Complaint a11d to the Request for Admissions herein, please set forth with respect to each such 
qenial and affirmative defense all facts, docwnents, records, individuals or other evidence, known to 
you, your attorneys ot agents which support or corroborate such denials or defenses; the name, 
address and telephone. number of each such person known to you who claims to have knowledge of 
such; and the name, address and telephone number of any custodian of any writing or report which 
supports any such denial or affirmative defense. Also provide a detailed summary statement of tl1e 
facts known by each such person, Also, please state the full name, address and telephone number of 
any individual not list~ above who was either a witness to or haci any knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding any other allegations of the Plaintiff's complaint or Defendants, denials 
or defense regarding this case. 
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Obj~ction. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule 
26(b)(I), Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that 1he information sought is 
premature prior to the completion of discovery in this matt~r. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule 8(c)~ 
Defendants are required to assert affirmative defenses in their first responsive pleading, or said 
defenses will be deemed waived. This response may be supplemented pursuant to the Court's 
scheduling order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedurf!. 
INTERROGATORY N0.14; Identify the user name and email address for any current or 
past Face book, MySpace, Link:edln~ lnstagrarn and/or Twitter or other social media account or blog 
mainted [sic] by Defendant Mariel Doyle from August 2011 through the present 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Objection. Pursuant to IRCP, Rule 
26(b )(1 ), Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that the information sought is not 
aqmissible in evidence or reasonably calculated lo lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Without waiving said objection, Defendants provide tbe following answer: Ms. Doyle has a 
Facebook account. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please provide detailed explanations of the training received 
by Plaintiff, t:Q.cjob descriptj.on at the ti.me of Plaintiff's employment, and any 9lher materials and 
training methods employed by Defendants at the time of Plaintiff's employment used to train .and 
assist CSRs. Please include but do not limit your answer to any specific materials given to assist the 
PlEµlltiff and general materials given to all CSRs during the Plaintifts time as an employee of 
Defendantc;. 
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO, 15: See documents produced herewith ac; BSU 
I - 560 including training manuals, emails and .Plainti:frs personnel manual. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: · Please identify and describe the applicable employee 
discipline procedures and policies in place during Plaintiff's employ. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Plaintiff was a classified (non-exempt) 
employee. The employment policies that pertained to Plaintiff's employment are through the Rules 
of the Division of Hum~ Resources and Idaho Personnel Commission, IDAP A 15.04.01. Specific 
rules pertaining to Plaintiff include that classified employees are subject to a probationary period of 
atleast six months in compliance with IDAPA 15.04.01.150, et seq. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 1: Please produce copies of each and all documents 
Jisted or referenced in your answers to all Interrogatories above. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: See documents produc~d 
herewith as BSU I - 560 including training manuals, emails and Plaintilrs personnel :file. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please list each and eve1y emrui correspond~ncc, 
document, video, photo, audio or other item in your possession related to Plaintiff and tl1is matter. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: See documents produced 
herewith as BSU 1 - 560 including training manuals, emails and Plaintiff's personnel manual. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please provide the employee file of each person, 
supervisor, or co-worker that is the subject of any of Plaititiff's complaints. 
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RESPONSE 'l'O REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Objection; Pursuant to IRCP, 
Rule 26(b )(I), Defendant objects to this request for production 011 the grounds that the information 
sought is overly broad, vague and unduly burdensome, and/or the infonnntion sought is not 
admissible in evidence or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Further, Defendant is prohibited from disclosing personnel infonnation of other employees. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please produce all communications between you 
and lhe Plaintiff, between Defendants and its employees and between yqu and any other third party 
relating to the Plainfil.f and his claims. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCIION NO. 4: Objection. Pursuantto TRCP, 
Rule 26(b)(l), Defendants object to this request for production on the grounds that the information 
sought is overly broad, vague and unduly burdenso~e, and/or the information sought is not 
admissible in evidence or reaso1,ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Fwiher~ Defendant is prohibited from disclosing personnel information of oth!;}r employees. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please produce all documents and information 
reviewed by any expert retained by you in connecti011 1o this case. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: See Answer to Interrogatory 
No.6. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Please produce all analysis, drafts of reports, 
reports, notes, correspondence and any other document drafted or prepi:u-ecl by any expert retained by 
you in this case. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: See Answer to Inten·ogatory 
No.6. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce each and every document in your 
possession or control relating to, supporting, or disproving the Plaintiff's claims, the Defendant's 
defenses, and the Defendant's af:finnative defenses. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR -PRODUCTION NO. 7: See documents produced 
herewith as BSU l - 560 including training manuals, emails and Plaintiff's personnel manual. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Please produce a copy of each and every 
employee file of the Plaintiff, Plajntiff' s prior supervisors and the employee file of each and every 
employee listed to have kaowledge of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses.a11d affirmative 
defenses. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Objection. Pursuant to IRCP, 
Rule 26(b )(1 ), Defendants object to this request for production on the grounds that lhe information 
sought is overly broad, vague a11d unduly burdensome, and/or the information sought is not 
admissible in evidence or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Further, Defendant is prohibited .from disclosing personnel information ofother employees. Without 
waiving said objection, Defendants provide the following response: See Plaintiff's personnel file 
produced herewith. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Please provide docwnents concerning the 
training of P,laintiff oth~r CSRs as described in Interrogatory No. 15. 
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RF.SPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: See training materials provided 
herewith as BSU l -133. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please provide docwnents concerning the 
discipline of other CSRs as described in Interrogatory No. 5. 
RF.SPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.10: Objection. Pursuant to IRCP, 
Rule 26(b)(l), Defendants object to this request f9r prod~ctiQ.Q. on the grmmds that the information 
sought is overly broad, vague and unduly burdensome, and/or the information sought is not 
admi~sible in evidence or reasonably calculated to lead to the discove1y of admissible evidence. 
Further, Defendant is prohibited from disclosing personnel information of other employees. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please provide policies, manuals and 
procedures as described in Interrosatory No. 16. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.11: See Ailswei: to Interrogatory 
No. 16 and documents produced herewith as BSU 1~133. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION N0.12: Please provide the Plaintiff's employee file and 
any documents in your possession conc(:rning him. 
RF.,SPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Sec docwnents produced 
herewith. 
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DATED This 27th day of January, 2014. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS C"'ASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
By:_~~~J~~~"----
David W. Ca11trill, Of the .Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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VERIFIC,!\TIQN 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of ADA ) 
PABLO COBl.ENTZ, being first duly sworn upon ontb, deposes and says: 
That he is the Assistant Vice President, Human Resource Services at Boise State University 
and a duly authorized representative of the Defen~ants in the above-entitled matter; that he has read 
the above and foregoing DEFENDANTS' FIRST ANSWERS TO INTERROGA TOR)ES, knows 
and understands the contents thereof, and states that the facts set forth herein are true and correct to 
the best of his knowledge. infonnation, and belief. 
SUBSCRmED AND SWORN to before me this;/7 day of January, 2014. 
Residing at EM Sl: Ic 
My Commission Expires 8'-/q -/JA 1 't 
DijBBJ FLORES, Notary'J)obllc 
Sljite-0f ldaho, COUQtj of Ada 
My co.mmfsslon expires Aug ts 2014 
li'lllng #_ assio 
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PG I ACTUAL HOURLY RATE: 
REGISTER # I SEARCH #: 
UMITED SERVICE APPOINTMENT: 
LSA AGREEMENT DUE DATE: 
Raul Mendez 
111316505 
Hire/ AO Original Appointment 
Entrance Probationary 
40 Hours/ 12 Months 
Customer Service Rep 1 
0761 
University Health Services / 981 
Lynn Swanson / 111111323 
981L101003 
8/24/2011 
tgjYes D No 
GI $11.72 
35253 / 12-005 
0Yes (g] No 
nla 
EVALUATION DUE: -~-·-··-- . ~_urs_or_approx._Fe_bJtlary_~;__ 2011 
FLSA / SHIFT: C/No 
Other Information/Comments: Off probation after 1,040 hours of satisfactory service. 
Please note overtime hours apply toward the probationary period I hours. 
PREPARED BY: Tiffany Trader DATE: August 23, 2011 
xc: K~y Trotter, Budget I Lynn Swanson, Supervisor 
/~· ~t 





CLASSIFIED EMPLOYEE ACTION FORM 
EMPLOYEE {LEGAL NAME): Raul Mendez 







40 Hours 112 Months 
Customer Service Rep. 1 
0761 
DEPARTMENT/ ID: 
SUPERVISOR NAME/ fD# 
ACCOUNT CODE(S): . 
EFFECTIVE DATE: 
University Health Services / 981 
Lynn Swanson / 111111323 
981L 101003 
l--1-150711 
BENEFIT ELIGIBLE: (g]Yes 0No 
PG/ ACTUAL HOURLY RATE: G/$11.72 
REGISTER#/ SEARCH #: 25253 / 12-005 
LIMITED SERVICE APPOINTMENT: 0Yes [Z}No 
LSA AGREEMENT DUE DA TE: n/a 
[EVAf__UATION-DUE1 
FLSA / SHIFT: 
(f. MO_hour.s_oc_~pRtqi(.£~bru~iy-~j; ~-1 .. ?' 
C/No 
HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATIONS: nla 
(Dept: Send degree verification for entry Into PeopleSofl) 
Other f nformation/Comments: 
HRS AUTHORIZATION BY: ___________ _ 
Date: November 30, 2011 
xc: Kay Trotter, Budget / Lynn Swanson, Supervisor 
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authority to request a temporary waiver of this rule by the administrator. (4-7-11) 
b. When attempting to fill vacancies for a classification where a lay off occurred, the agency will 
provide an opportunity to interview and will make their hiring selection from the individuals their agency laid off 
from the classification, including those separated from state service under Subsection 241. 02 of these rules and those 
that took a voluntary demotion in lieu oflayoff. (5-8-09) 
c. Individuals being returned to the classification from which they were laid off will be reinstated with 
the same salary, permanent status and their sick leave balance restored. If the pay minimum has increased, see 
Subsection 072.03 of these rules. (5-8-09) 
02. Consideration for Hire by Other Agencies. For promotional opportunities, internal agency 
candidates are normally considered before outside recruitment occurs, including other agencies' laid off candidates. 
However, individuals who have been laid off must be offered the opportunity to interview before other agencies 
consider candidates from statewide promotional or open-competitive recruitments. (3-16-04) 
03. Employment by Other Agency. Individuals may be reappointed or reinstated if eligible. The 
salary of an employee re-hired after a layoff is negotiable between the employee and new appointing authority in the 
current pay grade for the classification in which the employee is appointed. (3-16-04) 
04. Return to Register. If an individual finds another agency's position unsatisfactory or does not 
satisfactorily complete a voluntary probation period, he may be placed back on a register for the remainder of their 
twelve (12) month time frame. Individuals appointed to a position, other than the classification from which laid off, 
will remain on preference register status for the remainder of the twelve (12) month period if otherwise eligible. 
(5-8-09) 
146. (RESERVED) 
147. VOLUNTARY DEMOTION IN LIEU OF LAYOFF. 
Within their layoff unit, an employee with permanent status may choose to accept a voluntary demotion rather than be 
laid off. Demotion options are limited to a classification, or if deleted, its successor, in which the employee held 
permanent status in the agency. Such demotion will not be permitted if it causes the layoff of an employee with 
greater retention points. (5-8-09) 
01. Eligibility. (3-16-04) 
a. Qualified. Employee must meet the classification's current minimum qualifications and any 
minimum qualification specialties. (3-16-04) 
b. Exclusion. Limited service appointees are not eligible to take any voluntary demotion that would 
result in the displacement of other employees. However, voluntary demotions to a vacant position are allowed with 
the approval of the appointing authority. (3-16-04). 
02. Acceptance. To accept a voluntary demotion rather than a layoff, the employee must notify the 
appointing authority in writing of their decision no later than three (3) working days after written notification of the 
layoff and opportunity to demote to a specific position. (3-16-04) 
148. -149. (RESERVED) 
~o. PROBATIONARY PERIODS. 
01. Probationary Period Required. Except as provided in Section 040 of these rules, every 
appointment and promotion to a classified position is probationary, or in the absence of adequate registers, 
provisional. (5-8-09) 
02. Types of Probationary Periods. The probationary period serves as a working test period to 
provide the agency an opportunity to evaluate a probationary employee's work performance and suitability for the 
Section 147 Page 30 
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position. There are three (3) types of probationary periods: (5-8-09) 
a. Entrance probation is the probationary service required of an employee at the time of his original 
appointment or any subsequent appointment to state classified service excluding reinstatement and transfer, the 
J!yratjon of which is one thousand forty (1,040) hours of credited state service except for peace officers (defined in 
Section 19-5101, Idaho Code), who must serve two thousand eighty (2,080) hours. (5-8-09) 
b. Promotional probation is the probationary service required when an employee is promoted, the 
duration of which is one thousand forty (1,040) hours of credited state service except for peace officers (defined in 
Section 19-5101, Idaho Code), who must serve two thousand eighty (2,080) hours. (5-8-09) 
c. Voluntary probation is an agreement between employees and the appointing authority for 
interagency employment actions such as reinstatement, transfer, or voluntary demotion. A voluntary probation is not 
to be used for employment actions within the agency. The probationary period is negotiable but may not exceed one 
thousand forty (1,040) hours of credited state service except for peace officers (defined in Section 19-5101, Idaho 
Code), who may serve up to two thousand eighty (2,080) hours. (5-8-09) 
03. Extension of Probationary Period. Upon written request demonstrating good cause, the 
administrator may extend the probationary period of an employee for an additional specified period not to exceed one 
thousand forty (1,040) hours of credited state service. Extension must occur before an employee has worked one 
thousand forty (1,040) hours or two thousand eighty (2,080) hours for peace officers. (Ref. Section 67-53090), Idaho 
Code) (5-8-09) 
04. Interruption of Probationary Period. The probationary period in any classification must be 
completed withHU single agency uninterrupted by termination {Ref. Rule Subsection 152.02) or dismissal (Ref. Rule 
Section 190). An employee who separated during the probationary period must begin a new probationary period upon 
reappointment or promotion. (5-8-09) 
05. Temporary Service Credit. At the request of the hiring agency, the administrator will allow 
temporary service time in a given classification to be used toward fulfilling the entrance probationary requirement in 
that classification as established in Section 67-53090), Idaho Code. The temporary duties must be substantially the 
same as the regular permanent appointment. (Ref. Section 67-5309(x), Idaho Code, and Rule Section 122 and 
Subsection 150.01) (3-29-12) 
06. Acting Service Credit. At the request of the hiring agency, the administrator will allow acting 
appointment service time in a given classification to be used toward fulfilling the promotional probationary 
requirement in that classification as established in Section 67-53090), Idaho Code. The acting appointment duties 
must be substantially the same as the regular permanent appointment. (Ref. Section 67-5309(y), Idaho Code, and 
Rule Sec~ons 129 and Subsection 150.01) (3-29-12) 
151. SATISFACTORY SERVICE. 
When a probationary employee has satisfactorily served the probationary period, the appointing authority shall no 
later than thirty (30) calendar days after the expiration of the probationary period provide the employee and the 
Division of Human Resources a performance evaluation indicating satisfactory performance and shall certify the 
employee to permanent status. Such certification to permanent status shall be effective one thousand forty (1,040) 
hours of credited state service after appointment, except that it shall be effective two thousand eighty (2080) hours of 
credited state service after appointment for peace officer classifications unless either period has been extended 
pursuant to Rule 150.03. (Ref. Section 67-53090), Idaho Code, and Rule 210.04) (3-30-01) 
152. SEPARATIONDURINGPROBATION. 
01. Notification. If a probationary employee does not serve satisfactori)¥, the appointing authority, 
must, · alendar days after the ex iraf robaf' · provide the employee and 
the Division of Human Resources ape ormance eva uation indicating unsatisfactory performance. (Ref. Section 67-
53090), Idaho Code and Rule Subsection 210.04) (5-8-09) 
02. During Entrance and Voluntary Probatio!1· (3-30-01) 
Section 151 Page31 
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Re: Raul's Probation 
1 message 
Andy Cover < andycover@bolsestate.edu> tThu; Ocf27~ 20113t 9:09 AM 
To: Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
Mariel-
It ls good to hear from you. Because@robali_on~i§d·i~!?a~~-on·hours·,and not days, the exact 
date ls difficult du~ to the potential for overtime worked. Considering that there ls no overtime worked,'.]@ 
[~titlcfpat~~ttjate.for .. ~9ITIP!etion of the probationary perLog ls February 24, 2012. 
- - ............... , .. --- ... ~•""" ...... , . ., .... ·-···· 
How Is Raul doing? Is he still struggling with completing all the tasks with the quality you require or ls he 
making some headway? Hope everything is going well. When do you think you will leave and when do you 
think you'll be back? 
Andy 
On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 8:40 AM, Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
HI Andy, 





Boise State University 
(208) 426-4419 
Fax (208) 426-3100 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message, including attachments, is Intended only for the designated 
recipient(s), and may contain confidential, proprietary, or privileged information. If you are not a designated 
recipient, you may not review, copy or distribute this message. If you receive this in error, please notify the 
sender by reply e-mail and delete this message. Thank you. 
Join the Bronco Teem .... Check out Job opportunltles at: htlp:1/hrs.bolsestete.edu/Jobllstlngs/ 









Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> 
To: Raul Mendez <RaulMendez@boisestate.edu> 
Raul, 
Raul Mendez <raulmendez@boisestate.edu> 
Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 1:06 PM 
Per our conversation yesterday, I emailed Andy and asked him about your official probation end date. Here is 
his response: 
"Because the probationary period is based on hours and not days, the exact date is difficult due to the 
potential for overtime worked. Considering that there is no overtime worked, the anticipated date for 
completion of the probationary period is February 24, 2012." Given that you have been working some 
overtime, your date may vary based on the amount of overtime you have worked. -
Mariel 
https ://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=5a232de5e3 &view=pt&search=inbox&th= 13 346... 10/28/2011 
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Print Pa~~ 1 of 1 
Subject RE: Reference 
From: elswanson (elswanson@cableone.net) 
To: canizalezr@yahoo.com; 
Date: Sunday, November 20, 2011 9:10 PM 
RE: Letter of Recommendation for Raul Mendez 
November 20, 2011 
.... " 
I supervised Raul Mendez at Boise State University Medical Services for about one month. In that 
month Raul was a conscientious employee who worked hard to become a dependable customer 
service representative. He showed up on time and strived to do the best he could do. My time with him 
was short, but in working close!y with him during a very busy closing time one afternoon, I learned that 
he took his work seriously and would go to great lengths to make sure all responsibilities were 
covered. 
I would recommend him as someone who is trustful and hard working. 
Sincerely, 
Lynn Swanson 
Manager, Customer Service Department 
Boise State University 




November 30, 2011 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I worked with Raul Mendez at the BSU University Health Services in Boise, Idaho. He 
worked as a Customer Service Representative and I have found him to be a very 
customer-oriented employee. Raul is friendly, kind, and accommodating with customers 
and customer care has always been his top priority. 
Raul did an excellent job in this position. He has excellent written and verbal 
communication skills; he is extremely organized, reliable and computer literate. His 
bilingual skills would be an asset to any organization. 
Raul is flexible and willing to work on any project or hours assigned to him. He is great 
at multi-tasking as evidenced by the many times he worked by himself when the facility 
was short-staffed. His many responsibilities included scheduling patients, balancing 
money, knowledge of different Medical insurances, Check patients In/out, through 
knowledge of electronic health records, knowledge of policies/procedures, 
recordkeeping, screening customers for needed services, answering phone calls, and 
many other office related work. 
In summary, Raul would be a tremendous asset for your organization and has my highest 
recommendation. I wish Raul the very best in his future endeavors. If you have any 
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1 message 
Libby Greaney < llbbygreaney@boisestate.edu> 
To: Lynn Swanson <lswanso@bolsestate.edu> 
Bee: marieldahlman@boisestate.edu 
,!:!!_Lynn, _ =-· __ .,. _, _______ _ 
Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 4:09 PM 
(Per our. conversatH5ffoif the many. issues .you~reJ;~lng/having_ 
twhere_are you c;m awritten;document for a sjt_ ~own_wjtl} .~Ji:n?; 
Please make sure he does not negatively Influence Raul or Tiffany as they are new employees and one 
being a student (Tiffany); 




University Health & Recreation Services 
Boise State University · 
208-426-3389 
BSU 00209 
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- correspondence 
1message 
Libby Greaney< libbygreaney@bolsestate.edu> 




Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:05 PM 
That is what I thought. Just folfowing up on my request and why I thought it was important as Ex Director 
and 
some of my observations, information and concern on the pattern and content allowed in the 
correspondence; some of which you described to me. 
Will note this if needed later on. 
Thanks for the response. 
Thanks, Libby 
On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 11 :40 AM, Lynn Swanson <lswanso@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
HI Libby, 
Afte- left I deleted his label where I kept everything. I could see no reason to keep It I looked In the 
trash, but It looks like the trash has been deleted because last week there were almost 700 entries and 
now there are about 26 In trash. I suppose If someone was talented they could find It. 
Lynn 
t 11:27 AM, Libby Greaney <libbygreaney@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
As we've discussed several times, you and Mariel have expressed concern over Eric's behavior and 
.R§rformance issues 
while he was here. These Include his behavior while checking out female employees and we have one 
comment In particular that 
"he made me feel awful and he was Invasive". 
I have asked you to make hard copies of email and other {hand written or otherwise) correspondence 
Eric has given you during his 
tenure here and to you as his supervisor. To protect us later on, we may need this In that it establlshes 
a pattern of culture and \ 
his demeanor. · 
This is necessary due to you and Mariel's frequent stated concerns on Eric's undo Influence on Raul 
as a new employee as well as other 
CS R's and his discontent w/ Mariel in her new role as TR 1. 
Please catch up with me on this request prior to your last day and we'll also catch up on your files and 
materials so we know where it Is 
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U t I I I S I I J 
Debra Alvord <dalvord@bolsestate.edu> 
Re: Raul Mendez 
Mariel Dahlman <tnarleldahlman@bolsestata.edu> ~~tl at 4:16 PM 
To: Andy Cover <andycover@boiseslale.edu> 
Cc: Libby Greaney <llbbygreaney@boisestate.edu>, "Alvord, Debi" <dalvord@bolsestate.edu> 
Andy-
Attached Is the documentation I have pul together. Raul has conUnued lo display a lack of teamwork, 
communication and Interest in his· position as a customer service representalive. (We have decided thefie-h~i} 
~~_pass his.enlrance_pr.o~allo~pe}@_d. I have discussed Raul's situation with Libby and she has offered to 
pay him for 4 weeks, opposed to the 15 day staled In your email below. She has offered this to show good faith 
to Raul and help him In his future employment elsewhere. I have attached a word document documenting 
Raul's progress over the last few months. I've also attached a document I went over with him explaining his 
training (per his request, which he agreed to but refused to sign). I've also attached an email displaying the type 
of communication Iha! happens, when communication happens. You have a copy of Raul's response to his 
employee conference form, which he has yet to return to me despite my attempts asking him to return It signed. 
We would like to release him prior to Thanksgiving break, sometime next week If possible. Please let me know 
how to proceed and if you need anything else. · 
Mariel 
{Quoted lexl hidden) 
3 attachments 




,~i~ Raul's Trainlng.docx 
·::J 12K 
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9/27/11-1 witnessed Raul Involved In an Inappropriate conversation with a female patient. He asked 
the patient how many credits she was taking, she responded 12 credits. He said she was smart for only 
taking 12 because that's easy. He asked what program she is in and she answered nursing. He asked if 
shf: had applied for the program yet and she answered no but she was soon. He then asked If she had a 
back up plan in case she didn't get accepted because he has heard that the nursing program is hard. She 
became noticeable uncomfo~table and answered "no, I plan on getting In the first time." He then 
proceeded to tell her she needed a back up plan and that CWI offers an associates degree and that If she 
doesn't get in, she shourd look Into that so It wlll be easier to apply next time. She was visibly 
uncomfortable and tried to tell him that she had no interest in CWl's program. I Jumped in twice and 
said reaffirming things like "you'll get It the first time, you won't need a back up plan" and "there's no 
need for CWJ, you'll do just fine here." After the student left I asked Raul if he noticed that his 
conversation made her uncomfortable. He answered "no." J then explained that he needs to "use 
caution" when speaking with patients as he does not know their history or their situation. I also 
explained that from my perspective his telllng her that she needed a back up plan made her notrceably 
uncomfortable. He did not respond. I encouraged for him to keep conversation be~ween patients quick 
and professlonal, I spoke with Lynn later in the day and she said that she overheard this conversation 
between Raul and I and can verify. 
9/27 /11-1 was working at check out with Raul and was processing multiple medical record requests. 
The phone rang, Rauf was not helping a patient and did not answer the phone. He let It ring and looked 
over to me as though he wanted me to answer the phone. I stopped what I was doJl)g and answered 
the phone. After getting off the phone I apologized to Raul fqr not explaining myself sooner and then 
proceeded to explained that I am a CSR and a TRS, therefore I have other job duties In addftlon to my 
CSR duties and would appreciate that he handle the calls and the patients If he Is not busy. Instead of 
alternating turns. I asked him to not wait for me to answer the phone but to answer it when It rings if 
he is not busy helping other customers. He replied yes, 
9/28/11-We were meeting downstairs prior to meeting with Or. Lisa Harris. I noticed that Raul was not 
wearing his nametag but had his employee Id hanging from his shirt pocket. I asked him If he had his 
nametag here at work and asked him to go put ft on prior to being Introduced to Lisa Harris. He was 
notl~eable upset and said and did nothing. I had to ask him twice because he looked confused after the 
first time I asked him. I explained that his ID is not a nametag and that he Is required to wear his 
nametag. He did end up putting on his nametag prior to the meeting. I met with Lynn and she 
confirmed that he was upset by me asking him to put on his nametag. 
9/29/11- Raul and Morgan were working together at check out from 1:00-5:00. At 3:30 I noticed that 
Morgan was taking all the phone calls and that Raul was not picking up the calls. ta,t 4:30 I went out and 
asked why Morgan was taking all the phone calls and asked If they had something worked out because 
Raul was not answering the phones. Morgan answered that "no they hadn't.n I explained that botli 
people need to be answering the phones, not waiting for the other person to answer. 
10/03/11-At 1:00pm J checked the scheduled for the day and saw that there was many people on the 
schedule that were not checked out In dashboard. I ask_ed Raul if there was a reason why there were so 
BSU 00139 
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many people that had not been check out: He said that he was really busy and was focusing on checking 
bllllng workplace for any payments due and answering the phones, fnstead of checking them out. While 
he was at lunch I went through the pink sheets and checked out all the patients that he did not. All in 
total there were 35 patients that he did not check out. When he got back from lunch I explained to him 
that checking patients out ls not a~ option and it is the first thing we cio at check out and that It must be 
done every time, no exceptions. He said ok. 
10/03/114:15pm Raul asked me about the procedure for handling crutches. I explained that when a 
patient takes out crutches we the CSR's are to have them complete a crutch deposit form, make. a note 
In patient alerts and then put the deposit form In the red folder in the safe. When the crutches are 
returned, we have an ma check them to make sure they are not damaged and once they sign off on 
them, we pull the deposit and shred it, documenting this In patient alerts. Mary told me that she had 
just got done explaining this process to him not 10 minutes before he asked, so she was unsure as to 
why he was asking again. 
10/03/11-1 received an email from Tiffany asking why Raul was proposing a procedure change 
involving having the providers check out their own patients as opposed to the CSR's doing so. I 
responded to her by asking If he proposed this In person or via emall because I have heard nothing from 
him regarding this possibility. After speaking with tynn, she told me that Raul did bring this proposal to 
her a ttentlon and that she told Raul to add it to the agenda for the meeting on Wednesday, so she was 
unsure as to why he was not doing so. 
10/04/11- l was working at check out and noticed that when Raul was checking in patients that he was 
skipping the step of adding the insurance In the appointment, so It was not printing on the pink sheet. 
Around the same time Mary noticed that the CSR's are not getting an updated phone number and are 
not putting it In the patient file. Since Lynn was going to speak with. Terry and Raul regarding the phone 
number Issue, I asked her to make sure Raul understands that It's Important to add the Insurance, so It Is 
on the pink sheet. Lynn spoke with hi~ In person and both Lynn and I followed up with an email. Raul 
continued to not add the insurance and created more work for both people at check out. 
10/04/114:15 - Raul told a Medicaid patient that she qualified for a 50% discount. We only offer 
discounts to non!nsured patients. I've told him this ma~y times before but I took the pink sheet to him 
and explained that Medicare, Medicaid and Jrlcare are the only Insurance companies that we do not bill 
for and that patients with these plans are not considered noninsured. I explained that because he 
misinformed this patient our provider had to do a no charge on the office visit. I asked if he had any 
questions and he said that he would bring them up In the staff meeting, instead of asking me right then 
and ther~. I asked If he had a chance to add any Items to the agenda and he stated that he was too 
busy. I suggested he do It rlght away as there was no one at the front counter. 
10/04/11 2:00- J spoke with Tiffany and she said that Raul Is often very short and rude with her. I told 
her that Lynn and I will note this and take it into consideration. 
~0/04/11·4:Hpm~--f spoke ~~t~f\!a_ry .!_11d·sh~~ln:c':~~~ feedb~ck from her staff tha_t t.~ey h·av~ 
_ wltnessed·13aTil acting h1appr9prlately with female pc1tients and _sJaff members. Stating that he gawks, - ~ -- . - ,- . -
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stares up and down and makes them feel uncomfortable.[.t~q~lsed·her to Inform- Dr~ Serlo and i.yn_n .. and 
to handle ll quickly as I think we are under a time restriction for reportjng ISSl~es !Ike_ th~se. 
~ .. ,-- ·-·-'-··-·-·--. ___ .,.,. ,~ --- ·~----A, ..... :~ - . r,,_,. __ , ........ ---- " 
(10/05/11--8 :OOamTrecelvecfanemall :rro-mMaric.onflrmlng· rep-ort of Ra.~l's in~ppr~prlat~hfss_ towards: 't ·-- .. - ., ... , ..... ____ ..... , .. ,..._. . . . 
staff. ,Emall was malled to Lynn and Dr. Serio. I did not reply but looked online for BSU's policy on 
harassment and looking into the person in HR respo1_1slble for handling these complaints. 5:00pm • · 
stayed late to help Raul with dosing and balancing procedures because I asked him If he felt comfortable 
enough to do it by himself and he said no. 
10/05/11- met with Raul, Libby and Lynn regarding Raul's performance Issue. Reviewed issues stated 
above with Raul, created a record of employee conference form. Told him to take a few days to review 
it and respond in writing and follow up with Libby with any questions. 
10/06/11-12:00 ierrl was leaving for her lunch and I asked Ra·ur if he was comfortable being at check In 
by himself or if he would like for me to come sit with him. He saJa It was up to me but I said no, I need 
to know if you are ok being up here alone or if he wanted me to sit with him. He said he should be fine 
and that he would get me If he needed help, 
10/07 /11-8:30am. Raul and I were working at check out and I got pulllng Into Lynn's office for a 
meeting with her and Dr. Serio, I Informed Raul that I would be stepping away and asked lfhe would be 
alright while I was gone. He responded yes. 8:45am - r asked Raul if he would be alright working at 
check out alone while I step Into the scanning office to work on scanning, as I am behind and need to get 
It done,_ He responded yes and while I was In the scanning ~fflce and was keeping an eye on him to 
make sure he wasn't getting too busy. 9:15 - I Informed Raul, Terri and Tiffany that I have a meeting 
with Libby and will be unavailable until 10:00-10:30 and Informed them to speak with Lynn with any 
questions. Everyone confirmed. 
10/24/11-1 overheard Raul giving medical advice to a student, telling her to continue taking her over 
the counter meds and drinking water, Instead of having her consult with medically trained personnel. 
10/25/11- Received feedback from Jacee: Raul asked Jacee what she did prior to coming to UHS, she 
told him she worked at the print ship doing binding/deliveries. He stated "that's sounds a lot better 
then being stuck here_working behrnd a computer all day." 
10 6 11- Raul arrived 5 minutes late to the all staff meeting. 
et with Raul and discussed the following issues: 
1. Arriving to work late, told him that It will directly effect his future employment if he is late 
again. He said that It "was only 3 minutes" I told him that It was 5 minutes and that It doesn't 
matter if It ls 3 or S, the fact Is, is ~hat he arrived late to an all staff meeting which had already 
begun, 
r.:-:--~ -· ·- --------··'"· - ·- ..... . . -
2. t...La,sk_e_g_bim If he likes.working her:e~.o_d insls_~g_e_g_!:1lni to explore other _emP!9.Y!D§.nt, 
:opppr.tu.~tles_ If hE:_ls unh~ppy_ ~er~: He stated that he Is happy here and llkes his Job. 
BSU 00141 
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.3. Discussed that I have received feedback that he Is constantly negative, Is making negative 
comments to others, and that I've personally overheard him making negative comments. Asked 
him to comment, he stated that he "does not feel that he has ever made any negative 
comments and that It Is my Interpretation. I would not give specific names or details because I 
want to prot~ct those who have come to me. He asked for specific encounters so I referred to 
his comment that I witnessed, to Jacee regarding that she was lucky she is being trained now 
because !twas so busy the last couple weeks.[He cle~~ylngJbat and_st~Jecftiiat~he 
:Sifd was o!!'Y ln_fefereri~~·to_b:ciw.bu~:we!ve: been ove'r:"theJakfevtWee~~jlUt it had nothing 
to do with training. I explained that regardless of the specific content, comments like that are 
seen as negative and not positive. 
4. Told Raul to only get the basic Information from a student when scheduling appointments, not 
to ask unnecessary questions gave an example of the following: "10/25/11 a student asked to 
schedule an appt because he thought his nose was broken, Raul asked If he was in a fight." I told 
him the conversation should have stopped when the student stated the Issue, it was not Raul's 
Qob to Infer or ask any futher questions when he has the reason for appt. Raul agreed. t. xpl~ine_d th~_ce_b~ ajked for specifics regarding his "training" thaf filstraififngwlll forrriall'l .'end on November 1st!1-but as far as I'm concerned his "formal training" is over and he should be 
able to work independently now, with the exception of something we may hav~ missed in 
training or adapting to the constant changes of policies and procedures that happen daily. 
Explained that 1fwas-my understanding that his probation-ends 6monthsfrom his sfart dateoii] 
,Felirtlafy 24th,but the probation period Is speclflcally to see If he Is the correct fit for UH$ and -
also for him to decide It this Is the place he would llke to be employed at. Specifically addressed 
that fact that If the negative talk continues, It will be detrimental to his future employment and 
agalrfJ~v1tecflilm to search for otner.employme_nt lft~~rwas tlie ca_~ 
6. Discussed Raul's Inability to Initiate conversation with me along with his inability to take 
imitative and communicate with others. Using the example of him not having a username and 
p?ssword for the 00.. He told me that Terri had already told him how to get access, which is to 
email Karla but said that he had not done It because "I had not Instructed him to do so." I told 
him that he needs to adapt to everyday situations and take initiative and handle business 
Independently and that I am not going to address every issues/concern with him, especially if he 
does not bring it to me personally. Raul stated that "we are too busy" for him to have a simple 
conversation with me. I told him that we are not, nor will we ever be "too busy" for him to have 
a verbal conversation to ask a question or clarlfy a policy or send me a quick email. There Is no 
excuse for not communicating with me and It will not be tolerated. 
7. I told Raul that I am working on a written response to his conference form and that I w!ll have It 
to him by the end of this week. 
8. I explained that we wlll be going over the checklist and he will be signing off on everything he 
has learned thus far and that this wlll be done by the end of the week. 
9. I asked him for feedback regarding his time here, he explained that he thinks I should do more 
communicating with him. I explained that I check in with all CSR's at least 3-4 times dally and if 
he does not take the opportunity/initiative to use that then it Is his lack of responsibility and 
that that is on him. He agreed that I In fact do check In. 
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10, He used the example of how yesterday he needed to ask me a question but I was on the phone, 
so as soon as I was off the phone I went to him and asked what he needed. He said that was 
good and that he liked that. I told him I do that every time with any person who needs me. I 
explained that I do not treat him differently than any of my CSR's or coworkers, he did not 
respond. 
11. Raul asked how he was doing so far. I told him to work on th~ things we discussed and that we 
wlll go from here. I reviewed our conversation stating that he can't be late, needs to not ask 
unnecessary questions of the students, needs to watch the negative comments, needs to never 
give medical advice, reviewed new process of writing down names and reasons on the pink 
sheet, Instructed him to have responslbillty and take Initiative to ask questions and learn more 
about job duties instead of blaming me for lack of training. He also asked who he supervisor ls 
going to be once I am out on maternity leave. I told him that his direct supervisor will be the 
new assistant director but that I will still be his team lead so he needs to learn how to 
communicate effectively with me. I told him that we hope t? have that position flfled prior to 
my departure. 
12, I told Raul multiple times durlns the conversation that he needs to get over the fact that we 
gave him a record of employee conference, which he stlll has not signed and returned to me and 
to move forward. I am tired of hearing about it and he needs to move on. He can not continue 
to go back to that situation or use others as an excuse for Job performance. He tried multiple 
times to bring Terri Into the conversation and I specifically told him to leave other people out of 
It and to focus on himself. Ended with asking him to communicate with me. 
10/26/11-The last patient was checked out at 5:12, Raul stated that he did not leave untll 5:40. I asked 
why he stayed so late, he stated that it took him that long to balance and report the totals for the day. 
This process takes 5-10 minutes at most. I checked with Raul at 5:10 when I left and he stated that he 
was balanced but was waiting for the last patient to check out. Given that he was balanced, It should 
not have taken him 28 minutes to finish up required paperwork. 
10/27 /11- Noticed that I received an email from Raul dated 10/26/11 5:35pm. When I asked Raul why 
he stayed so late on 10/26/11, he said he was waiting for a patient. When it in fact looks to be that he 
was emailing me, This goes back to the communication problems we've been having, 
10/27/11-Sent out an email to all employees with the new schedule. Raul is no longer to work the late 
shift. His hours are 8-5 M-F. Also einalled a response to his email stating that he Is not to claim 
overtime for arriving early due to the bus ·schedule. 
10/28/11- Raul did not follow policy for employee flu shot, spoke with him regarding this. Mary got 
Involved as well and spoke with him because this Is not a new policy and has been told multiple times 
how to properly handle employee flu shots. 
11/1/11- spok_e with Raul one on one. Discussed training thus far. Went over attached training sheet, 
asked him to make any changes needed. He added that he was working independently at check o_ut on 
August 251\ one day after his start date. I told him that It was not completely accurate and added· "with 
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supervision." • I asked him to sign the document to confirm that we went over this, as it was orie of the 
specific things he asked for in his response to his employee conference form given to him on 10/5/11 
(which he has yet to return sign). He refused to sign stating that he did not see "any reason to." 
I also went over an email he presented to me 10/27/11 (see attached). I verbally read the entire emall 
and provided clarification to ~ny questions. I asked him to sign the form acknowledging that we 
discussed It and It and he again refused to sign stating that he did not see "any reason to.'' 
11/7/11-Email wa~ sent to all CSR's asking them to participate tn the shooting of the "Buster Video." I 
asked that anyone who felt uncomfortable being In the video to notify me asap. · 
11/8/114:35pm - Raul approached me and told me he did not want to participate. This Is another 
example of 1) lack of appropriate communication due to the fact that I asked everyone to notify me 
asap the day prior and 2) lack on teamwork and Involvement. This was a great opportunity to 
participate In something fun and build teamwork but he chose not to be Involved. I overheard him 
talking to Jacee about It and he stated it was "weird". 
11/9/11- sent all CSR's an email asking for feedback regarding Roxanne's phone. Received responses 
verbally and via email from everyone except Raul. 
11/10/11-had to send him a (ollow up email regarding Roxanne's phone informing him that he was the 
only CSR that I had not heard frorri and asked for his feedback. Continues to display a lack of 
communication and teamwork, 
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Boise State University - AppL_,.,r Employees Mail - Re: employee Page 1 of2 
B Mariel Doyle< marleldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
ao111 ITATI UNIVlallTY 
Re: employee 
1 message 
Mariel Dahlman < marleldahlman@bolsestate.edu> Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:12 PM 
To: Andy Cover <andycover@boisestate.edu> 
Cc: Jordan LePiane <jordanleplane@bolsestate.edu>, Lynn Swanson <lswanso@boisestate.edu> 
Bee: Libby Greaney <libbygreaney@boisestate.edu> 
Andy-
We have a lot going on over here. I know that Raul may be In contact with you. Please let me know If you 
would llke for me to be involved and If you'd like _to meet. 
Thanks, 
Mariel 
On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 4:21 PM, Andy Cover <andycover@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Lynn and Mariel -
Let me know If you want to sit down and talk about this - or how I can help. 
Andy 
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 3:37 PM, Jordan LePlane <jordanlepiane@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
HI Mariel, 
I'm going to refer you to Mr. Andy Cover In Employee Relations as this topic falls under his area of 
expertise. 
I'm sony to hear the employee Isn't working out. Let me know If there's anything else I can help with. 
Thanks! 
Jordy 
' On Tue,~at 1:59 PM, Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@bolsestate.edu> wrote: 
HIJor~ . 
We currently have an employee who is working with us,Lhe'wasJ.!:1~6J~g-~_li(iif~rfprobatlo~. We 
are thinking that he may nor work out for us. What steps do we need to take with tliis person to 
make sure that we are covered if he does not work out anq we neecno· release him? 1 Also, will you 
supply us with the ~ifics-regardlng the·sb(nio'htlipfoballon period and what we as employers are 
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Boise State University - Apps Lvl' Employees Mail - Raul Mendez Page 1 of 1 
B 
aOIII ITAT• UNIVlallTY 
Raul Mendez 
1 message 
Mariel Dahlman < marieldahiman@boisestate.edu> 
To: Andy Cover <andycover@boisestate.edu> 
Cc: Libby Greaney <libbygreaney@bolsestate.edu> 
Bee: "Dahlman, Mariel" <MarielDahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
Andy, 
Mariel Doyle< marleldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
[Thu;Oct 21;201'1 at 2:5_!f PM 
Due to Raul'scontlnlfed inability to performwe ne-ed to khowWha_t to.ao·to proce~s J~l$. termiriatii:>n. Should 
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Re: Raul Mendez 
1 message 
Mariel Dahlman< marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> Oli.E_,J!_Q.vj_o,_20_1.iaf~l:~16-eM} 
To: Andy Cover <andycover@boisestate.edu> 
Cc: Libby Greaney <llbbygreaney@bolsestate.edu>, "Alvord, Debi" <dalvord@bolsestate.edu> 
Andy-
Attached is the documentation I have put together. Raul has continued to display a lack of teamwork, 
communication and interest In his position as a customer service representative. We have decided the he 
has failed to pass his entrance probation period. I have discussed Raul's situation with Libby and she has 
offered to pay him for 4 weeks, opposed to the 15 day stated in your email below. She has offered this to 
show good faith to Raul and help him in his future employment elsewhere. I have attached a word 
document documenting Raul's progress over the last few months. I've also attached a document I went 
over with him explaining his training (per his request, which he agreed to but refused to sign). I've also 
attached an email displaying the type of communication that happens, when communication happens. You 
have a copy of Raul's response to his employee conference form, which he has yet to return to me 
despite my attempts asking him to return it signed. We would like to release him prior to Thanksgiving 
break, sometime next week if possible. Please let me know how to proceed and If you need anything else. 
Mariel 
--- ' ~ .~ ,, ......... _...... . - - ------- --- .-.... .. 
LOnJhu,-Oct27,_20.U.at 4:33-PM; Andy Cover <andycover@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Mariel-
L!!._m-soriy that you'have reached this employment option; but I understand that if Raul has continued to 
make mistakes that this option may need to be utilized. 
The process is that Raul is provided a letter from the Vice President that Informs Raul that he has failed 
to satisfactorily complete his entrance probationary period and that his last day will be X he will be 
provided 15 days notification of this date and be placed on Administrative Leave with Pay during this 
time. He will be allowed the opportunity to resign without prejudice as well. Raul will also be provided a 
performance evaluation that lets him know that he has failed to pass his entrance probationary period. 
If you get the opportunity to put together your documentation and send it to me, after I have reviewed the 
information, I will walk you and the Department through the process as well as prepare the letter and 
performance evaluation. 
Please let me know if you have any questions. 
Andy 
On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Andy, 
Due to Raul's continued Inability to perform we need to know what to do to process his termination. 
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PERl -· tMANCE ACTION/IMPROVEMEN .. 'LANS 
Guidance for Supervisors 
In support of Boise State University's strategic plan to attract, retain, reward and c:fev.~top_a high-quality workforce, Human 
Resource Services ("HRS") has developed this~PerformanceAction/lmprovement Plans G'uidance for supervisors who 
feel that an employee's performance or conduct is deficient. The Guidance explains how Employee Relations partners 
with supervisors and managers to provide assistance throughout the performance management process. 
No one likes to discipline employees, and as a result, supervisors may ignore problem behavior just to avoid 
confrontation. Yet, inaction can be equally dangerous if employee behavior or performance problems are consistently 
ignored. When managers do not actively address poor performance and misconduct, morale and productivity will suffer. 
Some of this unavoidable stress can be relieved by. - - - .- -n, -clear-ex ectatio - -- - erforrnance. and em -ioee 
lbehayjoi;JUniversity Shared Values and Standards of Conduct) ..§._n supervisors taking a proactive approach using a 
combination of corrective coaching/counseling and progressjve discipline. This approach coaches supervisors to confront 
employee p_~l:formal)ce an9 _ m.i~<?onduct problems and to document the proceedings. Further, !iCprovides-Efrtiployees 
sp-ecific leedback, · plus action plans-ancf timelines'for improvemiiinV 
Step One: Informal Coaching/Counseling (Initial Issue) 
Unless an employee has engaged in a serious or repeated offense, !..~ •. ~lEical initial response to a , 
performance/behavioral issue is to have@:r'Uhfbi:n'fal,~.Y.efspecific,'solutions-oriented coachin!fsessiofiiwith the employee. 
During this discussion you should: -
• Meet with the employee to discuss the matter. Remind the employee of pertinent policies, work rules and 
performance or behavior expectations. 
• Inform the employee of the nature of the problem (provide concrete examples of how the employee's behavior or 
performance has fal~~n_2!]9[t_of expeq!atior:is) and state-your expectafio-ris (includfnci 'adi6ns-and1imeframes -tile' 
remplciyeeneeds to-take to correct the problem). 
• ·Explain the impact of the employee's deficiencies on the customers, organization and coworkers. 
• [B'plain-the adverse consequen·ces-if tliepeiformancer or behavior is ·notcorrectea. 
Step one is intended to coach/cQunselJhe_e_mplo ee on im rovement and rovide a ro riate coaching and guidance to 
correc e pro em. c e emp o ee _s ou understand that s e/he is how at risk for additiona 1sc1 · 
1 erfor es not im rove. The supervisor should take notes or prepare a memorandum for the 
supervisor's own records indicating that the meeting has taken place and summary of conversation, expectations and 
agreement(s). This informal record helps supervisors remember the details of the first occurrence if other problems arise. 
In many instances, having one or two candid discussions is all you need to help a wayward employee get back on track. 
Step Two: Formal Reprimand (Second Occurrence) 
If there is an additional occurrence of the performance/behavioral issues, the supervisor should hold another meeting with 
the employee and take the following actions: 
• Issue a written reprimand to the employee and again inform the employee of the performance expectations and 
required changes. Summarize-riew/c·ontiffued issuesand ·previou's discussions -held ·and/or actions/agreements 
made 'and fime -frames. 
• Convey the increased seriousness of the performance/behavior concerns including the possibility of disciplinarx. 
action up to and including termination. 
• A Record of Emplo ee Conference Form is available as an o tion · umentafo of this step. A copy of 
the warnin ed in the employees official personnel file (retained in HRS). ---.:...:._ 
• Performance Improvement Plan. 
• A Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) may be a more effective option when there are various performance and 
behavior issues. A PIP ma include additi or instructional communications about expected 
performance/behavior including written warnings and plans for follow-up progress or spec1a eva uat1ons or it may 
include training/development requirements with specific application and outcome expectations and/or both. A 
manager should contact and partner with an Employee Relations representative to formulate and develop such a 
plan. 
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Step Three: Final Warning/Discip ry Consideration (Additional Occurren ___ ) 
' The type of corrective action a supervisor should take in a given situation generally depends on four issues: (1) the nature 
and seriousness of the infraction, (2) whether it is a first time or repeat offense, (3) past handling of similar disciplinary 
problems, and (4) whether there are special circumstances impacting the level of needed response. In addition, both the 
severity of the problem and the length of time between incidents should be considered when discipline is considered for 
repeat offenses. For relatively minor issues, it may be appropriate to reduce the importance of previous incidents after a 
year or more has passed between occurrences. However, if there is an ongoing problem, pattern, or if the employee is 
involved in several different types of occurrences, disciplinary action may be appropriate. 
When the informal (verbal) coaching attempts fail, or when there is a more serious issue or a pattern or continuation of 
performance/behavior issues, a formal disciplinary action may be necessary. The recommended progression may include 
a written warning, possibly suspension or other disciplinary action (final warning measure) and finally, 
termination. However, it is important to note that the decision to impose discipline as well as the severity and/or nature of 
the discipline is a discretionary matter resting solely with the University. 
If there are additional occurrences of performance or behavioral issues, the supervisor may consider taking the following 
action(s), depending on the severity of the problem: 
• Issue a final reprimand or warning and summarize new/continued issues and previous discussions and/or 
actions/agreements made and time frames. 
• This step may include a suspension without pay (or other disciplinary action (optional). This action is often 
referred to as a decision-making leave. Its purpose is to place the employee on final notice and force a 
commitment to improve, or face termination. This step may be replaced with a final warning letter or reduction in 
pay or some other disciplinary measure less than termination; or it may be omitted all together and the 
department may move to a termination action if appropriate and warranted. 
• The supervisor should discuss any recommendation for disciplinary action, which may include suspension, 
demotion, reduction in pay, etc. with the Department Director or. Dean and an HRS Employee Relations 
Representative. irhe-cfiscussiOn shoula indude reason(s) and documentation why.-disciplinary action is being 
crecoinmended and the_efforts--:-a·n-d dis·cussionsJhat have.taken placeJoJmptove.the performance of the employee; 
(the Dean would review the recommendation with the appropriate Vice PresidenUProvost or President). No 
disciplinary action can be implemented without the preparation and issuance of a Notice of Contemplated Action 
(coordinated by EmP,loyee Relations) andtP!_OVi~iQgJtJe,.emplbyee with-arro·pportunity tq respond;:this. is· referred 
,to as-"due process.";This review provides a system of checks and balances and should identify issues/concerns 
or decisions that warrant further review. 
Step Four: Final Action - Termination 
If all efforts fail to produce the desired changes in the employee's performance/behavior, the final step is termination. 
• To ensure that the recommendation to terminate is the proper course of action, all recommendations for 
termination must be reviewed by the Department Director/Dean and an HRS Employee Relations Representative. 
Jhe discussion should~ihcludefeason(sL?r:id~documentation why terniination·is being recommende~ arid the--; 
' efforts and discussions-that tiave taken ·place :to improve the·perforrhance-df the employee: No disciplinary action 
can be implemented without the preparation and issuance of a Notice of Contemplated Action (coordinated by 
Employee Relations)(and·providing the employee with ari opportunity-to respond;-this is referred to as "due 
process." This review provides a system of checks and balances and should identify issues/concerns or 
decisions that warrant further review. 
5. Serious Misconduct/Performance Requiring Immediate Action 
In cases involving serious misconduct and/or performance issues, such as a major breach of policy or violation of 
law, the steps outlined above, may be disregarded. In these situations, the employee is typically suspended (with 
or without pay - depending on circumstances) and an investigation of the incidents leading up to the suspension 
should be conducted to determine if any further action, such as termination, should be taken. 
Employee Relations typically reviews all recommendations for disciplinary action* (including termination) before any final 
action is taken. 
Additional Guidance: 
When counseling employees about problems, supervisors should limit their remarks to objective, factual evidence and 
foe n th · lation or erformance concern. ,In addition, su ervisors· should offer assistance~ specify a 
C~imeline for improverneot/and dearly state the consequences of the employee's continued misconduct or ma 11 y o meet 
000221
performance g~. Further, supervi should document their disciplinary diSCUvv,_ns and actions. This documentation 
• can assist the supervisor in conducting performance appraisals, provide an objective basis for future personnel decisions, 
and help defend the University against possible legal claims. 
Finally, an employee's work history may be considered when deciding disciplinary matters. Depending on the situation, a 
person with a strong performance history may deserve to be handled more favorably than someone who rarely performs 
up to acceptable standards. These are value judgments best made by supervisors, in consultation with the HRS 
Employee Relations staff. 
Wben applying discipline, managers should be careful ·not to show favoritism or act arbjtrarjly, Much of the litigation aimed 
at employers arises out of the on consistent application of discipline. To prevent these claims, some employers assume 
that they must apply the exact same discipline and follow identical procedures for each employee in order to be 
"consistent." However, employers are not required to treat every employee the same way. Rather,_!~Y,$.hculd try to treat 
"similarly situated" employees in the same manner. 
Typically, courts consider a number of factors to determine if employees are similarly situated, including the nature and 
severi~y of the incidents leading to discipline, past performance and disciplinary records. job·£/tt!i't'.'UWd·§tetus.i. and lengt.!} 
:Qf.e1+1ploymeot: For example, an employee who has been with the University for five years and has a good p'eiiormance 
record with no disciplinary infractions may be treated more leniently than an employee who has only worked for a year 
and has several documented performance or disciplinary problems. Alternatively, a manager may be disciplined more 
severely than a non-managerial employee for the same offense, because the manager is expected to enforce work rules 
and set an example. 
* Below is a summary of the processes that may be involved in taking disciplinary action: 
1. If the supervisor determines that a situation exists which requires immediate disciplinary action, contact an HRS 
Employee Relations Representative immediately to review the documentation, recommended action and to assfst 
the department_~jth_implementirJg ~pp~opriate actions and/or disciplinary measuresrln mo§tcases, due process 
r.. o ' , C o • to taking disciplina"ry:-action: -
2. the supervisor should discuss a recommendation or s c 10n, which may include suspension, 
demotion, reduction in pay, or dismissal, with the Department Director or Dean and an HRS Employee Relations 
Representative. The discussion should include reason(s) why disciplinary action is being recommended and the 
(efforts and discussions· that have taken place to imp"rove the·performance of the employee. Supporting 
documentation should be reviewed at this time. · 
3. If tlJ.~J!.QP.I.QP.ri irector su orts disci lina action a notice of contemplated action 
(NOCA) wrn be di!P.telefcleEI by HRS in cooperatjon with the department to be signed by the epa men rrec or or 
Dean. HRS may involve legal crn rnsel as agpropriate. 
4. The notice of contemplated action (NOCA) is delivered to the employee by the department director/Dean and/or 
immediate supervisor. The employee is given a designated period of time to respond to the NOCA. This step 
provides the employee an opportunity to respond to the notice and present his/her reason(s) why the 
contemplated action(s) should not be taken. The employee's response is directed to the President, Provost or 
appropriate Vice-President (or designee) to determine the final decision. 
5. The President, Provost, appropriate Vice-President, or their designee will notify the employee of the final decision 
in writing in accordance with the appropriate due process policy. If final action determined is to proceed with 
disciplinary action, it may be implemented immediately and a notification of final disciplinary action is prepared 
and delivered to the employee. 
6. The employee may appeal the University's disciplinary decision in accordance with appropriate rules and policies. 
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Performance Management System 
Boise State University's performance management Is developed to provide a mechanism for 
creating and maintaining ongoing communication between the supervisor and the employee. 
,This system focuses on helping our employees achi her best w rk I erformance. 
To t a en , niversI y s management system is designed to accomplis 
the following goals: 
,,,,..,....,,._.---- --~:·-· .,_. .... ~ .... .,.~ -.. .. ------, 
f 
:1,-- Creating a Review of the Job Description and Duties; 
2:-""Setting Performance Expectations; 
3:-- Keeping Performance on Target;· • _ 
4 .. Realigning Performance If necessary; and 
5. Ensuring a Comprehensive Performance Evaluation Meeting takes place. 
The performance management process Is supported with some solid on-line training that will 
assist managers In: reviewing established job expectations, reviewing employee 
performance standards, establishing new performance expectations, summarizing Individual 
job performance, assigning an overall rating, and coaching on how to conduct the evaluation 
meeting along with establishing employee development plans. 
In addition, this training helps the University and supervisors/managers meet the 
requirement of Idaho Code Section 12.67-5309.7 that states, "all superyj5pcs who eyalyate 
state employees shall receive training in the evaluation format and process to assure 
fairness and consistency In the evaluation process." 
EyaJuatjon Templates 
Go to the "Next" link below to start your training or to learn more about Boise State's 
Performance Management Process: 
(i37}i Performance Management Trajnjna Oyeryiew 
~ 
Last reviewed November 2008 
http:! /hrs. boisestate.edu/pfm/ 10/25/2011 
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Performance Management System 
Each employee plays an Important role In making Boise State University the best It can be. 
The Performance Management Program gives us tools for the ongoing process of workforce 
planning, employee coaching, feedback, and development. 
Note: Boise State University requires that all supervisors who supervise and complete a 
performance evaluation on any benefit eflglble employee complete the Performance 
Management Training. Those supervisors who supervise students or non-benefit eligible 
employees do not need to complete this training. 
Boise State University's Performance 
Management Program provides wa~ 
to brjng gut the best in employees and 
allows Boise State to meet Its goals. 
The focus Is on communication -
commynlcatlgn about performance. 
Performance appraisals develop anti 
motivate employees by ensuring their 
activities are linked to their goals and 
the mission of Boise State. 
The links at left will take you through 
the performance management 
process, from a general overview to 
delivering the actual appraisal. 
*The Performance Management 
Program consists of five parts that 
complete the full cycle of performance management. 
[
• Reviewing the Job Description and Duties . 
• Setting Performance Expectations 
• Keeping Performance on Target 
• Realjanjna Performance 
• The Performance Evaluation Meeting 
* These are optimal best practices that we encourage supervisors to follow. We recognize 
every step may not be followed; or In exact sequence, however, communication Is key. 
The graphic below shows the flow of the Performance Management Program 
after the Job Description and Duties have been reviewed and updated if 
necessary, 
~ Next Topic: Th~ Appraisal Process 
http:! /hrs. boisestate.edu/pfm/perftips.shtml 10/25/2011 
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Performance Management System 
The Performance Appraisal Process 
The Performance Management Program establishes a year-round partnership between 
employee and supervisor while creating a shared understanding about work that Is to be 
accomplished and how work Is to be done. 
{Joores"--:·--~-· -··· --,-n~; ~~·rfo~mance-~tiinda'rcfs and' develo in" - ·- "itles are) 
11 en 1fied and agreed upon: These are linked to the goals of the department and the University 
' so that each employee's work Is connected to the mission(Ft1:0ue·rit communication-provides 
{feedback and support to the employee regarding his o·r hetperformance. .. 
Why Do Performance Appraisals? 
Idaho Code requires annual performance 
appraisals CI,C,67-5309fhl) Performance 
appraisals assist employees In developing 
their careers and being successful In their 
jobs. They describe expectations and 
standards for all state employees. It's the 
right thing to do, and they ensure the agency 
mission and vision are achieved by: 
1. Motivating and encouraging employees 
to be prod uctlve contributors to the 
mission and goals of the department 
and the University. 
• Ensuring activities of the 
employees are linked to the goals and mission of the department and University. 
• Discussing employee performance through feedback. 
• Documenting communication regarding performance objectives to employees. 
Establishing performance standards with stated goals and objectives. 
Focusing on outcomes and results. 
Je'nhancii,g communication through continuous·feedback and coaching between 
r employee apd supervisor. ;I 
2. Promoting statewide consistency. 
3. Meeting legal requirements and serving as a legal document. 
4. Ensuring documents are In place and serving as resource for making human resource 
decisions, I.e. recruitment, promotion, succession planning, training plans, and 
compensation. 
The Supervisor's Role 
As a supervisor, you have many responsibilities in 
performance management. You provide recognition 
and reward achievement wlille removing barriers that 
Impede an employee's success. 
One way of accomplishing this Is by role modeling the · 
desired behaviors. Model your vision, goals, and 
expectations. Challenge employees to reach their 
optimum level of performance and hold them 
accountable. 
Remember: "Your success as a supervisor 
depends on your employees!" 
http:/ !hrs. boisestate.edu/pfm/perfappraisal.shtml 10/25/2011 
000225
Boise State University Human Resource Services - Training and Develonment 
The Appraisal Process 
To help supervisors and employees be successful, there are several elements to the 
performance appraisal process. These elements form a process that continues throughout the 
review period. 
• Review the Job description and job duties. It Is critical to have an up-to-date job 
description which provides clarification of the job requirements, both for the manager 
and the employee. Make sure the job description accurately and realistically reflects the 
essential duties and requirements of the job. Please forward the revised Job Description 
to jthies@bojsestate.edu for archiving. If an employee and supervisor cannot locate a 
current job description, please contact your department director to check for availability. 
In some cases, the University's Human Resource Services may have a copy. Please 
contact Classification and Compensation at 426-1616 for more Information. 
• Set expectatlons:Em lo ees·must"kn·ow what I ·ex -ected and how _their job_supports 
the university's miss on be ore t e-rev ew period begins. ri' a-ree - n the oals, 
,performance stanijards and objectives that are set'. Review the goals with the emp oyee 
periodically and make changes as needed .•. - - .... ~-----... __ __ 
• Provide supportr Arrange for training,_ provide resources encouragement, 
land develo 'menfo opp_o unities so ee t elr O ves aiicrthe 
·ob ectlv s o t e e r ment and unlversi as needed. ' 
• Provide feedback on employee pe ormance 
· Timely - give employees time to correct_b_E}hpvlor .• ____ ____ _ . __ _ 
· Specific -1j)rovid · I · hd- erf r ex ectatlons aricf "'ivetemployees 
(s"ecific:"'examp es of issues or concerns 
• Honest - on sugar-coat or g oss over concerns 
· Designed to hel the e o ee be successful - be constructive; not destructive 
· Rein orces effective behavior - set the tone and mode what you expect 
• Record significant employee performance events when they occur. Include both 
positive and negative performance Issues, and be specific! 
• Seek employee feedback on performance issues. Ask for employee feedback and 
input. Use open-ended questions. Don't make assumptions. Get all the facts. 
Communicate! 
• "Prepare and review the performance appraisal prior to the due date. Gather 
feedback; consider asking the employee to answer some self evaluation questions. Know 
your BSU policy/procedure on delivering the performance appraisal document. Be timely 
- It really matters to the employee. 
• Communicate, It Is the hallmark of good performance management. There should be 
no surprises. Communication should occur throughout the review period and most 
Importantly, when the annual appraisal Is delivered. 
• Use the formal review process. It can be used for human resource decisions such as 
promotions, transfers, dismissals, succession planning, and assessing training needs . 
. (~j Next Topic; ssu Guidelines for Employee Performance standards 
Last reviewed October 2006 
http://hrs.boisestate.edu/pfm/perfappraisal.shtml 
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Faculty Ombuds Office 
Policy Interpretations and 
Practices 
Employee Relations 
Welcome to Employee Relations 
Boise State Human Resource Services Is dedicated to the 
enhancement of a quality and efficient work environment 
within the University community. 
We promote positive communication between employees, 
supervisors and managers; address root causes of 
workplace distractions and advise the campus on 
employee relations matters, administrative processes and 
policies. 
The Employee Relations manager and HRS staff are 
de lcated to serving the OrnverSltY eolhltlUhlty by 
{provlilli'i'g fair·an i able services consistent with 
Urnvers1 policies and proce ures and State and Federal 
laws and guidelines. 
These services Include: 
• Providing University policy and procedural 
interpretation and administration 
• Providing advice on how to manage performance 
and conduct issues 
HRS Resources for Budget 
Reductions (pd!) 
Layoff FAQs {pd/) 
Support & Resources for 
Laid Off Employees (pd!) 
Classified Reduction in Force 
(RIF) Procedures (pd!) 
, .... -- .. --. .......... -- ·-·--------
:· .. ~ Wliais iiew i,d-ires 
ri Tel;~~:n~~tin~ ~t B~;;~·state 
~ Nursing Mothers: 
l. ~r~a~ _an~ Lactation Ro~ms 
Advlsln de artments on adm n orrective action{f<irfi.}ulaBng"'.µerforiiiarice 
l mprovement plans .a.nd administering progressive p 
• Providing University policy and procedural Interpretation and administration 
• Providing advice on how to manage performance and conduct Issues 
• Advising departments on administering corrective action, formulating performance 
improvement plans and administering progressive disciplinary process ------ ·- ---- --. • (Reviewing proposed employee actions, Including written reprimands, demotions, 
suspensions,ip~o,b·~.tio,nary, period terminations, contract non-renewals and dismissals 
for cause before they are administered 
• Providing advice and serves as coordinate point for reduction In force actions 
• Providing advice on win/win exit strategies 
• Providing assistance and advice on the Problem Solving and Appeal processes 
.:'"'Assistingdepartments to· u·se ·the Uiii\ier5ity's"Pe'ftorma6fe roa.ngement-systemancl 
ldeve!ap and administer performance standards, performance evaluatl.ons, and -
~ development pla'!! · 
• Pr vldln Supervisor Skills k and tralnln recomm nd In 
the delivery o regular or specialized training needs_, 
• Assisting departments In development of employee Incentives 
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Raul Mendez <raulmendez@boisestate.edu> 
UHS All Staff updates .. 
1 message 
Libby Greaney <libbygreaney@boisestate.edu> Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 1 :49 PM 
To: University Health Services <uhs-all-staff-group@boisestate.edu> 
Good Afternoon, 
Congratulations to Verla, Sophia and Michael for 5 years of service to BSU! Thank You. 
We will have All-Staff meeting time tomorrow and we'll get updated on a lot of things going on. 
J_gssjca will update us on'.tne_projectof refinifiitrcfournew employee ch-eck-lisfforall fourdepartfffents. 
This has been a work in process all summer and it is looking good. 
We have the fourth candidate in tomorrow ( Rebecca Tucker) for the Asst. Director, Clinical Operations. 
The search committee is conducting phone interviews on Thursday for Manager, Patient Services and will 
then narrow that down to 2-3 for on campus interviews. 
Please note: these days will be Monday 31st, Tues, 1st and Wed 2nd. Thanks to both search committees 
and other participants in these processes. 





University Health & Recreation Services 
Boise State University 
208-426-3389 
https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=5a232de5e3&view=pt&search=inbox&th=l333c... I 0/25/2011 
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New Employees 
1 message 
Mariel Dahlman< marieldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
To: Jessica Martin <Jesslcamartln2@bolsestate.edu> 
Hey Jess"" 
Mariel Doyle< marleldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
You mentioned this morning that Y<>!!_ Ca!! prl!'!t O~<iiew-employees-or1~-11fall:On~hfil!@oo!:,s ... would you 
please print two of them for me? LO.i:i~JqcJ_a_p_e.e,and.one for.Raul'L .. 1 
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Raul Mendez <raulmendez@boisestate.edu> 
Check List 
1 message 
Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 4:51 PM 
To: Raul Mendez <RaulMendez@boisestate.edu> 
I want to follow up with you and let you know that I h_av.e nof finisheathe CSR ch·eck··nsf::-j a"m still working on; 
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TEAM MEETING · 
Meeting called by: Mariel Dahlman 
Facllltator: Mariel Dahlman 
@ovember9;-201!] 
8:00am-9:45am 
Conference Room 114 
(the small side} 
Type of meeting: CSR/SHIP Unit Meeting 
Note taker: 
Attendees: Mariel Dahlman, Terri Lee, Raul Mendez, Tiffany Fuhriman, Jacee Tucker, Marika Butler, Susan DeBaugh & John Griffiths 
Please read: 




,/ Printing Receipts 
,/ Current processes, any questions/comments? 
,/ Releases 
../ SHIP Updates 
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Training Check Lists 
1 message 
Mariel Dahlman< marleldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
To: Marla Henken <marlahenken@bolsestate.edu> 
Hi Marla, 
iflie:s_e1ir,eJlje:_cneckllsts·tharw¢re·created after Raul wa-s hirecJ: I had him go over the CSR checklist with 
!119 during our m"eetiri~j" on 1· 11111 J {(l:ie 11~v.r EJ!!IPI_Qy~e- c~·e,ck_Jis~ w~s-c~ompleted prior to,thatdate. butC 
. ·can1 r.ef!l~mber what date It Was signed,, I think there is a copy of It in the file you have. Give me a call 
when you can and we can go over anything else you need. 
Have a good afternoon, I hope your kiddos feel better soon :) 
Mariel 
2 attachments 
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Re: Raul's Probation 
1 message 
Andy Cover < andycover@boisestate.edu> 
To: Mariel Dahlman <marleldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
Mariel-
Thanks for continuing the good work. I'm glad to hear that Jacee appears to be a promising employee. We 
will want to make sure that we get the checklist and material to Jacee as wen.:Wfine it is difficult to treat 
Le_v.eiy_p_Qe l@)al_Yle; we Will wantto _111~~~:sur~-vtftry.very_hard _to_provide the-same lnformatiQIJJP ;- ' 
eve_ryon~ _an~. trea,t f:l\relY.9!18 __ gQQaj~t~~!IY.:, I l<now this Is your plan, but l!Baul eventually can't make his 
probationary period due to the work related reasons you have outlined,~we will want to make-sUrelt I~' 
I,[e~~-g~ti_Qf hl§.J!l~Pjlity _to .Perf2rm,_ 11o_t b..ec~al!~e:\\'.~. qlqnJ puJ fort_h the effort- -·-- ~ ... - .... ·--- -----· 
I am including some Information from our skillsoWbooks 24/7 system that you might find fun to read when 
you get the chance. 
Thanks for all you do, let me know how I can help. 
Andy 
Leading With Kindness: How Good People Consistently Get Superior Results 
by William F. Baker and Michael O'Malley 
AMACOM © 2008 (254 pages) Citation 
ISBN:9780814401569 . 
Identifying the surprising attributes successful "kind" leaders share, this eye-opening book shows 
leaders how they can use sincerity, honesty, and respect to achieve true organizational 
greatness. 
Generations, Inc: From Boomers to Llnksters: Managing the Friction Between Generations 
at Work 
by Meagan Johnson and Larry Johnson 
AMACOM © 2010 (273 pages) Citation 
ISBN:9780814415733 
Offering perspectives of people of different eras, eliciting practical insights on wrestling with 
generational issues in the workplace, this book provides realistic strategies for those seeking to 
coexist, flourish, and thrive together ... at the same time. 
On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 9:29 AM, Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Andy, 
Thank you for the info. We are still working on some issues that he is having with communication and 
following UHS policy and procedures. I had to meet with him yesterday about being late and the more 
serious issues of his ability to effectively communicate with me. I have not seen improvement 
regarding his communicateion and have been hearing more feedback from fellow staff that he Is making 
negative statements, which was addressed yesterday as well. I emphasized the fact that probation is a 
time to see if he is a proper fit for the University as well as to see if he like_s it here. I invited him to look 
for employment elsewhere If he Is not happy here. He stated that he is happy here and feels that he has 
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BSU Policy #1060 
Protected Class: Protected class is a term used in anti-discrimination law 
to describe characteristics or factors which cannot be targeted for 
discrimination and harassment. For purposes of this Policy, the following 
characteristics are considered "Protected Classes" and, to the extent 
permitted by applicable law, individuals cannot be discriminated against 
based on these characteristics: race, color, religion, gender, age, sexual 
orientation, national origin, physical or mental disability, veteran status, 
genetic information, or any other status protected under applicable federal, 
state, or local law . 
Discrimination: Discrimination occurs when an individual or group of 
individuals is treated adversely (i.e. denied rights, benefits, equitable 
treatment, or access to tac1hbes available to all others) based on the 
individual's or group's protected class. -
Harassment: Harassment is a form of discrimination. Harassment 
consists of unwelcome behavior that is based upon a person's protected 
class. Harassment includes conduct that demeans or shows hostility or 
aversion toward an ind1v1dual because of his or her protected class ana is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an Intimidating, hostile or' 
offensive environment for academic pursuits, employment, or participation 
in University sponsored activities. Haras'sing conduct may be verbal, 
written, visual or physical in nature. It includes, but is not limited to: 
1. Verbal abuse or hostile behavior such as insulting, name calling, 
teasing, mocking, degrading or ridiculing another person or group; 
2. Conduct that is physically offensive, harmful, threatening or 
humiliating such as impending or blocking movement, leering or 
staring; 
3. · . Unwelcome or inappropriate physical contact such as kissing, 
hugging pinching, patting, grabbling; · · · ·· 
4. Physical assault or stalking; 
5. Unwelcome or inappropriate sexual advances, flirtations, 
propositions, requests for sexual favors, comments, questions, 
epithets or demands; 
D. Sexual Harassment: Sexual Harassment is a form of sex discrimination. 
Sexual harassment is unwelcome sexual advances or behavior which 
affects employment decisions, makes the job or academic environment 
offensive or hostile, or unreasonably interferes with work performance or 
participation in a University program or activity. For purposes of this 
policy, sexual harassment includes (in addition to the examples provided 
above in paragraph C), but is not limited to: 
Page 2 of6 
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1. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: 
a) Submission to the conduct is either an explicit or implicit 
term or condition of employment, basis for participation or 
advancement in an academic program, or basis for 
participation in a University activity or benefit, or basis for a 
vendor, contractor customer's ability to do business with the · 
University; 
b) Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual 
influences employment decisions affecting the individual 
such as salary, wages, or performance evaluation, benefits, 
grade, or academic advancement in the case of an 
employee or student or business decisions affecting the 
individual or his/her company in the case of a vendor, 
contractor or customer; or 
c) Such conduct has the purpose ·or effect of interfering with an 
- individual's work performance and is sufficiently severe and 
pervasive that it creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
environment. 
Ill. Reporting Responsibilities 
A. Management's Prevention and Reporting Responsibilities 
1. Members of the University Community who (a) supervise other 
employees or students, contractors or vendors; (b) teach or advise 
students; or (c) _have management authority.related to a University · 
sponsored program or activity must: 
a) Engage in appropriate measures to prevent violations of this 
Policy; and 
b) ..Promptly ootif_y the Equal Employment 
_9pporttmitytAtticrnative Action Office after bAin9 informed qf 
..or having a reasonable basis to suspect that there has been 
_g_iscriroioatjon against, harassment of, or retaliation against a 
member of the University community; or 
Page 3 of6 
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c) Promptly notify the Office of Students Rights and 
Responsibilities, if the alleged policy violator or the person 
who is the subject of the conduct is a student. 
B. Individual Responsibilities 
1. All Members of the University Community are responsible for 
participating in creating a campus environment free from prohibited 
discrimination and harassment and for following this policy. The 
University expects all Members of the University Community to 
avoid any behavior or conduct that could reasonably be interpreted 
as unlawful discrimination or harassment. 
2. All Members of the University Community are expected to treat 
each other with courte!:ly, consideration and professionalism as 
outlined in the University's.Statement of Shared Values. 
3. Individuals who observe or are otherwise aware of discrimination, 
harassment or other inappropriate conduct that could be in violation 
of this Policy should report such conduct in accordance with this 
Policy. 
4. Members of the University Community are expected to cooperate 
with the University in any investigation of allegations under this 
Policy. 
5. Individuals who engage in personal social networking or other off-
duty activities could violate this Policy if such conduct creates or 
contributes to an intimidating, hostile or offensive work or campus 
environment. 
. -; .· - -. . . . . . 
IV. - Investigation Process · - - - ---- -- · ·· - -- -- - --
~ating a Complain~ 
1. 
2. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action (EEO/AA) 
Office will promptly investigate all complaints of discrimination and 
harassment, in a manner it deems appropriate, based on the 
information available about the circumstances . ..Qnce an allegation 
is brought to the University's attention, the University will evaluate ' 
~the need to iovestigate and take action, even if the complainant 
may not want to commence an investigation. 
During an investigation, the EEO/AA Office will take appropriate 
measures to ensure that any alleged discrimination or harassment 
does not reoccur. 
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3. The EEO/AA Office has the discretion to engage an outside 
investigator to conduct the investigation, depending on the 
circumstances giving rise to the investigation. 
4. The parties to the complaint will each have an opportunity to be 
heard during the investigation, and to provide witnesses and other 
evidence to the investigator. The parties to the complaint will also 
be informed of the status of the investigation as deemed 
appropriate. 
5. The University will use its best efforts to complete the investigation 
within thirty (30) days of the report of discrimination or harassment. 
Depending on the circumstances and nature of the complaint, 
extensions of time may be necessary to complete a thorough 
investigation. If additional time is needed, the University will notify 
the parties to the complaint of the extension. 
B. Investigation Findings 
1. The findings of the investigation will be communicated to the parties 
to the complaint. 
2. If based on the investigation the University determines that a 
violation of the Policy has occurred, the University will take action 
commensurate with the conduct to ensure that any discrimination, 
harassment or inappropriate behavior (if any) does not reoccur. 
The nature of the action and its implementation will depend upon 
the particular facts and circumstances. Corrective action may 
include a range of disciplinary measures up to and including 
immediate termination. 
3. If corrective action involves disciplinary action, appropriate 
disciplinary procedures will be followed. Sanctions imposed may· 
be appealed through the appropriate appeals process·depending 
on the status of the alleged policy violator. 
V. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality of complaints will be maintained on a "need to know" basis to the 
extent permitted by the circumstances and applicable law, and consistent with 
the University's obligations to thoroughly investigate the incident and 
circumstances 
VI. Retaliation 
A. The University prohibits any retaliation against an individual (by any 
Member of the University Community) who has made a goad faith 
~nder this policy or anyone who has cooperated in good faith i~ 
-------
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Raul Mendez <raulmendez@boisestate.edu> 
Response to employee conference form 
2 messages 
Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> 
To: Raul Mendez <RaulMendez@boisestate.edu> 
Hi Raul, 
Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 12:33 PM 
Will you please email me your written response to your employee conference form? I need it in electronic 
form please so Libby and I can respond. Also, I am currently working on a reply to your response and will be 
scheduling a meeting with you soon. I just want to keep you updated and let you know that I am working on it 
and will get it to you as soon as I can. 
Thanks, 
Mariel 
Raul Mendez <raulmendez@boisestate.edu> Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 3:50 PM 
To: Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> 
Hello, 
I will attach the document as soon as I have access to a computer that would allow me to download it from 
the USS drive. In the meantime, would you be able to make copies of the one that I gave you last Monday? 
Thanks for the update. No worries, I know that we are busy and I don't expect to have a reply from you right 
away. Also, I wanted to follow up with you regarding the late shift CSR. I understood that I would stay late 




[Quoted text hidden] 
, 
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Fwd: employee 
1 message 
Mariel Dahlman< marleldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
To: Libby Greaney <libbygreaney@bolsestate.edu> 
Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 8:15 AM 
Shoullli~pply __ hir_n~ copy of the contract, or respond dlfferentfy?(l'm_a~s_UJJ1l1JgJ3a_ul_h~i an ap8t 
~yJg_day_ at noon, as he specifically asked to have that time for lunch. --- ·· 
-------- Forwarded message --
From: Andy Cover <andycover@bolsestate.edu> 
Date: Mori;Ocf10~-:to1j_~t 7:38 AM 
L..."- - ~- ~ -----~ Subject: Re: ei11ployee 
To: Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@bolsestate.edu>, "Swanson, Lynn" <LSWANSO@boisestate.edu> 
Mariel-
Thank you for your note.ffiJ9_Q_k,~,1ike:8itil.mlg-ht b·e ttie.emRloy~e lri.iu~stfun here. What are the areas of 
improvement that he needs to work on? Let me know how I can help. · 
Andy 
,On_Eri, dcf1-;-2®TatJ2:i2.RM, Marfel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Andy-
lW.1ihave~ii.fot~oing_oi(q~1;3i h~_re;Ii<nciwjhat:Rautrriay.be.in contact.with YQ!J. Please let me know if 
you would like for me to be involved and If you'd like to meet. 
Thanks, 
Mariel 
On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 4:21 PM, Andy Cover <andycover@bolsestate.edu> wrote: 
Lynn and Mariel -
Let me know if you want to sit down and talk about this - or how I can help. 
Andy 
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 3:37 PM, Jordan LePlane <jordanlepiane@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
HI Mariel, 
I'm going to refer you to Mr. Andy Cover in Employee Relations as this topic falls under his area of 
expertise. 




On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 1:59 PM, Mariel Dahlman <marleldahlman@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Hi Jordy, 
BSU 00335 
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B Marlel Doyle< marleldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
10111 ITATI UNIVIIIIITY 
Re: employee 
1 message 
Andy Cover < andycover@bolsestate.edu> 
To: Lynn Swanson <lswanso@bolsestate.edu> 
[Mon;.-oct .f<(2Qf1at 10:5TAM' 
Cc: Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@bolsestate.edu> 
Lynn - -~- ,.________ _ _______________ --~ 
L\Jl{ould y_oJJ.Jjke_toJal~Joday_atA:00J_ l'.ll_bJther~Jf. that will_ work.for: you.i 
Andy 
On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 10:56 AM, Lynn Swanson <lswanso@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Hi Andy, 




On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 7:38 AM, Andy Cover <andycover@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Mariel-
Thank you for your note. It looks llke Raul might be the employee in question here. What are the areas 
of improvement that he needs to work on? Let me know how I can help. 
Andy . . 
On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12: 12 PM, Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Andy-
We have a lot going on over here. I know that Raul may be in contact with you. Please let me know 
If you would Ilka for me to be Involved and If you'd like to meet. 
Thanks, 
Mariel 
On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 4:21 PM, Andy Cover <andycover@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
Lynn and Mariel -
Let me know if you want to sit down and talk about this - or how I can help. 
Andy 
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 3:37 PM, Jordan LePiane <jordanlepiane@boisestate.edu> wrote: 
HI Mariel, 
I'm going to refer you to Mr. Andy Cover in Employee Relations as this topic falls under his area 
of expertise. 









BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 
RECORD OF EMPLOYEE CONFERENCE FORM 
EMPLOYEE NAME: Raul Mendez I TITLE: Customer Service Representative 
DEPARTMENT: University Health Services 






DOCUMENTATION OF CONCERN($), ISSUE(S) OR INCIDENT(S) INVOLVING: 
.t Conduct or Behavior (Interpersonal Skills 
.t Department or University Rules 
_ Safety or Work Environment 
.I Work Performance (Productivity or Quality of Work) 
_ Attendance • D~pendability 
.I Customer Service 
~ Other C: -
Cl) 
"'C 
Describe performance concern or issue (be specific, include dates and examples): ·c:; 
C: 10-3-2011 Raul did not check out 35 patients according to process maps. He was given verbal instruction to check out the patients - properly. He continued not to check out the patients, stating he was too busy . ... 
0 10-4-2011 Raul continued to not load insurance information in the appointment after being given verbal and written instructions to 
do so, causing the insurance information to not be printed on the pink sheets. - 10-4-2011 Raul misinformed patient regarding discount policy. Did not follow procedure. Cl) Needs to work on eye contact and verbal communication with fellow staff. 
:::, 
u, 






ct-loteJollow:up review plan :aatefs): 
Employee's Signature: Date: 
Print Supervisor's Name & Sign: Date: 
2nd Level Supervisor's Name & Initials: Date: 
NOTE: Employee's signature indicates that this information has been discussed with the employee, and does not necessarily mean that the employee 
a rees with it. It does acknowled e recei t of a co of the conference record. The em lo ee ma attach an comments to this form for his/her file. 
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• B O I ~ E Vice President for Student Affairs 
HATE 
UNIVERSITY 
November 15, 2011 
Mr. Raul Mendez 
Customer Service Representative 
University Health and Recreation Services 
MS 1351 
Dear Mr. Mendez: 
1910 University Drive Boise, Idaho 83725-1300 
phone 208-426-1418 
fax 208-426-1062 
Per State of Idaho Rules, IDAPA 15.04.01152 (attached), you are hereby officially 
notified that your employment as a Customer Service Representative for University 
Health and Recreation Services is being terminated. 1ftfe-reason-:for-termination-is 
daiLure-to satisfactorily=·complete-your-enti"ahce.pi''obationar:y~p-etioa, per the attached 
performance evaluation. Effective immediately, you be placed on administrative leave 
with pay through the official termination date of November 30, 2011. 
Termination during the entrance probationary period is not intended to prejudice your 
ability to seek employment with a different State agency or another employer. For that 
reason, you have the right to resign instead of accepting the termination. If you wish to 
resign, please prepare a letter of resignation (effective November 30, 2011), and either 
fax (426-3100), email (andycover@boisestate.edu), or deliver your resignation (Room 
218 Administration Building) to Andy Cover, Boise State University Human Resource 
Services by 5:00pm, November 21, 2011. ,Yo(.1r-personnetfecords:willthen:reflecf.tfiis 
resitfnatiof.1. If you do not respond by that date, the University will proceed with the 
termination action. 
Any remaining vacation and/or compensatory leave balances will be lump sum paid to 
you and deposited according to the regular payroll schedule. Please return all University 
property you have in your posl?ession (such as keys, etc.) to Mariel Dahlman, Technical 
Records Specialist prior to your departure today. As standard practice, with the 
exception of Bronco Web, your computer access will also be terminated by this action. 
Your payroll information will remain current on Bronco Web through the tax season. If 
you need any assistance accessing this information please contact the BSU Office of 
Information Technology Help Desk at 426-4357. 
I would like to remind you that you still have access to the University's Employee 
Assistance Program (877-427-2327). This program allows five free visits where you can 
confidentially discuss topics about career planning and occupational development, 
and/or any personal concerns/issues you may have. This benefit, as well as your health 
insurance, will be effective through the end of the month of December, 2011. If you have 
any other benefit questions, please contact Ms. Sarah Jones, Employee Benefits, Boise 
State University Human Resource Services, at 426-4417. 
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I wish you the best in your future endeavors. Please contact Mr. Andy Cover in Human 
Resource Services (426-4419) if you have any questions about this letter. 
Sincerely, J / • 
1 ~,d~ 
Dr. Lisa Harris 
Vice President for Student Affairs 
cc: Dr. Libby Greaney, Executive Director, UHRS 
Mariel Dahlman, Technical Records Specialist, UHRS 
Sarah Jones, Director, Benefits and Compensation 






Boise State University 
Employee Performance Evaluation _Summary Form 
Evaluation Period: 8/24/11 to 11/15/11 
Evaluation Meeting Date: 11/15/11 
Employee: Raul Mendez Employee ID: 111316505 Phone: 426-1459 
PCN: 0761 Job Title: Customer Service Representative 1 
College (If Applicable): Department: University Health and Recreation Services 
Immediate Supervisor/Manager: Mariel Dahlman Title: Technical Records Specialist Phone: 426-1459 
. . -
Type of Review: 
; D Annual Review 
D Entrance Probation (Classified Employees Only) 
D Promotion Probation (Classified Employees Only) 
X Special Evaluation 
Next Date Special Evaluation Required/Requested: NI A 
Overall Performance Rating (see expanded definitions on page 2): 
i D (3) Exemplary Performance 
' D (2) Solid Sustained Performance (Exceeds Expectations) 
D (1) Achieves Performance Standards 
X (0) Does Not Achieve Performance Standards (Supervisor: This requires a special follow-up evaluation. Please contact HRS at 426-1616 
. ·-· .. to coordinate.a follow-up special evaluation and performance_imp;ovement !}Ian). .. ... . ...... __ _ 
Supervisor Summary Comments (attach additional sheet ifnecessary): 
Employee is being terminated due to'failure.tooomplete-the entrance probationary-period;according to State Division of Human Resource Rule 
IDAPA 28.01.01.152. 
Employee Comments (attach additional sheet ifnecessary): 
Signature Section: (Signature acknowledges discussion of evaluation, but it does not necessarily imply agreement. The immediate supervisor, chair, 
department director/dean must sign. Departments must check with the Provost/Vice President/President to determine if next review level is required.) 
I 15 
Employee (Print Name and Sign) Date Date 
Second Level Supervisor (Print Name, Title, and Sign) Date 
Third Level Su ervisor (Dept. Dir/Dean) (Print Name, Title, and Sign) 
President, Provost, or Vice President (If required) Date If signature is not required, check here D 
: Please return completed evaluation to: 




Fax: ( iC/ () Y J_ Ce - 3, \ 0 0 






~ ;. ~c>v.r...J c~ 
l)/lf/\\ 
0 Urgent 0 For Review 0 Please Comment O Please Reply O Please Recycle 
• Comments: Select this text and delete it or replace it with your own. To save changes to this 
template for future use, choose Save As from the File menu. In the Save As Type box, choose 
Document Template. Next time you want to use it, choose New from the File menu, and then double-
click your template. 
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November 18, 2011 
Andy Cover 
Employee Relations 




I'm officially resigning from my position as Customer Service Representative I with BSU University health 
Services. Please feel free to contact me at 208-440-3485. 
Sincerely, 
~~ ~~/ 




;Boise State University - Apps for Employees Mail - Invitation: Meeting with Andy @ Mo... Page 1 of 1 
BOISE+~TAIE 
1/lllll'[ISlTl' 
Raul Mendez <raulmendez@boisestate.edu> 
Invitation: Meeting with Andy@ Mon Oct 17 8:30am -
9:30am (raulmendez@boisestate.edu) 
1 message 
Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 4:14 PM 
Reply-To: Mariel Dahlman <marieldahlman@boisestate.edu> 
To: "RaulMendez@boisestate.edu" <raulmendez@boisestate.edu>, Libby Greaney 
<libbygreaney@boisestate.edu>, Andy Cover <andycover@boisestate.edu> 
Meeting with Andy more details» 
When 
Where 
Mon Oct 17 8:3'Jam - 9:30am !\~ountain Time 
Admin Conference Room (map) 
Calendar raulmendez@boisestate.edu 
Who • marieldahlman@boisestate.edu - organizer 
• Libby Greaney 
• Andy Cover 
• Raul Mendez 
Going? Yes - Maybe - No more options» 
--------·----· .... -----······· - -·------------------------1 
Invitation from Google Calendar 
You are receiving this email at the account raulmendez@boisestate.edu because you are subscribed for invitations on calendar 
raulmendez@boisestate.edu. 
To stop receiving these notifications, please log in to https://www.google.com/calendar/ and change your notification settings for 
this calendar. 
D invite.ics 2K 





.. _·_·/~--:">:.:' __ 
... _,·· . . 
f · .... ·. : i :·, . . .. ·.; 
July 24, 2013 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
. . ·: .· . 
SPECIAL DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL APPOINTMENT 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
David W. Cantril! of the firm of Cantril!, Skinner, Lewis, Casey_& Sorensen, LLP, 
P. 0. Box 359, Boise, Idaho 83701, is hereby appointed Special Deputy Attorney 
General for the purpose of representing the State of Idaho in Mendez v. Univ. 
Health Services Boise State Univ., et al., Case No. C\i-OC-1312890. 
This letter of appointment will be included in the files of any court case, hearing, 
or other matter in which he represents the _State of Idaho in this matter. This 
appointment is effective for the duration of the above-stated case. 
Any courtesies you can extend to -Mr. Cantril! in his conduct of business for the 
State of Idaho, as my delegate, will be appreciated. · 
Sincerely, 




P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400, FAX: (208) 854-8071 




David W. Cantrill 
ISB #1291 
NO,---~F~,LE~o----
A.M, _____ __,~M obi 
JUN 2 9 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RiCH, Clerk 
By TENtUE GRP-.MT 
DEPUTY 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 















Case No. CV OC 1312890 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF OPPOSING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY WDGMENT 
Defendants above named, by and through their attorneys, Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & 
Sorensen, LLP, pursuant to I.R.C.P., Rules 12(f) and 56(e), hereby moves this honorable court for an 
order to strike Plaintiff's Affidavit Opposing Summary Judgment filed June 11, 2015. This motion is 
supported by the Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavit 
Opposing Summary Judgment filed herewith. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF OPPOSING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
QORIGINAL 
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Oral argument is requested. 
DATED This 29th day of June, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
By: ~
Attorneys for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF OPPOSING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 29, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
[] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Email: raulmendez2002@gmail.com 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF OPPOSING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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David W. Cantrill 
ISB #1291 
NO. ____ "irn"i!'lf"""'_._...__,......,_ 
FILED ..,.,== 
AM. ___ -..JP,M, git 
JUN 2 9 2015 I 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By TENtLLE GRANT 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
DEPUTY 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 














Case No. CV OC 1312890 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF OPPOSING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. Rule 56(e) specifically.dictates the "form" sufficient affidavits must take and 
specifically precludes a party's reliance on "the mere allegations of that party's pleadings." 
Although the Rule is entitled "Form of affidavits ... " it doesn't speak to the fact 
plaintiffs affidavit isn't paginated or the paragraphs numbered, nor are those the deficiencies for 
which Defendants move to strike. The deficiencies fatal to plaintiffs opposing affidavit are 
substantive. The Rule provides: 
[O]pposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 




copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. 
* * * 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations ... of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
* * * 
The determination of an affidavit's sufficiency presents an evidentiary question 
committed to the sound discretion of the Court: 
The admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in 
support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold 
matter to be addressed by the court before applying the liberal construction and 
reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence creates a genuine 
issue of material fact for trial. Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 
175 P.3d 172, 175 (2007) (citing Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 
327, 48 P.3d 651, 656 (2002)). "This Court applies an abuse of discretion 
standard when reviewing a trial court's determination of the admissibility of 
testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 15, 
175 P.3d at 177 (citing McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, 
LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221, 159 P.3d 856, 858 (2007)). "A trial court does not 
abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts 
within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) 
reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." O'Connor v. Harger Constr., 
Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008) (citing West Wood Invs., Inc. 
v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82, 106 P.3d 401, 408 (2005)). 
Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 241, 280 P.3d 740, 744 (2012). Here, the Court's discretion 
clearly should be exercised to strike plaintiffs defective affidavit. Absent adherence by the trial 
courts to Ger don 's principle that "the admissibility of evidence contained in [ opposing] affidavits 
... is a threshold matter to be addressed by the court before applying the liberal construction and 
reasonable inferences rule," there would be no such thing as summary judgment as the 
"principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
PLAINTIFF OPPOSING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private 
resources," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Every plaintiff faced with 
summary judgment would simply style his argument an "affidavit," swear to it and throw it in the 
Court's file as his opposition, as plaintiff attempts here. 
II. Every assertion in plaintiff's opposing affidavit fails one or more of Rule 
56(e)'s requirements of [1] personal knowledge; [2] iteration of facts admissible in evidence 
(which includes a threshold of foundation and relevance); [3] sworn or certified copies of 
all documents referred to and [4] an affirmative showing of the affiant's competence to 
testify to the matters stated. Instead, the assertions are merely the plaintiff's allegations, 
conclusions and self-serving opinions, together with an abundance of rank hearsay. 
The exhibits to plaintiffs affidavit are numbered. The affidavit itself, however, is a 
scrolled running document that defendants have hand-paginated to enable reference; they ask the 
Court to indulge it likewise. At its page 4, plaintiff claims his failure to provide real affidavits 
from fact witnesses is "because they are scared of Lawyers/Courts." In the meantime, for his 
opposition to summary judgment, plaintiff simply swears to his own argument, that is wholly 
devoid of (1) admissible facts, based on (2) personal knowledge, to which (3) the affiant has 
affirmatively shown himself competent to testify. This is no exaggeration; the content of 
plaintiffs purported affidavit is astounding: 
Defendant is trying to portray Plaintiff as someone who accuses employers of 
discrimination since they felt it was appropriate to bring the SARMC case into 
this matter. Plaintiff objects to Defendant's use of that case for purposes of a 
Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. Nonetheless, Plaintiff believes it is 
relevant to include in his Affidavit an article from the Sociology department at 
Boise State that talks about the history of racism against Latinos in Idaho ( exhibit 
2, 5 pages). You can skip the entire article and go to the last paragraph which is 
striking because it sheds light on the root of the problem. In 2008, an Idaho 
Statesman staff wrote a column extolling Boise's tolerance and good will only to 
be bombarded with letters and emails recounting acts of discrimination and 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
PLAINTIFF OPPOSING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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racism. Furthermore, the article points to some stats from 2012 in which it 
mentions that Hispanics are disproportionately overrepresented in Idaho prisons 
with about 16 percent. The problem is that the white majority and colored 
minority live in the same country and society, but living in two different worlds. 
Whites and minorities see issues such as discrimination thru different lenses. 
Some Sociologists and Civil Rights Activists see it as white privilege not 
wanting/needing to hear the truth of colored people. Most people in Idaho like the 
Statesman columnist claim there is no issue with discrimination while having 
little or no contact with minorities. 
Plaintiff has found thru talking with other minorities and refugees in Boise that 
most of their complaints of discrimination are usually related to the workplace; 
where it might be the only place white people are in contact with other ethnic 
groups. Plaintiff is far from a malcontent complaining about discrimination in the 
workplace, but the reality is far different out there for minorities. Sociologists 
believe that the issue persists because the organizations and policies against 
discrimination have been largely ineffective. Indeed, Plaintiff has learned from his 
own experiences and talking to Lawyers that discrimination cases are one of the 
most difficult to prove/win, the EEOC issues the majority of findings with no 
probable cause, and the Courts are very biased towards corporate/wealthy/affluent 
as shown on Court repositories. In America, of course that the concentration of 
wealth and power is heavily on white America. No wonder many of the people 
that I talked prefer not to do anything about their discrimination complaints 
because the procedures and remedies are largely ineffective. 
* * * 
Plaintiff understands that Pro se litigants are held to same rules of procedure and 
evidence as Defendants who are represented by counsel. However, Plaintiff takes 
issue with Defendant bringing up the withdrawal of Attorneys in an unrelated case 
or the findings of Judge Candy Dale on the SARMC case. Plaintiff has chosen to 
represent himself because he finds that in a corrupt Legal system that American 
Attorneys are unreliable to the people, and some former Judges/Lawyers suggest 
as much on the internet (remorse perhaps?). Plaintiff realized among other things 
that the Hawley Troxell, Givens Pursley, Holland & Hart, and even the medium 
size Firms of this country represent exclusively the insurance companies, 
corporations, government, and the affluent, which is a good indication of how the 
system really works. My only mistake was wasting so much money on Lawyers 
that did nothing for me. 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
PLAINTIFF OPPOSING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
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Plaintiff understands that to fight Summary Judgment he must support his 
response with Affidavits, depositions, answer to interrogatories, or admissions on 
file. Plaintiff has chosen not to spend more than a thousand dollars on each 
deposition knowing how biased the Courts are towards the wealthy/affluent and 
how common it has become for Courts to Grant Summary Judgments. Plaintiff 
cannot provide supporting Affidavits from witnesses because they are scared of 
Lawyers/Courts, but they will testify on Plaintiff behalf during Trial. 
Plaintiffs affidavit at 2-4. And so it goes for a total of 17 unnumbered pages. But as the 
Supreme Court noted in State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 167, 271, 899 
P.2d 977, 981 (1995), quoted with approval by the Gerdon court, 153 Idaho at 244, 280 P.3d at 
747, the requirements of Rule 56(e) "are not satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on 
hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge." 
III. Applicable objections to plaintiffs affidavit include: 
A. lack of affirmatively shown personal knowledge, based on mere belief; 
B. argumentative, conclusory statements instead of facts; 
C. lack of sworn or certified copies of documents referred to; 
D. lack of affirmatively shown competency to testify; 
E. inadmissibility for: 
1. lack of foundation, including authentication; 
2. hearsay; 
3. lack of relevancy. 
Because affidavit testimony is not subject to the truth-getting rigors of cross-examination, 
the rules for its admissibility are applied more, rather than less, strictly: 
Testimony presented by affidavit is different from testimony orally delivered, 
because the affiant is not subject to cross-examination. But that fact leads to 
greater, not lesser, strictures imposed on the testimony presented by affidavit. 
(E.g., see Rule 56(e) Fed.R.Civ.Proc.; DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co. 
(9th Cir.) 374 F.2d 50, cert. denied (1967) 389 U.S. 822, 88 S.Ct. 48, 19 L.Ed.2d 
74; Doza v. American Nat'! Ins. Co. (8th Cir. 1963) 314 F.2d 230; 6 Moore 
P56.22.) 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
PLAINTIFF OPPOSING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 
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us. V. Dibble, 429 F.2d 598,602 (9th Cir. 1970). 
Indeed, even where the affiant is testifying as an expert (which is certainly not the case 
here), courts observe the greater strictures that obtain with respect to affidavits: 
* * * 
"[T]here is no inconsistency in having one standard for admission 
of an expert's testimony at trial and a different, more stringent 
standard for admission of an expert's affidavit in support of or in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment. As noted, such an 
affidavit serves as 'a substitute for testimony taken in open court.' 
Given that cross-examination is unavailable as a means to test an 
affidavit, it is not surprising that the standard for admission of an 
affidavit in a summary judgment context would be higher than for 
the admission of an expert's opinion at trial." Id, 266 Ill.Dec. 915, 
775 N.E.2d at 995 (citation omitted). 
Perius v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 782 N.W.2d 355, 364 (N.D. 2010), [quoting from Robidoux v. 
Oliphant, 775 N.E.2d 987, 995 (2002)] emphasis added. Accord, Florez v. Sargeant, 917 P.2d 
250, 256 (Ariz. 1996) ("Conclusory affidavits, even from expert witnesses, do not provide a basis 
upon which to deny a motion for summary judgment," emphasis added.) 
Inasmuch as even expert affidavits are held to the strictures of Rule 56(e), it of course 
follows that so, too, must those of the parties themselves and indeed all affiants. An excellent 
collection of reported cases addressing some of those strictures is found in the unreported case of 
Bennett v. Hunter, 2006 WL 1174309 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) from the federal northern district court of 
New York: 
[T]o be sufficient to create a factual issue, an affidavit ( or verified complaint) 
must, among other things, be based "on personal knowledge." FN7 An affidavit ( or 
verified complaint) is not based on personal knowledge if, for example, it is based 
on mere "information and belief' or hearsay. FNS In addition, such an affidavit ( or 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
PLAINTIFF OPPOSING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 
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verified complaint) must not be conclusory.FN9 An affidavit (or verified 
complaint) is conclusory if, for example, its assertions lack any supporting 
evidence or are too general.FNIO Moreover, "[a]n affidavit must not present legal 
arguments." FNII 
FN7. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) ("Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent [to testify] to the matters 
stated therein."); see also US. v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n of 
Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., 44 F.3d 1082, 1084 (2d Cir.1995) [citations omitted], cert. 
denied sub nom, Ferrante v. US., 516 U.S. 806 (1995). 
FN8. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 ("[Rule 56(e)'s] requirement that affidavits 
be made on personal knowledge is not satisfied by assertions made 'on 
information and belief.' ... [Furthermore, the Rule's] requirement that the affiant 
have personal knowledge and be competent to testify to the matters asserted in the 
affidavits also means that the affidavit's hearsay assertion that would not be 
admissible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine 
issue for trial."); Sellers v. M .C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 643 (2d 
Cir.1988) ("[Defendant's] affidavit states that it is based on personal knowledge 
or upon information and belief.... Because there is no way to ascertain which 
portions of [Defendant's] affidavit were based on personal knowledge, as opposed 
to information and belief, the affidavit is insufficient under Rule 56 to support the 
motion for summary judgment."); Applegate v. Top Assoc., Inc., 425 F.2d 92, 97 
(2d Cir.1970) (rejecting affidavit made on "suspicion ... rumor and hearsay"); 
Spence v. Maryland Cas. Co., 803 F.Supp. 649, 664 (W.D.N.Y.1992) (rejecting 
affidavit made on "secondhand information and hearsay"), affd, 995 F.2d 1147 
(2d Cir.1993). 
FN9. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (requiring that non-movant "set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial"); Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (2d. 
Cir.2004) ("Nor is a genuine issue created merely by the presentation of 
assertions [in an affidavit] that are conclusory. ") [ citations omitted]; Applegate, 
425 F.2d at 97 (stating that the purpose of Rule 56[e] is to ''prevent the exchange 
of affidavits on a motion for summary judgment from degenerating into mere 
elaboration of conclusory pleadings"). 
FNl0. See, e.g., Bickerstaff v. Vassar Oil, 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir.1998) 
(McAvoy, C.J., sitting by designation) ("Statements [for example, those made in 
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affidavits, deposition testimony or trial testimony J that are devoid of any 
specifics, but replete with conclusions, are insufficient to defeat a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment.") [citations omitted]; West-Fair Elec. 
Contractors v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 78 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir.1996) (rejecting 
affidavit's conclusory statements that, in essence, asserted merely that there was a 
dispute between the parties over the amount owed to the plaintiff under a 
contract); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 997 (2d Cir.1985) (plaintiffs allegation 
that she "heard disparaging remarks about Jews, but, of course, don't ask me to 
pinpoint people, times or places .... It's all around us" was conclusory and thus 
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56[e] ), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 
(1985); Applegate, 425 F.2d at 97 ("[Plaintif.f] has provided the court [through 
his affidavit] with the characters and plot line for a novel of intrigue rather than 
the concrete particulars which would entitle him to a trial. "). 
FNll. N.D.N.Y. L[ocal] R[ule] 7.l(a)(2). 
Bennett v. Hunter, 2006 WL 1174309, 2 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), emphasis added. 
The Hon. Larry M. Boyle, then Chief Magistrate of the United States District Court for 
the District of Idaho (and a former Justice of the Idaho Supreme Court), performed a similar 
analysis of the strictures of Rule 56(e) in Mickelsen v. Albertson's, Inc., 226 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D. 
Idaho 2002). Because that court's treatment of the defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs 
affidavit mirrored much of the task presented here, it is attached in full for the Court's 
convenience as an Appendix. 
Defendants here will employ a similar protocol of citing plaintiffs affidavit and stating 
their objections, but since the greatest volume of plaintiffs opposition is in the form of unswom, 
uncertified documents for which no foundation is even attempted, defendants will address them 
first. 
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IV. Objection to Exhibits 1 through 10 and 12 through 17, i.e., all exhibits except 
Exhibit 11, for lack of foundation and for lack of relevance. 
The exhibits stapled to plaintiffs affidavit can be dealt with in en masse: Not only does 
the affidavit fail to show affirmatively plaintiffs competence to lay sufficient foundation for their 
admissibility into evidence, the affidavit doesn't even purport to lay foundation and defendants 
do not waive the objection. All in the world it does is simply to reference the exhibits (in 
parentheses), but without so much as a word even purporting to provide foundation for their 
admissibility into evidence. That is of course wholly insufficient, as the Ninth Circuit has long 
held: 
Evidentiary affidavits filed in connection with motions for summary 
judgment must be made "on personal knowledge," with "[s]worn or certified 
copies" of any supporting documents attached. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Where a party 
attempts to introduce an exhibit by attaching it to a declaration or affidavit, 
FRCP 56(e) requires that the declarant or affiant have personal knowledge of the 
exhibit. 
Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir.2002), emphasis added. United 
States v. Dribble, 429 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1970) (quoted above for its observation that the lack of 
opportunity to cross-examine warrants the greater strictures placed on admissibility of affidavits) 
was an ejectment action in which summary judgment for the United States was predicated on a 
number of exhibits attached to the affidavit of an assistant government engineer. On appeal the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that none of the government's moving papers established the 
requisite breach of contract. Moreover, it held the documents shouldn't have been considered at 
all because, as here, they failed to pass muster under Rule 56(e): 
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Thus far we have ignored the other deficiencies in the Government's moving 
papers. Those papers did not comply with Rule 56(e), and summary judgment 
should not have been predicated on them. (Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc. (1950) 339 U.S. 827, ~31, 70 S.Ct. 894, 94 L.Ed. 1312; Union Ins. 
Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. William Gluckin & Co. (2d Cir. 1965) 353 F.2d 946, 952-
953; F. S. Bowen Elec. Co. v. J. D. Hedin Const. Co. (1963) 114 U.S.App.D.C. 
361,316 F.2d 362; Washington v. Maricopa County (9th Cir. 1944) 143 F.2d 871, 
cert. denied (1946) 327 U.S. 799, 66 S.Ct. 900, 90 L.Ed. 1024.) [Footnote 
omitted] Rule 56(e) requires that affidavits 'shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that that affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers * * * referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith.' 
Mr. Watkins' affidavit was not made on personal knowledge; it did not set forth 
facts as would be admissible in evidence; and it did not show that Mr. Watkins 
was competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
The exhibits annexed to Mr. Watkins' affidavit are copies of intradepartmental 
memoranda, copies of copies of letters addressed to third persons by third 
persons, and copies of documents styled revocation notices addressed to third 
persons by third persons. None of the documents was authenticated, and all of 
them were hearsay. 
A writing is not authenticated simply by attaching it to an affidavit, even if the 
writing appears on its face to have originated from some governmental agency 
and the affiant is a government official. 
U.S. v. Dibble, 429 F.2d 598, 601-602 (9th Cir. 1970), emphasis added. Accord, Canada v. 
Blain's Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1987): 
It is well settled that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered on a 
motion for summary judgment. In order to be considered by the court, 
"documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit that meets the 
requirements of [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 56(e) and the af/iant must be a person through 
whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence. " l 0A C. Wright, A. Miller & 
M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2722 at 58-60 (2d ed. 1983) (footnotes 
omitted). This court has consistently held that documents which have not had a 
proper foundation laid to authenticate them cannot support a motion for summary 
judgment. Hamilton v. Keystone Tankship Corp., 539 F.2d 684, 686 (9th 
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Cir.1976); United States v. Dibble, 429 F.2d 598, 601-02 (9th Cir.1970). We hold 
that such documents may not be relied upon to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment. 
831 F.2d at 925, emphasis added. 
A similar result obtained in the very recent (May 2015) Seventh Circuit case of Castro v. 
DeVry University, Inc., 2015 WL 2231823 (7th Cir. 2015), an employment case in which the 
plaintiffs also claimed retaliatory termination. Claiming the defendant's justification of poor 
performance was pretextual, plaintiff attached unauthenticated documents to her affidavit in 
opposition to summary judgment. The district court refused to consider the documents, entered 
summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed because the documents 
failed the requirements of Rule 56(e): 
Brooks next attacks De Vry's performance rationale. Recall that Hurt's July 1 
email to Maher summarized her starts targets for the admissions classes in 
January, March, May, and July of 2008. According to Hurt's email, Brooks 
missed her target for three of these classes: January (she enrolled one student 
against a goal of three), May (zero students against a goal of two), and July 
(sixteen students against a goal of twenty). 
Brooks concedes that she missed her starts target for the July class. But she 
contends that she made her targets for the January and May classes and that two 
of the numbers in Hurt's email are therefore false. She argues that this evidence is 
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether DeVry's 
performance explanation was pretextual. (citation omitted.) 
Brooks's argument runs into an evidentiary problem. The only evidence she offers 
to support this theory are two documents produced by De Vry in discovery. One 
document suggests that Brooks enrolled six students for the January class; the 
other suggests that she enrolled four students for the May class. If these 
documents accurately reflect final starts numbers, then Brooks achieved her 
targets for the January and May classes, contrary to Hurt's claim in the July 1 
email. 
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The district court excluded this evidence, however, because the documents were 
not properly authenticated. Castro, 941 F.Supp.2d at 987 & n. 10. Plaintiffs argue 
that the district court should have admitted the documents as business records 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) for two reasons: (1) the documents were 
properly authenticated by Castro's sworn declaration, and (2) DeVry's production 
of the documents in the litigation served as implicit authentication under 
Thanongsinh v. Board of Education, 462 F.3d 762, 777-78 (7th Cir.2006). We 
review only for abuse of discretion a district court's ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence on summary judgment. Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704, 708-09 (7th 
Cir.1998); accord, e.g., Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818, 822 (7th 
Cir.2011). 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence. We agree 
with the district court that Castro's declaration did not lay a sufficient foundation 
to authenticate the documents. Rule 803 (6) requires authentication by a 
"custodian or another qualified witness." Castro's declaration did not establish 
that she was a custodian or otherwise qualified witness. It merely stated: 
"Attached as Ex. F is a document generated by De Vry in the normal course of 
business reflecting registered students by advisor for January of 2008. Ex. F is a 
document produced by De Vry in this litigation on a disc. " Castro's declaration 
includes an identical statement about the second document, which was offered to 
show Brooks's starts for the May 2008 class. 
Brooks contends that Castro could properly authenticate these documents because 
she had been a "supervisor" who was qualified to opine about DeVry's 
performance evaluations. But that's not enough. To lay a proper foundation for 
admitting this evidence under Rule 803(6), Castro needed to be familiar with 
DeVry's record-keeping practices. See, e.g., Joseph P. Caulfield & Associates, 
Inc. v. Litho Productions, Inc., 155 F.3d 883, 888 (7th Cir.1998) (no abuse of 
discretion where district court excluded evidence because foundational witness 
did not testify as to the business's "regular record-keeping practices"). Her 
declaration was silent on this issue. The fact of production in the litigation says 
nothing about Castro's familiarity with De Vry's record-keeping practices. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Thanongsinh is also unpersuasive. In that case, we 
identified a narrow exception to the rule that admission under Rule 803(6) at 
summary judgment requires an affidavit from a custodian or other person familiar 
with the type of record. The exception applies "when the party challenging the 
document's admissibility relied on that same document 'for its accuracy' in earlier 
proceedings, or otherwise 'conceded the accuracy of the documents that the 
[opposing party] sought to introduce.' "Thanongsinh, 462 F.3d at 778 (alteration 
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in original), quoting Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir.2000). 
The exception does not apply here. DeVry has not relied on these documents for 
their accuracy. Nor has it conceded the accuracy of the starts numbers reflected in 
the documents. In Thanongsinh, by contrast, the party opposing admission had 
"admitted in discovery that the [exhibit] is what the plaintiff purports it to be." Id 
No such admission exists here. The mere act of producing a document in response 
to a discovery request based on the content of the document does not amount to 
an admission of the document's authenticity [italics original]. A party's duty to 
produce documents under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a) applies to 
responsive documents in its "possession, custody, or control." They must be 
produced regardless of their authenticity, accuracy, or reliability, so the act of 
production does not say anything about authenticity, accuracy, or reliability. 
Castro v. DeVry University, Inc., 2015 W L 2231823, 15 -17 (7th Cir. 2015), emphasis added 
except where noted otherwise. Because none of the exhibits to plaintiffs affidavit have been 
properly authenticated or any other necessary foundation laid, they must all, with the exception 
of Exhibit 11, be stricken. 
Finally, since plaintiff concedes he was still very much within the entrance probationary 
period of his employment, he was subject to termination without cause assigned, anyway. 
IDAPA 15.04.01.152, 'Separation During Probation'. Since none of the exhibits show 
dissembling by the defendants, they would not defeat summary judgment even if they were 
admissible. Statements that are merely inconsistent or inaccurate or unfair are not relevant to 
show pretext: 
To show pretext, an employee "must present evidence suggesting that the 
employer is dissembling." O'Leary, 657 F.3d at 635; see also Naik v. Boehringer 
Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 627 F.3d 596,601 (7th Cir.2010). "The question 
is not whether the employer's stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether 
the employer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain the discharge." 
O'Leary, 657 F.3d at 635. To meet this burden, the employee "must 'identify such 
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weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions' " in the 
employer's proffered reason " 'that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy 
of credence.' " Coleman, 667 F.3d at 852 (alteration in original), quoting 
BQumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir.2007). 
Castro v. DeVry University, Inc., 201WL 2231823, 3 -4 (7th Cir. 2015). See, Mitchell v. Zilog, 
125 Idaho 709, 874 P.2d 520 (1994). The documents stapled to plaintiffs affidavit as exhibits 
are objectionable as irrelevant, as well. 
V. Specific objections to specific assertions. 
The absence of numbered paragraphs in plaintiffs affidavit precludes objection via the 
expedient of reference to numbers, so defendants will resort to citation to their hand-paginated 
copy. As respects the single sentence in the middle of page 9, ("Defendant has admitted the 
Plaintiff was hire[ d] at a higher rate of pay due to his experience in the medical field and Plaintiff 
does not dispute that fact."), Defendants make no objection. Defendants object to the balance of 
the affidavit as follows: 
1. Omnibus objection: Nowhere does plaintiffs state, as required, that it was made 
on personal knowledge, nor does the affidavit itself show personal knowledge. This is fatal to its 
consideration on defendants' motion for summary judgment. See, Cornell Research Foundation, 
Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co. 2007 WL 4349135, 9-10 (ND.NY., 2007): 
The rule governing affidavits offered in support of or opposition to motions for 
summary judgment provides that they "shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see DeBari v. Town of Middleton, New York, No. 97-CV-
1422, 1998 WL 903633, at *1-*2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec.23, 1998) (McAvoy, C.J.). The 
competency of a fact witness to offer testimony, in tum, is addressed by rule 
which provides that "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
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introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge 
of the matter." Fed.R.Evid. 602; see also New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Saint Francis 
Hosp., 94 F.Supp.2d 423,425 (S.D.N.Y.2000). 
* 10 Together, these rules require that a person whose affidavit is given in support 
of or opposition to a summary judgment motion possess personal knowledge as to 
the matters contained within it. St. Francis Hosp., 94 F.Supp.2d at 425; Cooper 
Indus., Inc. v. Agway, Inc., 987 F.Supp. 92, 109 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (McAvoy, C.J.); 
see Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2738. Implicit in this mandate is the 
additional requirement that to qualify for consideration under Rule 56(e), an 
affidavit must contain more than a simple, conclusory statement to the effect that 
the maker possesses personal knowledge regarding the matters asserted; instead, 
a basis for the person's acquisition of such personal knowledge must be readily 
discernable from the face of the affidavit. Cooper Indus., 987 F .Supp. at 109; see 
also Kamen v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d 
Cir.1986). In the event that these requirements are not met, the disputed affidavit 
may be stricken, either wholly or in part, as necessary to insure adherence to 
these fundamental principles. Brown v. BKW Drywall Supply, Inc., 305 F.Supp.2d 
814, 821 (S.D.Ohio 2004); see Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2738. 
Cornell Research Foundation, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2007 WL 4349135, 9-10 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007), emphasis added. 
2. Plaintifrs affidavit, pages 1 through carryover sentence at top of page 2. 
Objections: Not made on personal knowledge; argumentative and conclusory; contains 
reference to unauthenticated exhibit for which no foundation laid; not relevant. 
3. Plaintifr s affidavit, pages 2 through 3, "Plaintiff Background." 
Objections: Not made on personal knowledge; argumentative, speculative and conclusory; 
contains reference to unauthenticated exhibit for which no foundation laid; not relevant; contains 
hearsay. 
4. Plaintifrs affidavit, bottom of page 3 through page 4, "Procedural History and 
Standard of Review." 
Objections: Not made on personal knowledge; argumentative, speculative and conclusory; 
contains reference to unauthenticated exhibit for which no foundation laid; not relevant; contains 
hearsay. 
5. Plaintifrs affidavit, bottom of page 4 through middle of page 12, "Mendez 
employment history with UHS." 
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Objections: Not made on personal knowledge; argumentative, speculative and conclusory; 
contains reference to unauthenticated exhibits for which no foundation laid; not relevant; 
contains hearsay; 
As respects the last sentence of page 8 ("Defendant's policy #1060 state under investigating a 
complaint (Exhibit 11), 4 pages: Once an allegation is brought to the university's attention, the 
university will evaluate the need to investigate and take action, even if the complainant may not 
want to commence an investigation."), the affiant has not affirmatively shown his competency to 
testify to the matter. 
As respects the single sentence in the middle of page 9, ("Defendant has admitted the Plaintiff 
was hire[ d] at a higher rate of pay due to his experience in the medical field and Plaintiff does 
not dispute that fact."), Defendants make no objection. 
As respects the single sentence near the lower middle of page 11 ("The reason for termination 
was because of not serving satisfactorily and the expiration of the probation period ended on 
February 24, 2012."), Defendants object as unintelligible. 
6. Plaintifrs affidavit, middle of page 12 through top of page 14, 11B. Disparate 
treatment on the basis of race. 11 
Objections: Not made on personal knowledge; argumentative, speculative and conclusory; 
contains reference to unauthenticated exhibits for which no foundation laid; not relevant; 
contains ~earsay. 
7. Plaintifrs affidavit, upper middle of page 14 through top of page 16, 11 C. 
Retaliation. 11 
Objections: Not made on personal knowledge; argumentative, speculative and conclusory; 
contains reference to unauthenticated exhibits for which no foundation laid; not relevant; 
contains hearsay. 
8. Plaintifrs affidavit, upper page 16 through end of page 17, 11D. and E. Implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Breach of implied contracts of employment; F. 
Defendant fees for inclusion of defendant Doyle as an individual; Conclusion 11 
Objections: Not made on personal knowledge; argumentative, speculative and conclusory; 
contains reference to unauthenticated exhibits for which no foundation laid; not relevant; 
contains hearsay. 
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Conclusion 
For the above and foregoing reasons, pursuant to I.R.C.P., Rules 12(f) and 56(e), the 
Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, with the sole exception 
of the single sentence in the middle of page 9, ("Defendant has admitted the Plaintiff was hire[d] 
at a higher rate of pay due to his experience in the medical field and Plaintiff does not dispute 
that fact."), should be stricken in its entirety. 
DATED this 29th day of June, 2015. 
CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY 
& SORENSEN, LLP 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of June, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 







[ ] Email: raulmendez2002@gmail.com 
David W. Cantrill 
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Westl~w. 
226 F.Supp.2d 1238 , 
(Cite as: 226 F.Supp.2d 1238) 
p 
United States District Court, D. Idaho. 
Marigrace MICKELSEN, Plaintiff, 
V. 
ALBERTSON'S, INC., Defendant. 
\ 
No. CIV.01-398-S-LMB. 
. Sept. 10, 2002. 
Terminated 63-year-old employee, who 
had back condition, brought state court ac-
r tion against former employer, alleging dis-
ability discrimination under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), age discrim-
ination under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), and violations 
of Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA). Ac-
tion was removed. On employer's motion 
for summary judgment, and cross-motions 
to strike, the District Court, Boyle, Chief 
United States Ma~istrate Judge, held that: 
(1) statements m employee's affidavit 
offered in opposition to summary judg-
ment, which were based on employee's in-
formation and belief, rather than personal 
knowledge, would be stri~ken; (2) conclus-
ory statements in employee's affidavit, 
offered in opposition to summary judg-
ment, would be stricken; (3) affidavits sub-
mitted by employer in support of its motion 
for summary judgment in employment dis-
crimination action would not be stricken; 
( 4) elimination of employee's position, 
while she was on personal leave of, ab-
sence, in anticipation of decline in work-
load, as well as, lack of available compar-
able positions into which employee could 
be transferred, were legitimate, non-age 
based reasons for terminating employee, 
and such reasons were not pretexts for age 
discrimination in violation of the ADEA 
and IHRA; (5) employee was not disabled 
within meaning of the ADA and IHRA; 
/ 
Page 2 of 17 
Page 1 
and (6) employer did not "regard" employ-
ee as disabled within meaning of the ADA 
andIHRA. 
Motions granted in part, and denied in 
I part. 
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age discrimination in· violation of the AD-
EA and Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA). 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, § 2 et seq, 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; 
LC. § 67-5909. 
[6] Federal Civil Procedure 170A ~ 
2497.1 
170A Federal Civil Procedure 
170AXVII Judgment 
170AXVll(C) Summary Judgment 
170AXVll(C)2 Particular Cases 
170Ak2497 Employees and 
Employment Discrimination, Actions In-
volving 
170Ak2497 .1 k. In Gener-
al. Most Cited Cases · 
Plaintiff can demonstrate pretext on 
summary judgment in ADEA action by 
either direct or circumstantial evidence; 
when plaintiff offers direct evidence of dis-
criminatory motive, triable issue as to actu-
al motivation of employer is created even if 
evidence is not substantial, but when 
plaintiff must rely on circumstantial evid-
ence to defeat summary judS!,llent, plaintiff 
is required to produce specific, substantial 
evidence of pretext. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq, 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. . 
_) 
. ( 
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[7] Civil Rights 78 ~1019(2) 
78 Civil Rights 
781 Rights Protected and Discrimination 
Prohibited in General 
78kl016 Handicap, Disability, or Ill-
ness 
·78k1019 Who Is Disabled· What 
Is Disability - ' 
78k1019(2) k. Impairments in 
General; Major Life Activities. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly J8kl07(1)) . , 
To establish a pnma fae1e case of dis-
ability discrimination under ADA, plaintiff 
must f~st s~ow that she has physical or 
me!ltal JJ11Pfilr!11~nt that s~bstantially limits 
maJor hfe actiVIty. Amencans with Disab-
ilities Act of 1990, § 2 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 12101 et seq. 
[8] Civil Rights 78 ~1218(2) 
78 Civil Rights 
7811 Employment Practices 
78k1215 Discrimination by Reason 
of Handicap, Disability, or Illness 
78k1218 Who Is Disabled· What 
Is Disability ' 
78k1218(2) k. Impairments in 
General; Major Life Activities. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 78kl 73 .1) 
When the major life activity under con-
sideration in ADA action is that of work-
ing, statutory phrase "substantially limits"· 
requires that pla~tiffs allege that they are 
unabl~ to work m broad class of jobs. 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 
3, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102; 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2G)(2)(i-iii). 
[9] Civil Rights 78 ~1218(3) 
78 Civil Rights 
7811 Employment Practices 
Page 4 of 17 
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78k1215 Discrimination by Reason 
of Handicap, Disability, or Illness 
78k1218 Who Is Disabled· What 
Is Disability ' 
. . . 7?k1_218(3) k. Particular Con-
ditions,. Lmutations, and Impairments. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78kl 73.1) 
Employee, who had back condition and 
was restricted to lifting no more than 25 
pol!flds, . was 1:10.t substantially limited in 
maJor hfe activity of working, and thus 
was not disabled within meaning of the 
ADA and Idaho Human Rights Act 
(IHRA); employee did not allege nor show 
that she was unable to work in broad class 
of jobs or even her specific job with em-
ployer due to her condition. Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 3 42 
U.S.C.A. § 12102; 29 C.F.R.' § 
1630.2G)(2)(i-iii); I.C. § 67-5909. 
[10] Civil Rights 78 <£=)1218(3) 
78 Civil Rights 
7811 Employment Practices 
78k1215 Discrimination by Reason 
of Handicap, Disability, or Illness 
78k1218 Who Is Disabled· What 
Is Disability ~ 
. . . 7?k~218(3) k. Particular Con-
ditions,. Limitations, and Impairments. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78kl 73.1) 
Employee, who had back condition and 
was restricted to lifting no more than 25 
pol!flds,. was !l~t substantially limited in 
maJor hfe activity of performing manual 
tasks, and thus employee was not disabled 
within meaning of the ADA and Idaho Hu-
!llan . Rights ~ct (IHRA); employee's · 
rmpairments, which consisted of not being 
able to do some recreation, i.e., running 
and bicycle riding, did not amount to 
severe restrictions m activities that were of 
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central importance to most people's daily 
lives, so as to constitute limitations in abil-
ity to perform manual tasks. Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 3, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 12102; 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2G)(2)(i-iii); LC. § 67-5909. 
(11] Civil Rights 78 €=>1218(6) 
78 Civil Rights 
7811 Employment Practices 
78kl 215 Discrimination by Reason 
of Handicap, Disability, or Illness 
78k1218 Who Is Disabled; What 
Is Disability 
78k1218(6) k. Perceived Dis-
ability; "Regarded As" Claims. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 78kl 73.1) 
Employer did not "regard" employee, 
who had back condition and was restricted 
to lifting no more than 25 pounds, as dis-
abled within meaning of the ADA and 
Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA); evidence 
that employee allegedly showed human re-
source manager a physician's release, upon 
her return to work following back surgery, 
and stated that she could not perform one 
of essential functions of her position, i.e., 
reaching' across counter for necessary ship-
ping paperwork, did not establish that em-
ployer regarded emJ?,loyee as disabled. 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 
3(2); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2); LC. § 
67-5909. 
*1239 Stephen J Lord, Boise, ID, for Mari-
grace Mickelsen, plaintiff. 
*1240 Harry S Chandler,Stoel Rives, 
Boise, ID, for Alberts_on's, Inc., defendant. 
ORDER 
BOYLE, Chief United States Magistrate 
Judge. 
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Currently pending before the Court are 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment (Pocket No. 17), Defendant's Motion 
to Strike (Docket No. 34), and Plaintiffs 
Motion to Strike (Docket No. 40). 
Having carefully reviewed the record, 
considered oral arguments, and otherwise 




Mari ("Plaintiff') was 
born on n the instant ac-
tion, P gloyed by Al-
bertson's, Inc. ("Defendant'') from Septem-
ber of 1964 through June of' 1974, and then 
again from May 9, 1988 through May 21, 
1999, when Plaintiff was discharged by 
Defendant. Complaint 1 IV. Plaintiff al-
leges that she was not remstated to her pre-
vious position, and was instead discharged 
when she returned from a leave of absence 
for back surgery. 
From approximately 1992 until 1996 or 
1997, Plaintiff worked as a shirping clerk 
in the warehouse at Defendant s Sundries 
Center until she was moved to the receiv-
ing clerk responsibilities. Deposition of 
Marigrace Mickelsen, p. 16 (A.ff. of Harry 
S. Chandler, Docket No. 23). In late 1997, 
Plaintiff experienced a non-work related 
injury which required surgery in Januarr. 
1998. She did not return to work until 
March 1998. Id. at pp. 10-11. 
In December 1998, Plaintiff had anoth-
er surgery performed on her back. On April 
29, 1999, she was released by her doctor to 
return to work with a lifting restriction of 
25 pounds as well as instructions not to sit 
on high chairs with poor back support. Id. 
at pp. 24-26, 31. Thereafter, on or about 
May 5, 1999, Plaintiff met with Mary 
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Huber-Thompson, Defendant's Sundries 
Center Human Resource Manager, and 
Tony Hartz, Defendant's Warehouse Oper-
ations Manager, and was informed that 
"one warehouse clerk position had been 
eliminated and there was no warehouse 
clerical job for her to return to." A.ff. of 
Mary Huber-Thompson ,r 7 (Docket No. 
20). 
On May 5, 1999, Plaintiff applied for 
the open position of Personnel Assistant, 
which: was the "only open warehouse posi-
tion then available." Id. However, Plamtiff 
was not selected for the position and, as a 
result, on May 21, 1999, Plaintiffs em-
ployment was terminated. Id. ,r 5. 
Plaintiff filed suit in the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho alleging claims under the Americ-
ans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967 ("ADEA"), and violations of the 
Idaho Human Rights Act ("IHRA"). On 
_August 7, 2001, that action was then re-
moved to this Court. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Defendant's Motion to Strike · (Docket 
No. 34) . 
Defendant moves to strike portions of 
Plaintiffs affidavit which are conclusory, 
speculative, argumentative, do not demon-
strate that the affiant is competent to testify 
to those matters, and not based on personal 
knowledge. FNt Defendant argues that 
these type of statements do not comply 
*1241 with the requirements of 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and must be stricken. 
FNl. Specifically, Defendant moves 
to strike paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17, · 
18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 32, 
34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, and 41. De-
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fendant's Motion to Strike, p. 2 
(Docket No. 34). 
r 
It is well settled that "only admissible 
evidence may be considered in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment." Beyene v. 
Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 
1182 (9th Cir.1988). Pursuant to Rule . 
56( e ), affidavits "shall be made on :Qersonal 
· knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is com-
petent to testify to the matters stated 
therein." See also Block v. City of Los 
Angeles, 253 F.3d 410,419 (9th Cir.2001). 
[1] Since Rule 56( e) is clear in requir-
ing that supporting and opposing affidavits 
must be based on personal knowledge, the 
Ninth Circuit has recognized that an affi-
davit made upon information and belief 
does not comply with Rule 56( e ). Bank 
Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1412 
(9th Cir.1995) (recognizing that declara-
tions "on information and belief' are not 
entitled weight for summary judgment pro-
ceedings where the declarant lacks person-
. al knowledge); Columbia Pictures Indus., 
Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, 
Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1529 (9th Cir.1991) 
( concluding that because an individual's 
declaration is "not based on personal 
knowledge, but on information and belief, 
his statement does not raise a triable issue 
of fact regarding antitrust injury"); Cermet-
ek, Inc. v. Butler Avpak, Inc., 573 F.2d 
1370, 1377 (9th Cir.1978) (stating that 
"facts alleged on 'understanding' like those 
based on 'belief or on 'information and 
belief,' are not sufficient to create a genu-
ine issue of fact"). 
In light of the foregoing, the Court will · 
strike p~agraphs 15, 16, 18, 21, and 24 of 
the Affidavit of Marigi-ace Micklesen on 
the grounds that the affiant lacks personal 
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. knowledge. Further, the Court will · strike 
those identified portions of the following 
paragraphs on the same grounds: 
Paragraph 13: 
The sentence "[ e Jven under Albertson's 
notion of 'seniority, I believe that I was 
considered 'senior.' " 
Paragraph 17: 
The sentence "I have reviewed Exhibit 
N attached to Mary Huber Thompson's af-
fidavit and believe that it was not in effect 
on the date of my re-hire in 1988 or on the 
date of my transfer to the receiving clerk 
position in 1996, as Exhibit N has a date in 
the lower left hand corner of7/97." 
'-- Paragraph 23: 
The first part of the :{)aragraph that 
states "[i]n addition to altenng documents 
or creating documents with mistakes on 
them and signing my name to them to 
make me appear as if I had been inaccurate 
" 
Paragraph 25: · 
The sentence "I confidentially com-
plained about this behavior to Bruce Smith, 
who, instead of taking action to prevent 
Burchfield from continuing her pattern of 
behavior toward me, apparently told 
Burchfield to counsel me." 
. Paragraph 32: . 
The sentence "I believe that this move 
was the beginning point of a concerted ef-
fort to remove me from the workplace 
based on my age." 
Paragraph 36: 
The sentence "I believe that Albertson's 
did not provide all of the time sheets from 
all vendors of temporary help." 
Paragraph 37: 
The sentence "I believe that my com-
Page 7 of 17 
Page6 
bination of formal college education and 
experience, even though I did not obtain a 
college degree, is at least the equivalent of 
a college degree." 
Paragraph 38: 
The sentence "I believe that I could 
easily have learned all the Microsoft ap-
plications*1242 mentioned, but was never 
given the chance to, because Mary 
Huber-Thompson hired Tara Elayer, a 
younger applicant for the job." 
Paragraph 41: 
The sentence "I believe that the de-
cision to terminate me was only made 
when I was able to return to work in May 
of 1999 and requested that I be placed in 
the last job for which I was selected, 
namely the receiving clerk position." 
[2) Further, it is well established that 
Plaintiff cannot defeat a motion for sum-
mary judgment by making conclusory 
statements without evidentiary support. 
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 
Cir.1989); see also Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 
137, 138 (9th Cir.1993) (recognizing 
"[w]hen the nonmoving party relies only 
on its own affidavits to oppose summary 
judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory al-
legations unsupported by factual data to 
create an issue of material fact"); Steck! v. 
Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th 
Cir.1983) (recognizing that the plaintiffs 
"mere assertions" that the defendant had a 
discriminatory intent were inadequate, 
without substantial factual evidence, to 
raise an issue to preclude summary judg-
ment). 
With respect to paragraphs 22, 28, 34, 
39, and 40, the Court concludes theseJ'ara-
graphs are conclusory and shoul be 
stricken: Further, the Court concludes that 
the second sentence of paragraph 29 which 
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states "Albertson's was aware that I needed 
this accommodation to allow me to provide 
care for my husband" is conclusory and 
speculative. 
· Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to 
Strike is granted as provided above. 
B. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Docket No. 
40) 
(3] On August 28, 2002, during the 
heanng of all pending motions, Plaintiff 
made an oral motion to strike inadmissable 
portions of the affidavits submitted in sup-
port of Defendant's summary judgment 
motion. (Minute Entry, Docket No. 40). To 
the extent that the Court relied on these af-
fidavits, the Court concludes that the por-
tions of the affidavits referenced in this de-
cision are admissible as they are based on 
personal knowledge and otherwise comply 
with Rule 56. Accordingly, Plaintiffs oral 
motion to strike is denied. 
\ . 
C. Standard/or Summary Judgment 
Motions for summary judgment are 
governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, which 
r.rovides, in pertinent part, that judgment 
'shall be rendered forthwith if the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to interrogator-
ies, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56(c). · 
The United States Supreme Court has 
made it clear that under Rule 56, summary 
· judgment is required if the nonmoving 
party fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element which 
is essential to his case and upon which he 
or she will bear the burden of proof at trial. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 4 77 U.S. 317, 
322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 
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(1986). If the nonmoving party fails to 
make such a showing on any essential ele-
ment of his case, "there can be 'no genuine 
issue as to any material fact,' since a com-
plete failure of proof concerning an essen-
tial element of fhe nonmoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immater-
ial." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.FN2 
FN2. See also Rule 56( e ), which 
provides in part:_ 
When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this rule, an ad-
verse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of the· 
adverse party's pleading, but the 
adverse party's response, by affi-
davits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genu-
ine issue for trial. If the adverse 
party does not so respond, sum-
mary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against the ad-
verse party. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). 
*1243 Under Rule 56 it is clear that an 
issue, in order to preclude entry of sum-
mary judgment, must be both "material" 
and "genuine." An issue is "material" if it 
affects the outcome of the litigation. An is-
sue is "genuine" when there is "sufficient 
evidence supporting the claimed factual' 
dispute . .. to require a jury or judge to re-
solve the parties' differing versions of the 
truth at tnal," Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 
461, 463 (1st Cir.1975) (quoting First Nat'! 
Bank v. Cities 'Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 
289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) 
), or when the "evidence is such that a reas-
onable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty 
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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 
2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Ninth 
Circuit cases are in accord. British Motor 
Car Distrib., Ltd. v. San Francisco Auto-
motive Indus. Welfare Fund, 882 F.2d 371 
(9th Cir.1989). 
In ruling on summary judgment mo-
tions, the court does not resolve conflicting 
evidence with respect to disP.uted material 
facts, nor does it make credibility determ-
inations. T. W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific 
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F .2d 626 (9th 
Cir.1987). Moreover, alJ inferences must 
be drawn in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Id. at 631. As the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "[l']ut 
another way, if a rat10nal trier of fact might 
resolve the issue in favor of the nonmovmg 
party, summary judgment must be denied." 
Id. . 
In order to withstand a motion for sum-
mary judgment, the Ninth Circuit has held 
that a nonmoving party: 
(1) must make a showing sufficient to es-
tablish a genuine issue of fact with re-
spect to any element for which it bears 
the burden of proof; (2) must show that 
there is an issue that may reasonably be 
resolved in favor of either party; and (3) 
must come forward with more persuasive 
evidence than would otherwise be neces-
sary when the factual context makes the 
nonmoving party's claim implausible. 
British Motor Car Distrib., 882 F.2d at 
374 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit has held that where the moving 
party meets its initial burden of demon-
strating the absence of any genuine issue of 
material fact, the nonmovm$ party must 
"produce 'specific facts showmg that there 
remains a genuine factual issue for trial' 
and evidence 'significantly probative' as to 
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any rmaterial] fact claimed to be disputed." 
Stecfcl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 
(9th Cir.1983) (citing Ruffin v. County of 
Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th 
Cir.1979)). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
acknowledged that in recent years the Su-
preme Court, "by clarifying what the non-
moving party must do to withstand a mo-
tion for summary judgment, has increased 
the utility of summary judgment." Califor-
nia Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. 
Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 
1468 (9th Cir.1987). As the Ninth Circuit 
has expressly stated: ''No longer can it be 
argued that any disagreement about a ma-
terial issue of fact precludes the use of 
summary judgment." Id. 
In addressing the ap.elication of the 
"Summary Judgment Test, ' the Ninth Cir-
cuit has specifically explained that: 
*1244 A "material" fact is one that is rel-
evant to an element of a claim or defense 
and whose existence might affect the out-
come of the suit. The materiality of a fact 
is thus determined by the substantive law 
governing the claim or defense. Disputes 
over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will 
not preclude a grant of summary judg-
ment. 
T. W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)) (emphasis added). 
D. Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Docket No. 17) 
Pursuant to the IHRA, "[i]t shall be a 
prohibited act to discriminate against a per-
son ... on the basis of age or disability .... " 
LC. § 67-5909. As recognized by the Ninth 
Circuit, "[t]he Idaho Supreme Court has 
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held the analysis under Title VII applies to 
claims under IHRA." Wallis v. J.R. Simplot 
Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 n. 4 (9th Cir.1994) 
· (citing Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 
· 644 P.2d 355, 358 (1982)). Further, with ·· 
respect to Plaintiffs ADA claim, the Su-
preme Court of Idaho has recognized that 
an analysis under federal law is applicable 
to a claim under the IHRA. Stansbury v. 
Blue Cross of Idaho Health Serv., Inc., 128 
Idaho 682,685,918 P.2d 266 (1996). 
In light of the foregoing, the Court con-
cludes that the Court's decision resolving 
Plaintiffs ADEA and ADA claims will also 
resolve her IHRA claim. See Wallis, 26 
F.3d at 889 n. 4. Accordingly, the Court 
will first address the burden of proof re-
quired for Plaintiffs claims under the AD-
EA and the ADA. 
1.ADEA 
When Plaintiff was terminated, she was 
63 years old. Under the ADEA, it is 
''unlawful for an employer ... to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual 
or otherwise discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's age." 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(l). In the Ninth Circuit, 
the basic allocation and burden of proof for 
an ADEA claim involves three steps: 
[A] plaintiff must first establish a frima 
facie case of discrimination. I the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 
,... the burden then shifts to the defendant to 
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for its employment decision. 
Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff 
, must demonstrate that the employer's al-
leged reason for the adverse employment 
decision is a pretext for another motive 
which is discriminatory. 
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·wallis, 26 F.3d at 889 (quoting Lowe v. 
City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1007 (9th 
Cir.1985)). 
The court in Wallis recognized that 
"[t]he requisite degree of proof necessary 
to establish a prima facie case for ,Title VII 
and ADEA claims on summary judgment is 
minimal and does not even need to rise to 
the level of a preponderance of the evid-
ence." Id. (citing Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 
F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th C1r.1987)). Further, 
"[t]he prima facie case may be based either 
on a presumption arising from the factors 
such as those set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), 
or by more direct evidence of discriminat-
ory intent." Id. (citing Lowe, 775 F.2d at 
1009).FNJ 
FN3. The factors set forth by the 
Supreme Court of the United States 
in McDonnell Douglas are: 
1. that the plaintiff belongs to a 
class protected by Title VII; 
2. that the plaintiff applied and 
was qualified for a job for which 
the employer was seeking applic-
ants; 
3. that, despite being qualified, 
the plaintiff was rejected; and 
4. that, after the plaintiffs rejec-
tion, the position remained open 
and the employer continued to 
seek applicants from persons of 
comparable qualifications. 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. 
*1245 [4] Generally, to establish a 
prima facie case of an ADEA violation, 
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Plaintiff must show that she was: 
(1) A member of a protected class [ age 
40-70]; 
(2) Performing her job in a satisfactory 
manner; 
(3) Discharged; and 
(4) Replaced by a substantially younger 
employee with equal or inferior qualifica-
tions. FN~ 
' 
FN4. With respect to the fourth ele-
ment, the court in Wallis recognized 
that proof of this element is not al-
ways required. The court in Wallis, 
26 F.3d at 891, stated: 
Where the discharge results from 
a reduction in work force, the 
plaintiff may show ''through cir-
cumstantial, statistical or direct 
evidence that the discharge oc-
curred under circumstances giving 
rise to an inference of age dis-
crimination." Such an inference 
can be established by showing the 
employer had a "continuing need 
for his skills and services m that 
his various duties were still being 
performed." (citations omitted). 
Rose, 902 F:2d at 1420 n. 1. 
[5] In the instant action, Defendant 
does not argue that Plaintiff has not estab-
lished a prima facie case for age discrimin-
ation. Accordingly, the burden shifts to De-
fendant to articulate a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for its employment de-
cision. See Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1005. 
According_ to the record, in 1996 or 
1997, Plaintiff requested and was moved to 
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the receiving clerk position because she did 
not want to "work all the overtime that was 
on the shipping desk." Mickelsen Depa., p. 
16. In January 1998, Plaintiff had back sur-
gery and did not return to work until March 
16, 1998. Id. at p. 11. On June 9, 1998, 
Plaintiff requested and received approval 
for an intermittent leave of absence to care 
for her husband, under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). 
In the fall of 1998, Tony Hartz made 
the decision that the three warehouse clerks 
performing shipping and receiving func-
tions should all be "cross-trained so that 
they could substitute for one another," and 
so there would be "better coverage of the 
jobs." Hartz A.ff. 1 3 · (Docket No. 22). 
Hartz further averred that in October 1998, 
he told Plaintiff that as a result of the 
cross-training, Plaintiff would go from 
"receiving to shipping clerical responsibil-
ities." Id. 14. 
From October 1998 until December 
1998, Plaintiff worked as a shipping clerk. 
Mickelsen Depa., p. 17. Subseguently, 
Plaintiff went on approved FMLA leave to 
have back surgery. On February 4, 1999, 
Plaintiffs twelve-week FMLA allowance 
expired. At this time, Plaintiff continued on 
a general or personal leave of absence, 
which did not guarantee a return to her pri-
or position. Huber-Thompson A.ff. 1 4, Ex. 
P. Pursuant to Defendant's "Leave of Ab-
sence Company Policy," unlike approved 
FMLA leave, "[ e ]mployees returning to 
work following an approved Leave of Ab-
sence will be re-employed in the closest 
comparable position ... but only if such 
work is available." Id. Ex. P. 
Following Plaintiffs exhaustion of her 
FMLA approved leave period, Mary 
HuberThompson testified in her affidavit 
that the position held by Plaintiff before 
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she left work on leave was posted as being 
available on February 22, 1999. According 
to Huber-Thompson's affidavit, this was 
after Plaintiffs FMLA leave expired and 
after Plaintiff "informed me that she would 
not be able to return to work." Id. ,r 4. 
However,· HuberThompson averred this 
oosting was withdrawn on March 3, 1999 
*1246 because "we expected to eliminate 
the _position as the result of an anticipated 
declme in the workload following the Al-
bertson's merger with American Stores." 
Id. The record demonstrates that Bruce 
Smith, General Manager for the Sundries 
Center, approved the withdrawal of the 
posting of the job vacancy, based on 
Hartz's representation that the warehouse 
clerks thought they could carry the neces-
sary workload without hiring a replacement 
for Plaintiff. A.ff of Bruce Smith, ,r 5 
(Docket No. 21). · · · 
Thereafter, Plaintiff applied for the Per-
sonnel Assistant position on May 5, 1999. 
However, Huber-Thompson averred that 
Tara Elayer was selected for the position 
because she was ''the best qualified of the 
50 applicants." Huber-Thompson A.ff ,r 4. 
Huber-Thompson averred that Elayer was 
a "stronger candidate than Mickelsen be-
cause Ms. Elayer had a college degree." Id. 
Subsequently, Plaintiffs employment was . 
terminated in May 1999 "as there was no 
suitable job for her to return to when she 
was fmally released by her physician to re-
turn to work." Smith A.ff. ,r 6. 
After carefully reviewing the record, 
the Court concludes that Defendant has ad-
equately articulated a legitimate nondis-
crnninatory reason for terminating 
Plaintiff. According to the record, in July 
1998, Smith became aware of the Al-
bertson's acquisition merger of American 
Stores Corporation. Smith A.ff ,r 4. Further, 
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by January 1999, Smith averred that "I was 
antici:i:mting that the various government 
agencies whose a_p_proval for the merger 
was required would compel Albertson's to 
divest some number of stores." Id. As a 
result, Smith averred that the workload of 
the Sundries Center would be reduced and 
that he ''welcomed any opportunity to re-
duce the number of positions at the Cen-
ter." Id. ,r,r 4-5. Therefore, Smith averred 
that he approved pulling the posting for 
Plaintiffs Job. Id. J 5. Huber-Thompson 
averred that even · Plaintiff would have 
been on the job when the decision was 
made to reduce one clerical position, 
Plaintiff still would have been laid off first 
"as she was the weakest performer." 
Huber-Thompson A.ff ,r 9. 
Further, the Court concludes that De-
fendant had a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
basis to terminate Plaintiff because the re-
cord demonstrates that emJ)loyees · on a 
general or personal leave of absence are 
not guaranteed a job when they return if 
there is no comparable position available. 
According to Huber-Thompson, a compar-
able position "would not be one that IS a 
promotion for the individual in question." 
Huber-Thompson A.ff_ ii 5. 
Huber-Thompson averred that placing 
Plaintiff in the Personnel Assistant job 
would have been a promotion. Id. ,r 6. 
Since the Court is satisfied that Defend-
ant has demonstrated a legitimate nondis-
criminatory basis to terminate Plaintiff, the 
burden shifts back to Plaintiff to demon-
strate that Defendant's reason for the ad-
verse employment decision is pretext for 
another motive which is discriminatory. 
Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1007. 
[ 6] The Ninth Circuit I has recognized 
that a plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by 
either direct or circumstantial evidence. 
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Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 
1217, 1221 (9th Cir.1998). When a 
plaintiff offers direct evidence of a dis-
criminatory motive, "a triable issue as to 
the actual motivation of the employer is 
created even if the evidence is not substan-
tial." Id. However, where a plaintiff must 
rely on circumstantial evidence to defeat 
summary jud~ent, the plaintiff is required 
to produce ' specific, substantial eviaence 
of pretext." Id . 
In the instant action, Plaintiff has not 
submitted direct evidence to SUJ?port her 
claim of Defendant's discnminatory 
motive .. Thus, Plaintiff relies on *1247 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 
Incorporated, 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 
2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) in opposi-
tion to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment for the proposition that circum-
stantial evidence may be sufficient to pre-
clude granting of summary judgment. In 
Reeves, the Supreme Court of the United 
States analyzed a situation where the de-
fendant contended that it had fired the 
plaintiff due to his failure to maintain ac-
curate attendance records. In response, the 
plaintiff argued that the defendant's explan-
ation was pretext for age discrimination. In 
its analysis, the Court m Reeves stated that 
the plamtiff made a "substantial showing 
that [the defendant's] explanation was 
false." Id at 144. Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that "a plaintiffs prima facie case, 
combined with sufficient evidence to find 
that the employer's asserted justification is 
false, may permit the trier of fact to con-
clude that the employer unlawfully dis-
criminated." Id at 148. 
. Although the Court in Reeves con-
cluded that plaintiff had submitted suffi-
cient evidence to sustain the jury's fmding 
of liability, the Court stated: 
\ 
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This is not to say that such a showing by 
the plaintiff will always be adequate to 
sustain a jury's fmding of liability. Cer-
tainly there will be instances where, al-
though the plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case and set forth sufficient 
evidence to reject the defendant's explan-
ation, no rational factfmder could con-
clude that the action was discriminatory. 
For instance, an employer would be en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law if 
the record conclusively revealed some 
other, nondiscriminatory reason. for the 
employer's decision, or if the plaintiff 
created only a weak issue of fact as to 
whether the employer's reason was untrue 
and there was abundant and uncontrover-
ted independent evidence that no discrim-
ination had occurred. FNs 
FN5. The Court in Reeves recog-
nized that the "standard for granting 
summary judgment 'mirrors' the 
standard for judgment as a matter of 
law, such that 'the inquiry under 
each is the same.' " Id. at 150. 
Thus, although the Court in Reeves 
addressed a Rule 50 motion, this 
Court concludes that the standard is 
applicable to the instant summary 
judgment proceedings. 
Id ( emphasis in original). 
Contrary to Reeves, wherein the 
plaintiff made a "substantial showing" that 
the defendant's actions were pretextual, the 
Court concludes in this instant action that 
Plaintiff has not made this type of eviden-
tiary showing to preclude granting of sum-
mary judgment. For examr.le, although 
Plaintiff argues that she was ' senior" to the 
other two warehouse clerks, the record 
does not support that contention: Accord-
ing to the record, Huber-Thompson 
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averred that even if Plaintiff would not 
have been the "weakest performer," and if 
all three warehouse clerks "had been equal 
in performance, Mickelsen would have 
been laid off first based upon her having 
the most recent date . of hire and the least 
number of years of continuous service." Id. 
,r9. 
Huber-Thompson . averred that 
Plaintiffs date of hire was May 9, 1988, 
making the other two warehouse clerks, 
Teddi Hoffman, and Gloria Richardson, 
senior to her. Huber-Thompson A.ff. ,r 8. 
Smith'. averred that although Plaintiff did 
receive a service award in 1988, reflecting 
twenty (20) total years with Defendant and · 
its predecessor, he averred that "[ o ]ur ser-
vice awards take into consideration total 
years of service, which is different from 
date of hire for purposes such as vacation 
accruals, sick leave accruals, and consider-
ations in the event of a reduction in work 
force. For those purposes, the most recent 
date *1248 of hire is used as the seniority 
date." Smith A.ff. ,r 7. 
According to Defendant's Rehire and· 
Reinstatement Policy, when a former em-
ployee is rehired after a period of 30 days 
or more of not being employed by Defend-
ant, a new hire date is established. 
Huber-Thompson A.ff. Ex. N. The Court 
notes that Plaintiffs payroll history, per-
formance appraisals, and vacation and sick 
pay records all clearly confirm her date of 
hire was May 9, 1988, Second 
Huber-Thompson A.ff. Exs. R, U, W. In 
fact, the record is clear that Plaintiff signed 
performance appraisals, all of which made 
1t clear she knew, or at least was put on no-
tice, that her hire date was May 9, 1988. Id. 
Ex. U. In the Court's view, it is difficult for 
Plaintiff to argue that she did not know her 
hire date was considered by Defendant to 
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be May 9, 1988. 
Further, the Court notes that Defendant 
utilized temporary employees "who filled 
in for shipping/receiving clerks in the 
warehouse during 1999." Id ,r 4. However, · 
the Court is of the opinion that because 
temporary employees were used does not 
establish that a warehouse job had in real-
ity not been eliminated. Rather, according 
to the record, it is undisputed that tempor-
ary employees were used when either Hoff-
man or Richardson were on vacation or 
sick leave. Id. Ex. Z. Plaintiff has not sub-
mitted any evidence to the contrary on this 
factual issue. , 
Further, the Court concludes that the 
fact Defendant hired Tara Elayer, a young-
er applicant, instead of Plaintiff, for the 
Personnel Assistant job is insufficient of it-
self to establish pretext. In this regard, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated 
that in order to establish pretext in this 
manner, Plaintiff must establish that her 
qualifications "leap from the record and 
cry out to all who would listen that [she] 
was vastly-or even clearly-more quali-
fied for the subject job." Price v. Fed Ex-
press Corp., 283 F.3d 715 (5th Cir.2002). 
The Fifili Circuit has also described in 
most colorful language that the disparities 
in qualifications must be "so apparent as to 
virtually jump off the page and s~a you in 
the face.' Deines v. Texas Dep't o Protect-
ive & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3 277, 279 
(5th Cir.1999); see also Cofield v. Goldkist 
Inc., 267 F.3~ 1264 (11th Cir.2001). 
In the instant action, Huber-Thompson 
averred that Elayer was selected instead of 
Plaintiff because she was a "stronger can-
didate" than Plaintiff. Huber-Thompson 
A.ff. ,r 4. In opposition, Plaintiff averred 
that 'befendant "frequently hires under-
qualified individuals and provides them a 
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chance to learn on the job." Mickelsen A.ff 
, 38. However, it is clear that the role of 
the Court in this judicial setting is not to 
act as a "super-personnel department" that 
"~econd · guesses [an] employer's business 
judgments." Simms v. 0/ilahoma Dep't of 
Mental Health and Substances Abuse 
Servs., 165 · F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th 
Cir.1999); see also Chapman v.' AI Trans-
port, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir.2000) 
(stating that to survive summary judgment, 
"[a] plaintiff is not allowed to recast an 
employer's proffered nondiscriminatory 
reasons or substitute his business judgment 
for that of the employer" as federal courts 
do not sit as "super-personnel departments 
that reexamines an entity's busmess de-
cisions"). The Court agrees. 
In light of all the foregoing, this Court 
concludes in this instant action that 
Plaintiffs · personal opinions about her 
qualifications do not give rise to a material 
factual dispute. Simms, 165 F.3d at 1329. 
Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has 
failed to demonstrate pretext by Defend-
~t's hiring _of Elayer for the Personnel As-
sistant position. 
*1249 Finally, the Court has considered 
Plaintiffs allegations that her discharge 
was also based on her filing a grievance 
against Cathy Burchfield for harassment. 
Complaint ,r IX. Plaintiff alleges that this 
· harassing behavior began "f s lhortly after I 
rejoined Albertson's m 1988." Mickelsen 
Aff. ,r 20. Plaintiff avers that in 1992, she 
was moved from Burchfield's supervision 
in, accounts payable to the warehouse ship-
ping clerk Job "to insure she would no 
longer have any supervision over me." Id ,r 
27. 
Although Plaintiff argues that the 
grievance filed against Burchfield was a 
basis that Defendant used to terminate her, 
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there is no evidence in the record to estab-
lish a connection between the grievance 
filed many years earlier and Defendant's 
subsequent decision to terminate Plaintiff 
in 1999. Thus, the Court concludes that the 
Burchfield incident is insufficient evidence 
to show a discriminatory motive in termin-
ating Plaintiff. 
In sum, after carefully considering the 
record, the Court finds, and thus concludes, 
that beyond the fact that Plaintiff was 63 
years old at the time of her termination and 
that she was the oldest of the three ware-
house clerks, Plaintiff has not demon-
strated the "specific, substantial evidence 
of pretext" required to defeat summary 
judgment. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. 
Rather, the Court concludes there is 
"abundant and uncontroverted indeJ?endent 
evidence" of Defendant's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating 
Plaintiff. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 
S.Ct. 2097. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim 
of age discrimination under the ADEA and 
the IHRA is dismissed and Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
in this respect. 
2.ADA 
According to the ADA, a disability is, 
"(A) a :{>hysical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the ma-
jor life activities of such individual; (B) a 
record of such an impairment; or (C) bemg 
regarded as having such an impairment." 
42 u.s.c. § 12102(2). 
[7] According to the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Toyota Motor Manu-
facturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 
U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 
(2002), in order for Plaintiff to establish a 
prima facie case for discrimination based 
on disability, she must first show that she 
has a physical or mental impairment that 
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
https://web2. westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?mt=Westlaw&prft=HTMLE&vr=2.0&de... 6/24/2015 
000291
226 F.Supp.2d 1238 
(Cite as: 226 F.Supp.2d 1238) 
substantially limits a maJ or life activity. 
122 S.Ct. at 690. 
In determining whether the impairment 
· substantially limits a major life activity, the 
SuP.reme Court in Toyota Motor considered 
"[tJhe nature and severity of the impair-
ment; (t]he duration or expected duration 
of the rmpairment; and [t]he permanent or 
long-tenil impact, or the expected perman-
ent or long-term impact of or resulting 
from the rmpairment." Id. (quoting 29 
C.F.R. §§ 1630.2G)(2)(i-iii) (2001)). The 
Court in Toyota Motor determined that a 
substantial rmpairment "clearly precludes 
impairments tliat interfere in only a minor 
way with the performance of manual tasks 
from qualifying as disabilities." Id. at 691 
( emphasis added). · 
Further, the Court in Toyota Motor de-
scribed "major life activities" as "activities 
that are of central importance to daily life," 
which include "such basic abilities as 
walking, seeing, and hearing." The Court 
also recognized that ''these terms need to 
be interpreted strictly to create a demand-
. ing standard for qualifying as disabled." Id. 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101). 
[8] [9] When the major life activity un-
der consideration is that of workinf?;, "the 
statutory phrase 'substantially limits' re-
quires... that plaintiffs allege that they are 
unable to work in a broad class of *1250 
jobs." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471, 491, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 
450 (1999). Although the Court in Sutton 
declined to address the question whether 
working could even be considered a major 
life activity, it went on to state " even as-
suming that working is a major life activ-
ity, a claimant would be required to show 
an inability to work in a 'oroad range of 
jobs,' rather than a specific job." Toyota 
Motor, 122 S.Ct. at 693 (quoting Sutton, 
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527 U.S. at 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139) (emphasis 
added). 
In the instant action, the record demon-
strates that Plaintiff was released to work 
on approximately April 29, 1999 with a 
lifting restriction of 25 pounds. (Mickelsen 
Depa., pp. 24-26, 31). However, Plaintiff 
has neither alleged facts nor produced 
evidence that demonstrates she is unable to 
work in a broad range of jobs or even her 
s_pecific job with Defendant, as is required 
for finding her disabled from the major life 
activity of "working." Rather, the evidence 
demonstrates that Plaintiff did temporary 
work with different employers. Mickelsen 
Depa., pp. 29-30. In fact, Plaintiff testified 
that at the time of her February 2002 de-
position, she was involved in volunteer 
work at Greenleaf City Hall. Id. at p. 31. 
[10] The Supreme Court in Toyota Mo-
tor recogajzed that upon a proper showing, 
a plaintiffs impaired ability to perform 
manual tasks may qualify as a limitation of 
a major life activity. 122 S.Ct. at 691. The 
Court held that "to be substantially limited 
in performing manual tasks, an individual 
must have an impairment that prevents or 
severely restricts the individual from doing 
activities that are of central importance to 
most people's daily lives. The impairment's 
impact must also be permanent or long-
term." Id. 
In Toyota Motor, the plaintiff had al-
leged and argued that "her physical impair-
ments substantially limited her in (1) 
manual tasks; (2) housework; (3) garden-
ing; (4) playing with her children; (5) lift-
ing; and (6) working, all of which, she ar-
gued, constituted major life activities," id. 
at 687, but that "she could still brush her 
teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend her flower 
garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and . pick 
up around the house." Id. at 694. The Court 
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concluded that these impairments "did not 
amount to such severe restrictions in the 
activities that are of central importance to 
most people's daily lives that they establish 
a manual-task disability as a matter of 
law." Id. · 
In the instant action, Plaintiff testified 
that "[t}he only physical disability I believe 
I have is not bemg able to do some of the 
recreation that I did like running, bicycle 
riding." Mickelsen Depo., pp. 43-44. Fur-
ther, Plaintiff testified that she does a vari-
ety of activities including housekeeping, 
cooking, laundry, mowing her lawn, 
gardenmg, some rototilling, raking leaves, 
playing with great grandchildren, washing 
windows, shopping, driving (including four 
hour drives to Jackpot, Nevada), pamting 
woodwork, computer work, taking out the 
garbage, and walking daily for exercise. Id. 
at pp. 32-37. 
In the Court's view, Plaintiffs alleged 
impairments fall far below the impairments 
experienced by the plaintiff in Toyota Mo-
tor, where the Supreme Court found the 
plaintiff was not disabled. Based on the in-
stant record, beyond the fact that Plaintiff 
has undergone two back surgeries and that 
her doctor placed a 25 pound lifting restric-
tion and other minor restrictions upon her 
return to work, Plaintiff does not make any 
· allegations and cites to no evidence that 
she was severely restricted from doing any 
activities of central importance in most 
people's lives as described by the Supreme 
Court in the Toyota Motor case. 
*1251 [11] The Court notes that in 
Plaintiffs opposition to Defendant's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff ar-
gues that Huber-Thompson "regarded" her 
as having a disability ( citing to 
Huber-Thompson's Affidavtt at p. 5, 1 7). 
However, in that paragraph, . 
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Huber-Thompson avers only that Plaintiff 
"showed her doctor's release, and stated 
that she would not perform one of the es-
sential functions of the shipping position, 
i.e., reaching across a counter for necessary 
s~ping paperwork." Huber-Thompson 
AJJ. 1 7. In the Court's view, this evidence 
does not establish that Huber-ThomP.son 
"regarded" Plaintiff as having a disability, 
nor is there evidence in the record to sup-
port such a claim. 
In light of all the foregoing discussion, 
this Court concludes that Plaintiff has 
failed to establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination based on disability. Accord-
ingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs 
disability discrimination claim under the 
ADA and the IHRA is dismissed, and De-
fendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted in this respect. 
III. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Strike 
(Docket No. 34) is GRANTED. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Docket 
No. 40) is DENIED. 
3. Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Docket No. 17) is GRANTED, 
!hereby dismissing Plaintiffs complaint in 
its entrrety. 
4. The October 21, 2002 pre-conference 
· and the November 4, 2002 jury trial are 
VACATED. 
D.Idaho,2002. 
Mickelsen v. Albertson's, Inc. 
226 F.Supp.2d 1238 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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EX PARTE MOTION TO SEAL 
EXHIBIT 14 OF AFFIDAVIT OF 
PLAINTIFF OPPOSING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE ADD 
REDACTIONS TO DOCUMENTS 
Defendants above named, by and through their attorneys, Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & 
Sorensen, LLP, and hereby moves this honorable court for an order to seal confidential patient health 
records provided by Plaintiff pursuant to I.R.C.P., Rule 3(c)(3)(b). In the alternative, Defendant 
requests that the names of the eight individuals be redacted in the Court's record. 
Plaintiff filed his Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment on 
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June 11, 2015. In Plaintiffs Exhibit 14, at pages 100-107 of the Affidavit (the pages are not numbered 
consecutively), Plaintiff has attached eight pages of"Visit Information Sheet" information from Boise 
State University's University Health Service office. Plaintiff redacted ID information, date of birth 
information and "Reason for Visit" information; however, Plaintiff did not redact that patient's names 
from the eight pages. Boise State University and University Health Services did not authorize Plaintiff 
to possess patient health information records after the termination of his employment and Boise State 
University does not know how Plaintiff came to possess these records. 
Public disclosure of these patient health information records by Plaintiff implicates the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIP AA") and contributes absolutely nothing to 
this case. 
Defendants respectfully requests that the eight pages of Visit Information Sheet"_information be 
sealed from the public, or in the alternative, that the names of the eight individuals be redacted in the 
Court's public record. 
Oral argument is requested. 
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Meridian, Idaho 83646 
Telephone: (208) 860-5037 
Rmendez79@hotmail.com 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
:.~-----FI_...LE,~ } 1 
JUL O 6 101~ 
CHfflel'OflHEPI o. l'IICH, Clerk 
19y STACEY LAFFERTY 
0EPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES BOISE 
STATE UNIVERSITY, MARIEL DOYLE 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1312890 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT EX 
P ARTE MOTION TO SEAL EXHIBIT 14 
OF AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF 
OPPOSING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff requests the Court to disregard the Defendant's Motion to Seal exhibit 14. Plaintiff wa~ 
provided with the entire record by Defendant as part of Answers to Interrogatories and Requests for 
discovery. The "Visit information Sheets" were already provided redacted and intact the way it is by 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff certainly did not have a way to access the information after his termination. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff believes that exhibit 14 does contribute to his case as it shows that on the day that 
he was formally disciplined while in training (nonetheless!), other staff similarly situated and not in 
training were making the exact same mistakes, yet only Plaintiff was disciplined. Page 1 of exhibit 14 
shows emails that were sent to the entire staff about the issue for which Plaintiff was singled out and 
chastised. Plaintiff belief that at the very least the email in page 1 should be allowed to stand as it has 
nothing to do HIP AA. 
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Plaintiff cannot help but point out to this Court the hypocrisy and inconsistencies by Defendant. 
Defendant is moving to strike Plaintiff Affidavit because according to them; the exhibits lack authenticity, 
accuracy, and reliability. Yet they file a separate Motion to Seal the same documents because the 
unauthenticated documents provided by them, now are authenticated as being part of Defendant's 
property; ,see page 2 of Ex Parte Motion to Seal Exhibit 14 in which states the following: "Plaintiff has 
attached eight pages of visit Information Sheet information from Boise State University's health Services 
Office." 
Dated: July 6 2015 
1i:: ~7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on July 6, 2015 I served a copy to: 
David Cantril! 
1423 Tyrell lane 
Boise Idaho 83701 
Raul Mendez 
D By mail 
Q,-BY fax to 208-345-7212 
~y personal delivery 
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UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES BOISE 
STATE UNIVERSITY, MARIEL DOYLE 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1312890 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF OPPOSING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE IT 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff Affidavit and supporting memorandum 
in its entirety. Defendant cites alleged non-compliance with rules and regulations as the main arguments 
to strike it. Yet, Plaintiff finds it incredibly hypocritical given the fact that this entire case is full of 
inconsistencies/noncompliance with rules by those who actually went to school to get their Law degrees. 
For example: the Affidavits of service of complaint have never been filed with the Court but somehow on 
9/13/2013 Defendant's Lawyer filed a notice of appearance claiming to be representing several parties 
including the State of Idaho ..... only to later prove that he was not representing the State because they 
were not even a proper party to this action. Defendant failed to file a proper Motion for Summary 
Judgment on 09/2014 when it was due according to the first Order Governing Proceedings and Setting 
Trial; instead on ·11/4/2014 Defendant was asking to Vacate Trial because they were not ready for Trial 
(see exhibit 1 of Plaintiff Affidavit), on 12/8/2014, Trial was vacated without a Motion, Stipulation, or 
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Order. The new Trial was set for September 2015, but absolutely nothing has change in between 11/2014 
and July 2015 other than now Defendant asking for the claims to be dismissed without having the due 
diligence to gather depositions and further discovery that they claim were missing when they requested 
the 12/8/2014 Trial to be vacated. If anything, the Case Docket ( exhibit 1, 2pages) shows that this matter 
has been delayed at the Defendant's request for no good reason wasting the time and resources of 
everyone. 
Defendant also claims that all exhibits on Plaintiffs Affidavit with the exception of Exhibit 11 
are inadmissible because they are not "authenticated" or unsworn. Plaintiff is puzzled as to why 
Defendant believes exhibit 11 is ok but not the rest. The exhibits are part of the entire Affidavit sworn 
under oath beforC? an Ada County Notary Public. Furthermore, Defendants Assistant Vice president 
Swore under Oath that he read, understood the contents, and stated that the facts set forth herein in 
Defendant's Answers and Responses to Plaintiff First Set of Interrogatories are true and correct to the best 
of his knowledge, information and belief. (Exhibit 2, 2 pages). Furthermore, Defendant did not claim any 
of the evidence submitted as part of answers to interrogatories # 11 to be privileged in compliance with 
IRCP 26(B)(l) nor did Defendant raised an objection to the entire 560 page record provided as answer to 
interrogatory #11 per IRCP 26 (F). Per IRCP 36 (B) (D) the use of Defendants admissions on answer #11 
is proper on this action. Indeed, it is quite extraordinary and astounding that Defendant provided 
Plaintiff with the whole evidence for his case and now they are trying to rectify the mistake by trying to 
strike from the record the same facts and true and correct information sworn under oath. In addition, "the 
nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and show by affidavits or by the depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or admission on file that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Plaintiff Affidavit has 
proven that issues of material fact exists which are the same facts recognized by Defendant as being true 
and correct under Sworn testimony as part of interrogatory No 11. 
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Defendant is just trying to confuse the issues in question by filling up their Motion to Strike 
Plaintiff Affidavit with Legal jumble, but Plaintiff must point out that the evidence must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Defendant goes into mocking Plaintiff Affidavit claiming the content of it is astounding. Is it not 
true that all the big Law firms represent the insurance companies? Is it not true that repositories tell the 
story of a system that gives the wealthy/affluent the Judgments they want? Is it not true that America has 
become a bigjailhouse populated in large part by minorities? Is our Legal system about the constitution, 
rights and justice or is it about Lawyers making money at the expense of it? I remember watching the 
presidential debate a few years back where as always the issue of racism/discrimination was discussed. I 
remember Sen. Ron Paul saying that Law enforcement and the Legal system are bastions of white 
supremacy which at the time didn't quite make much sense. 
The courts are supposed to take measures that protect the public's best interests. The evidence 
submitted on Plaintiff Affidavits is pretty damning for Defendant. The record shows that Defendant 
engaged in systemic racism of the two Hispanic males at the healthcenter. Steps were taking to 
intentionally exclude them from the facility and Defendant intentionally ignored/disregarded both their 
own policies as well as the State ofldaho Division of Human Resources policies. There are other issues 
as well at that facility according to Dr. Libby Greaney, for example she claims that she was let go from 
the facility because she was not on line with the scam being run by the student health insurance for the 
benefit of the athletic department, and in particular the football program. 
In short, Plaintiff belief that a denial of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is proper 
because he has provided on his Affidavit issues of material fact that will serve the public's best interest by 
going to trial. 
Dated: July 6 2015 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on July 6, 2015 I served a copy to: 
David Cantril! 
1423 Tyrell lane 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Raul Mendez 
D Bymail 
D By fax to 208-345-7212 
R By personal delivery 
D Overnight delivery/Fed Ex 
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07/18/2013 New Case Filed - Other Claims 
07/18/2013 Complaint Filed 
07/18/2013 Summons Filed 
08/12/2013 Amended Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial 
08/12/2013 Amended Summons 
0811212013 Civil Disposition entered for: Greaney, Libby, Defendant. Filing date: 8/12/2013 
0910312013 No~ice Of Appe_aran~e (Cantril! for University Health Services Boise State University 
Amended Notice Of Appearance (Cantril! for State of Idaho, 
09/13/2013 University Health Services Boise State University and Mariel 
Doyle) 
Answer to Amended Complaint and Jury Trial (Cantril! for 
10/02/2013 State of Idaho, University Health Services Boise State, & 
Mariel Doyle) 
10/02/2013 Notice Of Service 
10/08/2013 Hearing Scheduled (Status 11/12/2013 03: 30 PM) 
10/31/2013 Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning 
1110512013 
Hearing r~sult for Status scheduled on 11/12/2013 03:30 
PM: Hearing Vacated 
11/06/2013 Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial 
1110612013 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 11/24/2014 03:30 
PM) 
1110612013 






Idaho Repository - Case Nur · Result Page 
11/20/2013 Notice Of Service 
12/05/2013 (2) Notice Of Service 
01/06/2014 Notice Of Service · 
01/28/2014 Notice Of Service 
04/30/2014 Notice of Taking Deposition of Raul Mendez 
05/12/2014 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record 
0511212014 Affidavit of Attorney in Support of Motion to Withdraw as Counsel 
05/12/2014 Notice Of Hearing 6.12.14@ 4pm 
0511212014 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw 06/12/2014 04:00 
PM) ., 
05/13/2014 Defendant's Notice of Non-Opposition 
0512912014 
Plaintiff Response To Order to Withdraw as Attorney of 
Record 
Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw scheduled on 
0611212014 06/12/2014 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: V. Gosney Number of Transcript Pages for this 
hearing estimated: less than 1--
07 io112014 Plaintiff Response to Order to Withdraw as Attorney of Record 
09/08/2014 Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Raul Mendez 
0911112014 Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Raul Mendez 
1012012014 
Plaintiff Re~uest For Dismissal Of The State Of Idaho As A 
Party In This Case 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 11/10/2014 04:00 
10/27/2014 PM) Plaintffs request for Dismissal of the State of Idaho as 
a Party in the Case 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 
ll/l0/2014 11/10/2014 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court 
Reporter: V. Gosney Number of Transcript Pages for this 
hearing estimated: Less than 100 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 
1112412014 11/24/2014 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: V. Gosney Number of Transcript Pages for this 
hearing estimated: less than 100 
1210812014 Hearing r~sult for Jury Trial scheduled on 12/08/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 Days 
12/31/2014 Case Status Update 
01/05/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/05/2015 03: 00 PM) 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 01/05/2015 03:00 
0110512015 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: V. Gosney Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less 
than 100 
01/05/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/12/2015 03:00 PM) 





Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Defendant; 
Mendez, Raul, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/6/2015 
1 01/07/2015 Memorandum Confirming Status Conference [________________ ---------
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of ADA ) 
PABLO COBLENTZ, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the Assistant Vice President, Human Resource Services at Boise State University 
and a duly authorized representative of the Defendants in the above-entitled matter; that he has read 
the above and foregoing DEFENDANTS' FJRST ANSWERS TO INTERROGA TO~, knows 
and understands the contents thereof, and states that the facts set forth herein are true and correct to 
the best of his knowledge, infonnation, and belief. . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this;/1 day of January, 2014. 
Residing at 8tH St- :R 
My Commission Expires 8'-11-:W I L/ 
DEBBY FLORES, Notary'Pobllc 
State of Idaho, County of Ada 
My co.mmisslon expires Aug 19 2014 
FJUng #_ 386!0 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES - 16 -
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video, photo, audio or other item in your possession related to Plaintiff and this matter. 
~'imsrONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO, 11: See docmnents producedherewith as BSU 
l - 560 for training materials for CSR, emails and Plaintiff's personnel file. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Plea1,e identify and describe each action taken by the 
Defendant to resolve the concerns or complaints issued by the Plaintiff regarding his employment 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: See Answer to Interrogatory No. 10, as 
well as docwnents produced herewith as BSU 1 - 560_ including training manuals, emails and 
Plaintiff's personnel manual .. 
INTERROGATORY N0.13: With reference to each affinnative defense pleaded by you or 
your attorneys in the answer to the complaint, and with reference to each denial plead in the Answer 
to the Complaint and to the Request for Admissions herein, please set forth with respect to each such 
denial and affirmative defense all facts, docwnents, records, individuals or other evidence, known to 
you, your attorneys or agents which support or corroborate such denials or defenses; the name, 
address and telephone number of each such person known to you who claims to have knowledge of 
such; and the name, address and telephone number of any custodian of any writing or report which 
supports any such denial or affirmative defense. Also provide a detailed summary statement of the 
facts known by each such _person, Also, please state the full name, address and telephone number of 
any individual not listed above who was either a witness to or has any knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding any other allegations of the Plaintiff's complaint or Defendants' denials 
or defense regarding this case. · 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 






2712 N Goldeneye Way 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 
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DiPUlY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES BOISE 
STATE UNIVERSITY, MARIEL DOYLE 
Defendant. 
i 
Case No. CV OC 1312890 
MOTION TO VACATE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING 
Plaintiff moves to vacate the Summary Judgment hearing scheduled for 8/4/2015. Plaintiff has filed a . . 
timely (within 7 days) Motion to Disqualify without Cause on 7/21/2015. Per IRCP 40 (D) (5) state the 
following: 
""Upon the filing of a motion for disqualification, the presiding judge shall be without authority to act 
further in such action except to grant or deny such motion for disqualification." 
According to this rule no Summary Judgment hearing or any other action should take place pending a 
decision on the Motion to Disqualify without Cause. Furthermore, Plaintiff believes that he should not be 
filing a Motion to Vacate the Summary Judgment because he has filed a timely Motion to Disqualify 
without Cause; therefore has exercised his right and shall be granted per IRCP 40 (D) (1). 
Plaintiff is filing this motion because of his recent emails 'Vith both Judge Hansen's Clerk and opposing 
counsel. Therefore, Plaintiff will also file a Motion to Disqualify with Cause as well. 
Dated: July 28, 2015 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on July 28, 2015 I served a copy to: 
David Cantril! 
1423 Tyrell lane 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Raul Mendez 
D Bymail 
D By fax to 208-345-7212 
~ By personal delivery 
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SEP O 3 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDI~fltJMmmcT OF 
DEPUTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
























STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 
UNIVERSITY; MARIEL DOYLE, 
Defendants. 





This is an action for discrimination, retaliation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and breach of implied and/or express employment contract. 
At a pre-trial conference held on the record on July 13, 2015, the Court scheduled a hearing 
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which had been filed on June 1, 2015, and 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which had been filed on June 29, 2015. Hearing on those motions was set for August 4, 
2015. Plaintiff was present at the July 13, 2015, pre-trial conference, appearing prose, as he has 
throughout much of the proceedings in this matter. Subsequently, a Notice of Hearing regarding 
the August 4, 2015, hearing on Defendants' motions was filed on July 14, 2015, and provided to 
Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants. 
On July 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen Without 
Cause. Defendants filed a Response to Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen Without Cause 
on July 28, 2015. 




























On July 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen With Cause, 
along with an Affidavit Supporting Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen With Cause. 
On August 4, 2015, at the time previously set for hearing on Defendants' motions, the Court 
took up Plaintiff's motions to disqualify, noting that upon the filing of a motion for disqualification, 
the presiding judge is without authority to act further in the action except to grant or deny such 
motion for disqualification. See I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5). Plaintiff did not appear for the August 4, 2015, 
hearing and, being satisfied that Plaintiff had sufficient notice of the hearing date and time, the 
Court proceeded in his absence. 1 
At the August 4, 2015, hearing, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for disqualification 
without cause, as the motion was not timely pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(B). The Court then heard 
oral argument from Defendants regarding Plaintiff's motion for disqualification for cause. The 
Court also vacated the hearing on Defendants' motion to strike and motion for summary judgment, 
pending the Court's decision on the motion for disqualification for cause. 
Subsequent to the hearing, the Court scheduled a status conference for August 17, 2015, in 
order to give Plaintiff an opportunity to present argument regarding his motion for disqualification 
for cause. Plaintiff was present at the August 17, 2015, status conference and indicated he would 
like to schedule a hearing in order to present argument on his motion. Accordingly, the Court 
scheduled the matter for further oral argument on August 28, 2015. A Notice of Hearing setting 
forth the date and time for that hearing was filed on August 18, 2015, and provided to Plaintiff and 
counsel for Defendants. 
Plaintiff did not appear for the August 28, 2015, hearing.2 Being satisfied that Plaintiff had 
sufficient notice of the hearing date and time, the Court proceeded in his absence and took the 
motion for disqualification for cause under advisement. 
1 In his affidavit in support of his motion to disqualify for cause, Plaintiff states, "I received the Notice of hearing on 
Summary Judgment on 7/16/2015." See Affidavit Supporting Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen With Cause 
at 3. Further, the email communications Plaintiff attached as an exhibit to his affidavit reflect PlaintiWs awareness of 
the hearing scheduled for August 4, 2014. The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment 
Hearing on July 28, 2015. However, Plaintiff did not schedule or notice that motion for hearing as required by Rule 2.1 
of the Local Rules of the District Court and Magistrate D_ivision for the Fourth Judicial District. 
2 In the interim, Plaintiff indicated through email communication with the Court's clerk and counsel for Defendants that 
he did not intend to appear for the August 28, 2015, hearing and that he did not intend to file a motion to continue the 
hearing. 





























Plaintiffs Motion for Disqualification Without Cause 
As noted above, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion for disqualification without cause on the 
record at the August 4, 2015, hearing. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l)(B) provides: 
A motion for disqualification without cause must be filed not later than seven (7) days after 
service of a written notice or order setting the action for status conference, pretrial 
conference, trial or for hearing on the first contested motion, or not later than twenty-one 
(21) days after service or receipt of a complaint, summons, order or other pleading 
indicating or specifying who the presiding judge to the action will be, whichever occurs 
first; and such motion must be filed before the commencement of a status conference, a 
pretrial conference, a contested proceeding or trial before the judge sought to be 
disqualified. 
Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in this matter was filed on July 18, 2013, and an 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury trial was filed on August 12, 2013. Defendants' Answer 
to Amended Complaint and Jury Trial was filed on October 2, 2013. Thereafter, on October 8, 
2013, the Court issued a Notice of Status Conference Under I.R.C.P. 16(a) & 16(b) which indicated 
who the presiding judge in the action would be. Plaintiffs motion for disqualification without 
cause was not filed until July 21, 2015. Accordingly, the motion was clearly untimely, and the 
Court further finds that the motion was frivolous and without merit. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Disqualification For Cause 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40( d)(2) provides: 
Any party to an action may disqualify a judge or magistrate for cause from presiding in any 
action upon any of the following grounds: 
1. That the judge or magistrate is a party, or is interested, in the action or proceeding. 
2. That the judge or magistrate is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within 
the third degree, computed according to the rules of law. 
3. That the judge or magistrate has been attorney or counsel for any party in the action or 
proceeding. 
4. That the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the case in 
the action. 




























I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(A). A motion for disqualification for cause must be accompanied by an affidavit 
"stating distinctly the grounds upon which disqualification is based and the facts relied upon in 
support of the motion." I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(B). The decision regarding whether to grant or deny a 
motion for disqualification for cause is committed to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. 
Pratt, 128 Idaho 207,211, 912 P.2d 94, 98 (1996). 
In his motion for disqualification for cause, Plaintiff states, "Plaintiff believes that Judge 
Hansen is so biased and prejudiced that he cannot get a fair and impartial trial or hearings. The 
proof of the Judge biases is the way this case has proceeded until this point along with recent email 
conversation with his Clerk." Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen With Cause at 1. For 
the following reasons, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not demonstrated sufficient grounds for 
disqualification for cause. 
In his affidavit, Plaintiff sets forth certain allegations of bias or prejudice on the part of the 
Court.3 First, Plaintiff asserts, "Trial was originally scheduled for 12/8/2014 but it was 'vacated' 
without a Stipulation or an Order from the Court. I believe that Judge Hansen went along with 
Defendant stated desire to vacate trial ... " Affidavit Supporting Motion to Disqualify Judge 
Timothy Hansen With Cause (hereinafter Plaintiffs Affidavit) at 2. Plaintiff further asserts, 
"I believe that the Judge unfairly granted defendant wishes to vacate trial without a Stipulation or . 
an Order." Plaintiffs Affidavit at 4. However, Plaintiffs representation regarding vacation of the 
original trial date is plainly contradicted by the record in this matter. At a pre-trial conference held 
on the record on November 24, 2014, Plaintiff appeared prose and requested more time in order to 
see if he could hire an attorney. As the court minutes reflect, the Court indicated that if Plaintiff 
would like time to try to obtain counsel, the trial date would need to be vacated. Plaintiff confirmed 
that he would like more time. Counsel for Defendants agreed that the matter was not ready to 
proceed to trial and indicated that Defendants would be amenable to vacating the trial. On the 
record, and with Plaintiff present, the Court vacated the trial which was set for December 8, 2014. 
Accordingly, the trial date was vacated primarily due to Plaintiffs request for time to hire an 
3 The Court notes that certain allegations made by Plaintiff pertain to actions taken by his previous attorney in which the 
Court had no involvement, such as whether the State of Idaho would be named as a defendant in Plaintiff's lawsuit. 
See, e.g., Plaintiff's Affidavit at I. Accordingly, the Court will only address the allegations of prejudice which are 
specifically directed at actions taken by the Court or its staff. 




























attorney.4 Additionally, no Order vacating the trial was necessary, as the matter was handled on the 
record, in the presence of Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants. 
Plaintiff next asserts, "I believe that Defendant lost the right to file for Summary Judgment, 
yet Judge Hansen is displaying partiality towards Defendant by hearing the matter when there 
wasn't even an Order to vacate the original Trial date, and there is no specific date for filing for 
Summary Judgment on the new Order." Plaintiffs Affidavit at 2. Plaintiff further asserts, 
"I believe that the Judge is unfairly allowing/hearing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
when they lost that right by failing to file one on 9/2014." Plaintiffs Affidavit at 4. Again, 
Plaintiffs representations are contradicted by the record. At a status conference held on the record 
on February 12, 2015, the Court re-set the trial in this matter for September 8, 2015. Plaintiff was 
present for the status conference, again appearing pro se. As the court minutes reflect, the Court 
inquired about the deadlines for discovery and for filing summary judgment motions which had 
been previously agreed to by the parties in the Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning that was 
filed on October 31, 2013. The Court asked whether it was the parties' intention that those 
deadlines would still apply but would now be based upon the new trial date, September 8, 2015. 
The court minutes reflect that both Plaintiff and counsel for Defendant agreed that those dates 
would work, and the Court indicated that the deadlines contained in the October 31, 2013, 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning would be incorporated into the scheduling order for the 
new trial setting. The October 31, 2013, Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning indicated that 
summary judgment motions must be filed no later than 75 days prior to trial. See Stipulation for 
Scheduling and Planning at 2. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on 
June 1, 2015, was filed more than 75 days prior to the September 8, 2015, trial date and is therefore 
timely. 
Finally, Plaintiff asserts he filed his motion for disqualification for cause "after some 
disturbing emails between myself and the Judge Clerk/Opposing Counsel." Plaintiffs Affidavit at 
3. As noted above, the emails to which Plaintiff refers are attached as an exhibit to his affidavit. 
Plaintiff states, "These emails further heightens my concerns about the Judge lack of impartiality." 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at 3. Plaintiff also asserts, "I believe that I cannot get a fair and impartial 
Trial/hearings from the Judge when his Clerk is telling blatant lies." Plaintiffs Affidavit at 4. 
4 The Court would also note that Plaintiff has previously raised this issue, and at a status conference held on the record 
on February 12, 2015, the Court reminded Plaintiff that it was Plaintiffs request for time to hire an attorney which 
necessitated vacating.the trial date. 




























Plaintiff alleges the Court's clerk "lied" about several matters. First, Plaintiff asserts the Court's 
clerk told him that a motion to disqualify had been previously filed. However, as the email 
communications demonstrate, the Court's clerk indicated she believed the issue of a motion to 
disqualify had "previously been taken up." See Exhibit to Plaintiff's Affidavit at 3. The record 
shows that this statement was accurate. The Court held a status conference on the record on 
January 5, 2015, at which Plaintiff appeared telephonically. At the status conference, the Court 
inquired of Plaintiff whether he had some concerns regarding this Court remaining on the case. The 
Court noted that prior to the status conference, on December 31, 2014, Plaintiff had filed a Case 
Status Update in which he made the statement that judges are "corrupt," and to which he attached as 
an exhibit an article discussing an author's opinions regarding the corruption of the U.S. legal 
system. As the court minutes reflect, the Court indicated that Plaintiff could file a motion to 
disqualify if he had concerns about this Court remaining on the case. Plaintiff indicated he would 
look into filing a motion to disqualify, and the Court stated it would take no further action at that 
time and would await the filing of such motion. On February 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Update and 
Response to Defendant's Memorandum, in which he indicated that he would not be filing a formal 
motion to disqualify, although he would leave it up to the judge as to whether the judge wished to 
recuse himself from the case. See Plaintiff Update and Response to Defendant's Memorandum at 
1, 3. At the status conference held on the record on February 12, 2015, the Court noted that it had 
reviewed the information provided by Plaintiff and indicated that Plaintiff had presented no grounds 
for disqualification. Accordingly, although no formal motion to disqualify had been previously 
filed by Plaintiff, the issue of disqualification of this Court had been previously addressed. 5 
Plaintiff next asserts the Court's clerk "lied to me by claiming that the Judge was not going 
to be available until 8/4." Plaintiff's Affidavit at 3. In her July 22, 2015, email to Plaintiff, the 
Court's clerk indicated that the soonest date the Court could take up Plaintiff's motion to disqualify 
would be the hearing that had already been set for August 4, 2015, "as Judge Hansen is out for the 
last two weeks of July." See Exhibit to Plaintiff's Affidavit at 3. On the same day, Plaintiff 
responded by email and stated, "I just got from the Court a full copy of Judge Hansen calendar from 
today until 8/4. It appears that he is presiding over several cases, are you telling me that if I was to 
5 The Court also notes that Plaintiff's motion for disqualification without cause was filed on July 21, 2015. It is likely 
that when the Court's clerk responded to Plaintiff's email the next day, July 22, 2015, that motion had not yet been made 
a part of the court's physical file, and the clerk therefore would not have been aware that the motion for disqualification 
to which Plaintiff referred was, in fact, a new motion which had been filed by him the previous day. See Exhibit to 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at 3-4. 




























show up at those hearings that he won't be there?" See Exhibit to Plaintiffs Affidavit at 2. On 
July 23, 2015, the Court's clerk accurately replied, "You are correct, Judge Hansen does have 
hearings scheduled on his calendar, however, he is out of the office and has other Judges covering 
those hearings. Judge Hansen will be back on August 3 and will be presiding at the hearing in your 
case on August 4 ... " See Exhibit to Plaintiffs Affidavit at 2. 
Plaintiff next asserts that the Court's clerk told him Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment hearing would proceed as scheduled on August 4, 2015, and she "refused to issue a new 
notice of hearing" for his motion to disqualify. See Plaintiffs Affidavit at 3. However, the email 
communications clearly demonstrate that the Court's clerk simply indicated that a hearing date was 
set for August 4, 2015, and she accurately stated, more than once, that Plaintiff would be 
responsible for sending out a notice of hearing on his motion to disqualify. See Exhibit to 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at 1-3. 
As the allegations upon which Plaintiffs motion is based are plainly contradicted by the 
record in this matter, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any grounds for disqualification for cause and 
his motion is therefore denied. The Court further finds that the motion was frivolous and without 
merit. 
Finally, due to the delay caused by the filing of Plaintiffs motions for disqualification, 
Defendants' motions, which were timely filed as noted above, have not yet been addressed. 
Accordingly, this matter cannot proceed to trial on September 8, 2015, and the trial date is therefore 
vacated. The Court will set a scheduling conference for the purpose of rescheduling the trial and 
setting a date for hearing on Defendants' summary judgment motion and motion to strike. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen 
With Cause is denied. The trial which was scheduled for September 8, 2015, is vacated. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 3..-&. day of September, 2015. 
District Judge 
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Case No. CV OC 1312890 
ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE 
MOTION TO SEAL EXHIBIT 14 OF 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF OPPOSING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Defendants' Ex Parte Motion to Seal Exhibit 14 of Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Add Redactions to Document, 
having been heard before the Court on July 13, 2015, and pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative 
. a)~ 
Rule 32.(i)(3)ts GRANTED and the Court orders Exhibit 14 to be SEALED. 
ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE MOTION TO SEAL EXHIBIT 14 OF AFFIDAVIT OF 
PLAINTIFF OPPOSING DEFENDATNS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I 
000326
ITIS SO ORDERED. 
~y; DATED this~ay of , 2015. 
~ 
District Judge 
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This is an action for discrimination, retaliation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and breach of implied and/or express employment contract. The Court's previous 
decisions in this matter are incorporated herein by reference. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on June 1, 2015, along with a 
supporting memorandum, the Affidavit of Mariel Dahlman Doyle in Support of Memorandum of 
Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Sunny Wallace in Support of 
Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Marla S. Henken 
in Support of Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of 
Elizabeth Greaney in Support of Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment, 
the Affidavit of Andy Cover in Support of Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary 
Judgment, and the Affidavit of David W. Cantrill in Support of Memorandum of Defendants in 
Support of Summary Judgment. On June 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. On June 29, 2015, Defendants' Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, along with a 
supporting memorandum. On the same date, Defendants also filed an Ex Parte Motion to Seal 




























Exhibit 14 of the Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment or in 
the Alternative Add Redactions to Documents. On July 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to 
Defendant[ s '] Ex Parte Motion to Seal Exhibit 14 of Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and a Memorandum Supporting Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Objection to Defendants Motion to Strike It. 
Hearing on Defendants' motions was held on November 20, 2015. Plaintiff appeared pro 
se, as he has throughout the majority of the proceedings in this case. At the hearing, the Court 
granted Defendants' motion to seal, and took Defendants' motion to strike and motion for summary 
judgment under advisement. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendants' Motion to Strike 
When considering evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment, a court can only consider material which would be admissible at trial. Gem 
State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 14, 175 P.3d 172, 176 (2007), citing Petricevich v. 
Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869, 452 P.2d 362, 366 (1969), and I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
Accordingly, if the admissibility of the evidence presented "is raised by objection by one of the 
parties, the court must first make a threshold determination as to the admissibility of the evidence 
'before proceeding to the ultimate issue, whether summary judgment is appropriate."' Gem State 
Ins. Co., 145 Idaho at 14, 175 P.3d at 176 (citations omitted). Supporting and opposing affidavits 
filed in connection with a summary judgment motion "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." I.R.C.P. 56(e). An affidavit that is conclusory, 
based on hearsay, or not supported by personal knowledge does not satisfy the requirements of 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). Taft v. Jumbo Foods, Inc., 155 Idaho 511, 515, 314 P.3d 193, 197 (2013) (citation 
omitted). A district court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence offered in connection 
with a motion for summary judgment is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Major v. 
Security Equip. Corp., 155 Idaho 199,205, 307 P.3d 1225, 1231 (2013), citing Gem State Ins. Co., 
145 Idaho at 15,175 P.3d at 177. 
Defendants are seeking to strike the majority of the Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter Plaintiffs Affidavit), which was filed on 
















June 11, 2015. The only portions_ of the affidavit to which Defendants do not object are Exhibit 11 
and one sentence on page 9 of the affidavit1 which states, "Defendant has admitted that Plaintiff 
was hire[ d] at a higher pay due to his experience in the medical field and Plaintiff does not dispute 
that fact." Defendants object to the admission of the remainder of the affidavit and the attached 
exhibits on the grounds of lack of foundation and authentication, lack of relevance, lack of personal 
knowledge, and hearsay. Defendants also assert that, in large part, the affidavit is conclusory and 
argumentative. 
The Court agrees that much of Plaintiffs Affidavit consists of argument or conclusions 
rather than factual information based upon Plaintiffs personal knowledge. For example, at pages 2 
and 3 of the affidavit, Plaintiff discusses the history of racism against Hispanics in general, and the 
problems experienced by other minorities and refugees in the Boise, Idaho, area. At page 4, 
Plaintiff discusses his perceptions regarding the corruption of the American legal system. In order 
to preserve the record in this matter, the Court declines to strike Plaintiffs Affidavit in its entirety. 
However, the Court will give the affidavit the weight to which it deems it entitled and will not 
consider any portions that are in the nature of argument in rendering its decision on Defendants' 
summary judgment motion. 
:
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Defendants are seeking summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs claims. See Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, ~how that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Beaudoin v. Davidson Trust Co., 151 Idaho 701, 704, 263 P.3d 755, 758 (2011), quoting 
LR. C.P. 56( c ). The burden is on the moving party to show that no genuine issues of material fact 
exist. Soignier V. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 324, 256 P.3d 730, 732 (2011), citing Stoddart V. 
Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 149 Idaho 679, 683, 239 P.3d 784, 788 (2010). Disputed facts are 
"liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party and 'all reasonable i_nferences that can be 
drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.':' 1 Patterson v. State of 
Idaho, Dep'tofHealth & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310,315,256 P.3d 718,723 (2011), quoting Mackay 
v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P .3d 1064, 1066 (2008). "If reasonable 
1 The Court notes that the affidavit itself contains no page numbers or paragraph numbers. 




























people might reach a different conclusion from conflicting inferences based on the evidence," then 
the summary judgment motion must be denied. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 873, 204 P.3d 
508, 513 (2009), citing Mackay, 145 Idaho at 410, 179 P.3d at 1066. 
On or about August 24, 2011, Plaintiff was hired as a customer service representative for 
Defendant University Health Services Boise State University (hereinafter Defendant) under a six-
month probationary period. Defendant Mariel Doyle was an employee of Defendant and was one 
of Plaintiffs supervisors. On November 15, 2011, during his probationary period, Plaintiff was 
notified by Defendant that his employment was being terminated for failure to satisfactorily 
complete his entrance probationary period. Plaintiff was also notified that he could resign instead 
of accepting the termination. Plaintiff resigned from his position on November 18, 2011. 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in the case at bar on July 18, 2013, 
and an Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (hereinafter Amended Complaint) on 
August 12, 2013, alleging that Defendant engaged in discriminatory conduct against him because 
he is Hispanic. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: 
I) Discrimination under LC. § 67-5909; 2) Retaliation under LC. § 67-5911; 3) Breach of the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and 4) Breach of Implied and/or Express 
Employment Contract. 
In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant refused to give him adequate 
training and supervision, subjected him to formal discipline procedures, and discharged him. 
Plaintiff further alleges that these adverse actions were motivated by intentional discrimination on 
the part of Defendant because Plaintiff is a member of the Hispanic race. See Amended Complaint 
at 5. The Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA), LC. §§ 67-5901 et seq., provides for the execution of 
the federal Civil Rights Act within the state of Idaho. See Frogley v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 
2, 155 Idaho 558, 564, 314 P.3d 613, 619 (2013); LC. § 67-5901. The IHRA prohibits employers 
from discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees because of their race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. LC. § 67-5909. The Idaho Supreme Court has concluded that the 
legislative intent reflected in LC. § 67-5901 allows Idaho state courts to look to federal law for 
guidance in the interpretation of the IHRA's provisions. See, e.g., Mackay; 145 Idaho at 413, 179 
P.3d at 1069 (citations omitted). 
Idaho appellate courts apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis to 
discrimination claims arising under the IHRA. See Hatheway v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of 




























Idaho, 155 Idaho 255, 263, 310 P.3d 315, 323 (2013), discussing McDo'}nell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this analysis, an employee alleging disparate treatment must 
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden of production then shifts to the 
employe~ "to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for the challenged actions. 
Hatheway, 155 Idaho at 263, 310 PJd at 323, citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The 
burden of persuasion, however, remains at all times with the employee. Hatheway, 155 Idaho at 
263, 310 P.3d at 323 (citation omitted). 
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Plaintiff must show that: 
(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he 
experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his 
protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse 
employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. 
Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Defendant 
does not, dispute that Plaintiff has established the first and third elements of a prima facie case, as 
Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, the Hispanic race, and Plaintiff experienced adverse 
employment actions in the form of warnings and a notice of termination of employment. See 
Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment (hereinafter Defendants' 
Memorandum) at 14-15. As to the second element, the evidence in the record is sufficient to 
demonstrate that Plaintiff was qualified for his position, as Defendant hired Plaintiff at 20% above 
the beginning salary because of the medical experience he brought to the position. See Affidavit of 
David W. Cantrill in Support of Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment, 
Exhibit B; Affidavit of Mariel Dahlman Doyle in Support of Memorandum of Defendants in 
Support of Summary Judgment (hereinafter Doyle Affidavit) at ~ 4. With regard to the fourth 
element, Plaintiff asserts that Eric Quintero, the only other Hispanic . male employee in the 
department, also experienced similar adverse employment actions. See Plaintiffs Affidavit at 5-6. 
Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant did not provide him with a new employee orientation 
package until approximately two months after he was hired, yet Defendant made sure that Jacee, a 
new employee who was "white," received her orientation package right away. See Plaintiffs 
Affidavit at 8. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes 
that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate treatment. 
Accordingly; the burden of production has shifted to Defendant "to articulate some 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse employment actions. _Hatheway, 155 Idaho at 





























263, 310 P.3d at 323, citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Performance-related concerns 
are sufficient to satisfy this stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See, e.g., Maxfield v. 
Brigham Young Univ. - Idaho, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1089 (D. Idaho 2014), citing Pottenger v. 
Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cir. 2003). In the case at bar, Defendant's performance-., 
related concerns regarding Plaintiff were well documented. Ms. Doyle, Plaintiffs supervisor, 
asserts that the specific issues with Plaintiffs performance of his job duties included the following: 
• Mendez made inappropriate conversations with patients and gave medical advice; 
• Mendez was untimely to work and stayed past the hours that should have been required to 
complete his work; 
• Mendez repeatedly failed to follow procedures to check out patients, input insurance 
information correctly, handle employee flu shots and made errors resulting in a provider 
having to do a no charge on an office visit; 
• Mendez made staff feel uncomfortable with his negative comments, negative attitude and 
inappropriate "gawking" and looking at people "up and down." 
Doyle Affidavit at 17. Ms. Doyle took detailed notes concerning these issues and her discussion of 
them with Plaintiff, beginning on September 27, 2011, and continuing up to the time of Plaintiffs 
notice of termination. See Doyle Affidavit, Exhibit A at Bates #BSU 0.0504-BSU 00509. The 
Court concludes that Defendant has met its burden of articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons for disciplining Plaintiff and terminating his employment. . 
Under the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the burden shifts back to the 
employee to show that the employer's reasons are merely pretext for discrimination. See 
Hatheway, 155 Idaho at 267, 310 P.3d at 327. Generally, an employee demonstrates pretext by 
showing that the employer's stated reason for the adverse employment action either "(1) has no 
basis in fact, (2) was not the actual reason, or (3) is insufficient to explain the employer's action." 
Id., quoting White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court 
concludes that Plaintiff has not met this burden. While Plaintiff appears to assert that Ms. Doyle 
only reported his performance issues because of his race, he had produced no evidence to 
demonstrate that issues such as his failure to arrive for work timely or his failure to follow 
procedures and to input information correctly, for example, have no basis in fact or are not 
legitimate reasons for discipline unrelated to any discriminatory motive. Accordingly, the Court 




























concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding his first 
claim for relief, and summary judgment is therefore appropriate as to that claim. 
In his second claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated LC. § 67-5911 "by 
terminating Plaintiff in retaliation for complaining of discriminatory actions on the part of 
Defendant." Amended Complaint at ,r 40. Idaho Code section 67-5911 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for a person or any business entity subject to regulation by this chapter 
to discriminate against any individual because he or she has opposed any practice made 
unlawful by this chapter or because such individual has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter. 
A claim under LC. § 67-5911 is commonly referred to as a retaliation cause of action. Patterson, 
151 Idaho at 318, 256 P .3d at 727. To establish a prima facie retaliation claim, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment 
action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment 
action. Id., citing E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1005 (9th Cir. 
2002). Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff has established the first two elements, as Plaintiff 
engaged in protected activity by reporting his discrimination concerns to Andy Cover on October 
10, 2011, and as Plaintiffs ultimate termination was an adverse employment action. See 
Defendants' Memorandum at 18. As to the third element, however, the Court concludes that the 
evidence in the record, including the chronology of events, does not support a causal link between 
the protected activity and the termination of Plaintiffs employment. 
During the period of Plaintiffs employment with Defendant, Andy Cover was employed by 
Defendant as a Senior Human Resources Specialist. See Affidavit of Andy Cover in Support of 
Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment (hereinafter Cover Affidavit) at ,r 1. 
Plaintiff met with Mr. Cover on October 10, 2011. At the meeting, Plaintiff told Mr. Cover he felt 
he was being trained and evaluated differently than other customer service representatives and that 
he was being discriminated against because of his ethnicity. See Cover Affidavit at ,r 5. Mr. Cover 
told Plaintiff that if he felt he was being discriminated against, he should contact Marla Henken, 
Defendant's Director of Affirmative Action/Equal Employment Opportunity, as she was the official 
point of contact for the receipt and investigation of discrimination complaints. See Cover Affidavit 
at ,r 6. Plaintiff did not contact Ms. Henken to report any allegations of discrimination during his 
employment with Defendant. See Affidavit of Marla S. Henken in Support of Memorandum of 
Defendants in Support of Summary Judgment at ,r 4. 





























It is well documented that Plaintiffs performance issues began well before his October 10, 
2011, meeting with Mr. Cover. From September 27, 2011, through October 7, 2011, Ms. Doyle 
documented numerous concerns regarding Plaintiffs performance, including Plaintiffs 
inappropriate conversations with patients, his unwillingness to answer telephone calls, and his 
failure to follow procedures for checking patients out and for recording patients' insurance 
information. See Doyle Affidavit, Exhibit A at Bates #BSU 00504-BSU 00506. On October 5, 
2011, before Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by meeting with Mr. Cover regarding his 
discrimination concerns, Ms. Doyle created a Record of Employee Conference Form setting forth 
performance issues Ms. Doyle had observed on October 3 and October 4, 2011. Further, as early as 
October 4, Ms. Doyle indicated in an email conversation that Plaintiff may not "work out" and may 
need to be released. See Plaintiffs Affidavit, Exhibit 7 at Bates #BSU 00325. For these reasons, 
the Court concludes Plaintiff has not demonstrated a causal link between his conversation with 
Mr. Cover and the ultimate termination of his employment. As Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding his second claim for relief, summary judgment is therefore 
appropriate as to that claim. 
In his third claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing inherent in his employment contract by failing or refusing to provide 
Plaintiff with adequate training and supervision. See Amended Complaint at ,r 44. The Court notes 
that Plaintiff was an at-will employee. See Cover Affidavit at ,r 4. See also Mackay, 145 Idaho at 
412, 179 P .3d at 1068 ( citation omitted). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
"'does not create new duties that are not inherent' in the employment relationship, nor does it alter 
an employer's right to fire an at-will employee by creating a for cause requirement." Nix v. Elmore 
County, 158 Idaho 310,320,346 P.3d 1045, 1055 (2015). However, under Idaho law, an implied 
covenant. of good faith and fair dealing is found in all employment agreements, including 
employment at-will relationships. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 148 Idaho 881, 891, 243 
P.3d 1069, ,1079 (2010) (citation omitted). An action by one party that "violates, qualifies or 
significantly impairs any benefit or right of the other party under an employment contract whether 
express or implied, violates the covenant." Id. (citation omitted). 
Having considered the evidence in the record, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff failed 
to receive adequate training or supervision. Ms. Doyle thoroughly documented the training 
Plaintiff received during his first four weeks of employment. See Doyle Affidavit, Exhibit A at 



























Bates #BSU 00511. On November 1, 2011, Ms. Doyle met with Plaintiff to go over this 
documentation of his training. See Doyle Affidavit at~ 11. Further, Ms. Doyle's documentation of 
Plaintiffs specific performance issues throughout his period of employment indicate numerous 
instances in which Ms. Doyle, who was Plaintiffs supervisor, observed Plaintiff performing aspects 
of his job incorrectly, and immediately spoke to Plaintiff directly about the correct procedure and 
confirmed that he understood. See Doyle Affidavit, Exhibit A at Bates# BSU 00504-BSU 00509. 
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding his third claim for relief, and summary judgment is therefore appropriate as 
to that claim. 
In his fourth claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached an implied and/or 
express employment contract with Plaintiff by disciplining and terminating Plaintiff in violation of 
Defendant's own policies. See Amended Complaint at ~~ 49-50. However, as noted above, 
Plaintiff was an at-will employee who was subject to termination without cause. There is no 
evidence in the record to support the existence of an express employment j contract between the 
parties. Further, Plaintiff was disciplined and terminated during his probationary period. As the 
reasons for Defendant's discipline and termination of Plaintiffs employment during this period 
were well documented as discussed above, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff has 
demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding the breach of any implied contract of 
employment. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs fourth claim for relief. 
Attorney Fees Regarding Defendant Mariel Doyle 
Finally, at the conclusion of their brief in support of the motion for summary judgment, 
Defendants indicate that the naming of Ms. Doyle as a defendant in this matter was unreasonable, 
as the IHRA does not allow for individual liability. For that reason, Defendants request an award of 
attorney fees as to Ms. Doyle. See Defendants' Memorandum at 20. However, as the issue of 
attorney fees is premature, the Court declines to address it at this time. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff 
Opposing Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 




























Defendants are hereby directed to prepare a form of Judgment consistent with this decision. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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Case No. CV OC 1312890 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Plaintiff is awarded no relief against Defendants University Health Services, Boise State 
University and Mariel Doyle. Defoadants' Metion for SttmfflElf)' Judgment '.¥as GR.ANTED, an~ 
Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED This {9.k-day of February, 2016. 
JUDGMENT-I 
r 
Honorable Timothy Hansen 
District Judge · 
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I hereby certify that on~ day of F<l r~ , 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by methocih(icated below, upon: 
Raul Mendez 
2712 N. Goldeneye Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
Daniel J. Skinner 
Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey & Sorensen 
POBox359 



















2712 N Goldeneye Way 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 
Telephone: (208) 860-5037 
Raulmendez2002gmail.com 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
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APR O 1 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK 
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UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES BOISE 
STATE UNIVERSITY, MARIEL DOYLE 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. CV OC 1312890 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
To: The above named respondent, University Health Services, and the Clerk of the above 
entitled Court. 
Notice is hereby given that: 
Appellant/Plaintiff, Raul Mendez appeals to the Idaho Court of Appeals from the Judgment 
entered on February 19, 2016. 
I. PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Raul Mendez was employed by Boise State University from August 24th, 2011 to 
November 15th, 2011 and currently resides in Ada County, Idaho. 
2. Defendant Boise State University is a public institution of higher education with its principal 
place of business at 1910 University Drive, Boise, Idaho, 83725. 
,· 
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II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
3. Plaintiff claims arise under LC. 67-5909 and LC. 67-5911 and therefore jurisdiction is proper 
in the Appeal court. 
4. Venue is proper in this county by virtue of LC. 5-404 as the Defendant operates primarily in 
Ada County. 
III. APPEAL FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
5. Plaintiff appeals the entire record as the proceedings during the entire case are corrupted and 
show a significant deviation from normal standards. 
6. Issues on Appeal: 
(a) Plaintiff believes that Defendant acted with malice thru the entire proceedings by 
intentionally/unnecessarily delaying proceedings. Defendant's conduct during entire 
proceedings resulted in the violation of my civil and constitutional rights. 
(b) Whether this case should have even gone ahead when there was a failure to file Affidavit 
of service of complaint. 
( c) Defendant Attorneys misrepresented that they represented the State of Idaho among 
multiple parties when the evidence on record; specifically the Motion to dismiss the State show 
that was not the case and it is just one of many irregularities on this case. 
( d) Defendant has submitted billing showing that most of the charges are for contacts with 
the State ofldaho even after they had been removed as a party. This is just one of the many 
instances of Fraud upon the Court asking for fees on fraudulent charges. 
000343
(e) Defendant and presiding District Judge tampered with the administration of justice 
suggesting a wrong against institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public (Fraud upon the 
Court). 
(f) Presiding District Judge giving the appearance of biased/partiality where an 
objective/reasonable person would question his impartiality. 
(g) Presiding District Judge refusal to recuse himself after Plaintiff reasonably questioning 
his impartiality and after submitting a proper Motion/ Affidavit to disqualify with Cause. 
(h) Trial Judge Abuse of discretion in properly adjudicating matters presented to him in an 
unbiased/unprejudiced manner or even making decisions at all on Motions filed by Plaintiff. 
(i) Defendant failed to file a timely Motion for Summary Judgment on the first Stipulation 
for Scheduling and planning; instead that trial was vacated without even an order from the Court. 
G) There was no Stipulation for the second Scheduling order dated 2/23/2015 after the first 
one had been ignored. Furthermore, there wasn't even a stated date/timeframe by which to file 
Summary Judgment Motions. Instead, Trial Judge and Defendant simply referred to the 
previously voided scheduling order to justify the granting of Summary Judgment. 
(k) This case is 2.5 years long but there are not enough facts known to make a proper 
adjudication for Summary Judgment. 
(1) Granting of Summary Judgment is inappropriate as trial Judge has not adjudicated facts 
and inferences from record in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
(m) Facts show that Defendant engaged in systemic discrimination of the two Hispanic 
employees. Specifically, how at exactly the same time they were documenting the same issues 
000344
for both. While the focus was on documenting alleged issues; there was never an attempt by 
Defendant to address them by providing a plan to improve performance as outlined on 
defendant's policies. 
(n) Defendant submitted a 500 pages long document as part of discovery that was Sworn as 
being accurate and truthful by the Human Resources Director. In the document there are several 
emails that raise the question of defendant's conduct and credibility further highlighting the 
pretextual reasons for ending Plaintiff employment. For example, on the same day they talk 
about treating everyone the same while at the same time requesting to end Plaintiff employment. 
( o) Record shows that other similar situated employees were making the same mistakes as 
Plaintiff, but only he received a formal reprimand without any previous warnings. Furthermore, 
Plaintiff never received the training or new employee materials. 
IV. TRANSCRIPT/RECORD 
7. Plaintiff requests a hard copy of the entire case docket be prepared and be send to the Court of 
Appeals. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not have to pay fees as the Judicial Order attached on his 
Affidavit show that he is indigent. 
8. Service of this Notice of Appeal has been made on Daniel Skinner, Attorney for Defendant. 
9. Plaintiff appeals on all issues of Law and Fact. 
10. Plaintiff believes that it is a matter of fairness and justice that the Judgment and entire case 
be voided due to Fraud upon the Court and gross misconduct by Defendant. 
11. Plaintiff does not wave the right to assert other issues on appeal. 
Dated March 31, 2016 
000345
It ' t • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on April 1st, 2016 I served a copy to: 
Daniel Skinner 
1423 Tyrell lane 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Raul Mendez 
D Bymail g_ By fax to 208-345-7212 
D By personal delivery 




























IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAtI0.QJSIRI';~ OF 
AM. '~-~- p:aB 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




STATE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 
UNIVERSITY; MARIEL DOYLE, 
Defendants. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KARI MAXWELL 
D!PUTY 
Case No. CVOC 1312890 
ORDER RE: FEE WAIVER 
FOR APPEAL 
This is an action based on claims of discrimination, retaliation, breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and breach of implied and/or express employment contract. The Court's 
previous decisions in this matter are incorporated herein by reference. 
On December 31, 2015, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment which had previously been filed on June 1, 2015. 
Judgment subsequently entered on February 19, 2016, dismissing Plaintiff Raul Mendez's amended 
complaint with prejudice. Defendants University Health Services Boise State University and Mary 
Doyle then filed Defendants' Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees on February 25,- 2016, with a 
memorandum and an affidavit from Beth Rountree in support. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Deny 
Defendant's (sic) Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees on March 9, 2016. On that same date Plaintiff 
also filed a Motion and Affidavit for Fee Waiver of Filin (sic) Fee and Copies of Transcript/Record 
seeking waiver of the appellate filing fee and costs to prepare the clerk's record and transcripts on 
' . 
appeal. On March 16, 2016, the Court entered its Order recommending waiver of the appellate filing 
fee pursuant to I.A.R. 23(c). However, because the notice of appeal had not yet been filed and the 
Idaho Supreme Court had not yet waived the appellate filing fee, this Court deferred ruling on 
Plaintiffs request for waiver of the clerk's record and transcript costs on appeal. Plaintiffs Notice 




























of Appeal was subsequently filed on April 1, 2016, and on April 14, 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court 
entered its Order: 1) Waiving the Filing Fee 2) Conditionally Dismiss for Non-payment of Fee for 
Clerk's Record. Plaintiff was given twenty-one days from the date of that order to either pay the 
necessary fees or obtain an order from this Court waiving those fees. On April 20, 2016, Plaintiff 
filed his Motion to Waive Fee for Preparation of the Clerk's Record and Transcript. Hearing on 
Defendants' Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees has not yet been scheduled due, in part, to issues 
involving Plaintiffs appeal including the stay of proceedings on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 13. 
Waiver of appellate filing fees is a matter for the Idaho Supreme Court subject to 
recommendation by the district court. See I.AR. 23(c) and (d). However, waiver of fees for the 
preparation of the clerk's record and reporter's transcript on appeal are matters for the district court. 
See I.A.R. 24(h) and 27(f). Said waiver is a matter of discretion for the district court pursuant to LC. 
§ 31-3220. The court must first determine whether an appellant is indigent. See LC. § 31-3220(2). 
If the court finds an appellant to be indigent, but denies a waiver of these fees, it must ce1iify 
''in writing that the action is frivolous, malicious or otherwise not taken in good faith." LC. § 31-
3220(4). "'Frivolous' means a claim which has no arguable basis in law or fact, or is substantially 
similar to a previous claim that has been dismissed with prejudice or is barred by res judicata or 
collateral estoppel." LC.§ 31-3220(1)(c). "'Malicious' means a claim which appears to be intended 
solely to harass the party." LC.§ 31-3220(1)(e). 
This Court has previously determined in its Order of March 16, 2016, that Plaintiff is 
indigent and it does not appear he is able to pay any fees or costs at this time. See LC. § 31-
3220(1 )( d). In his Notice of Appeal filed on June 1, 2016, Plaintiff has presented fifteen issues on 
appeal. Most of them are without merit, including claims that Defendant and this Comi tampered 
with the administration of justice and that this Court was biased and failed to properly recuse itself 
for cause. Others are malicious, including claims of misconduct by Defendants or their counsel. 
Many of the issues raised in Plaintiffs appeal were also raised in his Motion to Disqualify Judge 
Timothy Hansen With Cause and his Affidavit Supporting Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy 
Hansen With Cause, both of which were filed on July 28, 2015. In a Memorandum Decision and 
Order entered on September 3, 2015, denying Plaintiffs motion to disqualify for cause, the Comi 





























specifically noted that the record plainly contradicted Plaintiffs allegations and, therefore, his 
motion was without merit and frivolous. This Court specifically incorporates its Memorandum 
Decision. and Order of September 3, 2015, and its findings that Plaintiffs allegations were frivolous 
and without merit into this order. The Comt has also attached a copy of its Memorandum Decision 
and Order of September 3, 2015, to this order. 
However, as to Plaintiffs issues on appeal claiming that this Court en-ed in granting 
Defendants' summary judgment motion, this Comt finds that to be a legitimate issue for appeal and 
cannot certify as to that issue that the appeal is frivolous, malicious or "otherwise not taken in good 
faith." I.C. § 31-3220( 4). However, as to the remaining issues it can and hereby certifies that Issues 
on Appeal 6(a) through G) are frivolous, malicious or not taken good faith. To the extent Issues on 
Appeal 6(k) through ( o) involve claims that there are issues of material fact or for some other reason 
this Court erred in granting Defendants' summary judgment motion, this Court finds a legitimate 
basis for appeal as to them. 
Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Waive Fee for Preparation of Clerk's Record and Transcript 
is granted, in part, as to any portion of the clerk's record or any transcript related to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. However, as to any other portion of the clerk's record or any other 
transcript, Plaintiff's fee waiver motion is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 2/, day of May, 2016. 
District Judge 
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ST A TE OF IDAHO, UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SERVICES BOISE STATE 
UNIVERSITY; MARIEL DOYLE, 
Defendants. 




This is an action for discrimination, retaliation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and breach of implied and/or express employment contract. 
At a pre-trial conference held on the record on July 13, 2015, the Court scheduled a hearing 
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which had been filed on June 1, 2015, and 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which had been filed on June 29, 2015. Hearing on those motions was set for August 4, 
2015. Plaintiff was present at the July 13, 2015, pre-trial conference, appearing prose, as he has 
throughout much of the proceedings in this matter. Subsequently, a Notice of Hearing regarding 
the August 4. 2015, hearing on Defendants' motions was filed on July 14. 2015, and provided to 
Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants. 
On July 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen Without 
Cause. Def cndants filed a Response to Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen Without Cause 
on July 28. 2015. 


























On July 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen With Cause, 
along with an Affidavit Supporting Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen With Cause. 
On August 4, 2015. at the time previously set for hearing on Defendants' motions, the Court 
took up Plaintiffs motions to disqualify, noting that upon the filing of a motion for disqualification, 
the presiding judge is without authority to act further in the action except to grant or deny such 
motion for disqualification. See I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5). Plaintiff did not appear for the August 4, 2015, 
hearing and, being satisfied that Plaintiff had sufficient notice of the hearing date and time, the 
Court proceeded in his absence.' 
At the August 4, 2015. hearing, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion for disqualification 
without cause, as the motion was not timely pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l )(B). The Court then heard 
oral argument from Defendants regarding Plaintiff's motion for disqualification for cause. The 
Court also vacated the hearing on Defendants' motion to strike and motion for summary judgment, 
pending the Court's decision on the motion for disqualification for cause. 
Subsequent to the hearing, the Court scheduled a status conference for August 17. 2015, in 
order to give Plaintiff an opportunity to present argument regarding his motion for disqualification 
for cause. Plaintiff was present at the August 17, 2015, status conference and indicated he would 
like to schedule a hearing in order to present argument on his motion. Accordingly, the Court 
scheduled the matter for further oral argument on August 28, 2015. A Notice of Hearing setting 
forth the date and time for that hearing was filed on August 18, 20 I 5, and provided to Plaintiff and 
counsel for Defendants. 
Plaintiff did not appear for the August 28, 2015, hearing.2 Being satisfied that Plaintiff had 
sufficient notice of the hearing date and time, the Court proceeded in his absence and took the 
motion for disqualification for cause under advisement. 
1 In his affidavit in support of his motion to disqualify for cause, Plaintiff states, "I received the Notice of hearing on 
Summary Judgment on 7/16/2015." See Affidavit Supporting Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen With Cause 
at 3. Further, the email communications Plaintiff attached as an exhibit to his affidavit reflect Plaintiffs awareness of 
the hearing scheduled for August 4, 2014. The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a _Motion to ~acate Sun~mary Judgment 
I fearing on July 28, 2015. However, Plaintiff did not schedule or notice that mot1~1~ for _he~rmg as required by Rule 2.1 
of the Local Rules of the District Court and Magistrate Division for the Fourth Judicial District. 
2 In the interim, Plaintiff indicated through email communication with the Court's clerk and counsel ~or Dcfcnd~nts that 
he did not intend to appear for the August 28, 20 I 5, hearing and that he did not intend to file a motion to continue the 
hearing. 

























Plaintiffs Motion for Disqualification Without Cause 
As noted above, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion for disqualification without cause on the 
record at the August 4, 2015, hearing. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)( I )(B) provides: 
A motion for disqualification without cause must be filed not later than seven (7) days after 
service of a written notice or order setting the action for status conference, pretrial 
conference. trial or for hearing on the first contested motion, or not later than twenty-one 
(21) days after service or receipt of a complaint, summons. order or other pleading 
indicating or specifying who the presiding judge to the action will be, whichever occurs 
first: and such motion must be filed before the commencement of a status conference, a 
pretrial conference, a contested proceeding or trial before the judge sought to be 
disqualified. 
Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in this matter was filed on July 18, 2013, and an 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury trial was filed on August 12, 2013. Defendants' Answer 
to Amended Complaint and Jury Trial was filed on October 2, 2013. Thereafter. on October 8, 
2013, the Court issued a Notice of Status Conference Under I.R.C.P. 16(a) & 16(b) which indicated 
who the presiding judge in the action would be. Plaintiffs motion for disqualification without 
cause was not filed until July 21, 2015. Accordingly. the motion was clearly untimely, and the 
Comt further finds that the motion was frivolous and without merit. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Disqualification For Cause 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(2) provides: 
Any party to an action may disqualify a judge or magistrate for cause from presiding in any 
action upon any of the following grounds: 
I. That the judge or magistrate is a party, or is interested, in the action or proceeding. 
2. That the judge or magistrate is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within 
the third degree, computed according to the rules of law. 
3. That the judge or magistrate has been attorney or counsel for any party in the action or 
proceec.ling. 
4. That the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the case in 
the action. 


























I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(A). A motion for disqualification for cause must be accompanied by an affidavit 
"stating distinctly the grounds upon which disqualification is based and the facts relied upon in 
support of the motion." I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(B). The decision regarding whether to grant or deny a 
motion for disqualification for cause is committed to the discretion of the trial court. See Stale v. 
Prall, 128 Idaho 207, 211, 912 P.2d 94, 98 (1996). 
ln his motion for disqualification for cause, Plaintiff states. "Plaintiff believes that Judge 
Hansen is so biased and prejudiced that he cannot get a fair and impartial trial or hearings. The 
proof of the Judge biases is the way this case has proceeded until this point along with recent email 
conversation with his Clerk." Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen With Cause at 1. For 
the following reasons. the Court concludes Plaintiff has not demonstrated sufficient grounds for 
disqualification for cause. 
[n his affidavit, Plaintiff sets forth certain allegations of bias or prejudice on the part of the 
Court.3 First, Plaintiff asserts, "Trial was originally scheduled for 12/8/2014 but it was 'vacated' 
without a Stipulation or an Order from the Court. I believe that Judge Hansen went along with 
Defendant stated desire to vacate trial ... " Affidavit Supporting Motion to Disqualify Judge 
Timothy Hansen With Cause (hereinafter Plaintiffs Affidavit) at 2. Plaintiff further asserts, 
''[ believe that the Judge unfairly granted defendant wishes to vacate trial without a Stipulation or 
an Order." Plaintiffs Affidavit at 4. However, Plaintiffs representation regarding vacation of the 
original trial date is plainly contradicted by the record in this matter. At a pre-trial conference held 
on the record on November 24, 2014, Plaintiff appeared prose and requested more time in order to 
see if he could hire an attorney. As the cou11 minules reflect, the Court indicated that if Plaintiff 
would like time to try to obtain counsel, the trial date would need to be vacated. Plaintiff confirmed 
that he would like more time. Counsel for Defendants agreed that the matter was not ready to 
proceed to trial and indicated that Defendants would be amenable to vacating the trial. On the 
record. and with Plaintiff present. the Com1 vacated the trial which was set for December 8, 2014. 
Accordingly, the trial date was vacated primarily due to Plaintiffs request for time to hire an 
:; The Court notes that certain allegations made by Plaintiff pertain to actions taken by his previous attorney in which the 
Court had no involvement, such as whether the State of Idaho would be named as a defendant in Plaintifrs lawsuit. 
See, e.!! .. Plaintiffs Affidavit at I. Accordingly. the Court will only address the allegations of prejudice which are 
specili;ally directed at actions taken by the Court or its staff. 
























attorncy.-1 Additionally, no Order vacating the trial was necessary, as the matter was handled on the 
record. in the presence of Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants. 
Plaintiff next asserts, ·'I believe that Defendant lost the right to file for Summary Judgment. 
yet Judge Hansen is displaying partiality towards Defendant by hearing the matter when there 
wasn't even an Order to vacate the original Trial date. and there is no specific date for filing for 
Summary .Judgment on the new Order." Plaintiffs Affidavit at 2. Plaintiff further asserts. 
··J believe that the Judge is unfairly allov-1ing/hcaring Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
when they lost that right by failing to file one on 9/2014." Plaintiffs Affidavit at 4. Again, 
Plaintiff's representations arc contradicted by the record. At a status conference held on the record 
on February 12. 2015. the Court re-set the trial in this matter for September 8. 2015. Plaintiff was 
present for the status conference, again appearing pro se. As the court minutes reflect, the Court 
inquired about the deadlines for discovery and for filing summary judgment motions which had 
been previously agreed to by the parties in the Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning that was 
filed on October 3 I. 2013. The Court asked whether it was the parties' intention that those 
deadlines would still apply but would now be based upon the new trial date. September 8, 2015. 
The court minutes reflect that both Plaintiff and counsel for Defendant agreed that those dates 
would work, and the Court indicated that the deadlines contained in the October 31. 2013, 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning would be incorporated into the scheduling order for the 
new trial setting. The Octoher 31. 2013. Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning indicated that 
summary judgment motions must be filed no later than 75 days prior to trial. See Stipulation for 
Scheduling and Planning at 2. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on 
June I, 2015, was filed more than 75 days prior to the September 8, 2015, trial date and is therefore 
timely. 
Finally. Plaintiff asserts he filed his motion for disqualification for cause "after some 
disturbing emails between myself and the Judge Clerk/Opposing Counsel." Plaintiff's Affidavit at 
3. As noted above, the emails to which Plaintiff refers are attached as an exhibit to his affidavit. 
Plaintiff states, "These emails further heightens my concerns about the Judge lack of impartiality." 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at 3. Plaintiff also asserts. "I believe that I cannot get a fair and impartial 
Trial/hearings from the Judge when his Clerk is telling blatant lies." Plaintifrs Affidavit at 4. 
1 The Court would also note that Plaintiff has previously raised this issue, and at a status conference held on the,rccord 
on February I 2, 2015. the Cou11 reminded Plaintiff that it was Plaintiffs request for lime to hire an attorney which 
necessitated vacating the trial date. 





















Plaintiff alleges the Court's clerk "lied'' about several matters. First Plaintiff asserts the Cou11·s 
clerk told him that a motion to disqualify had been previously filed. However. as the email 
communications demonstrate, the Court's clerk indicated she believed the issue of a motion to 
disqualify had ·'previously been taken up." See Exhibit to Plaintiffs Affidavit at 3. The record 
shows that this statement was accurate. The Court held a status conference on the record on 
January 5, 2015. at which Plaintiff appeared telephonically. At the status conference. the Court 
inquin..:d of Plaintiff whether he had some concerns regarding this Court remaining on the case. The 
Court noted that prior lo the status conference. on December 3 I. 2014. Plaintiff had filed a Case 
Status Update in which he made the statement that judges are "corrupt." and to which he attached as 
an exhibit an article discussing an author's opinions regarding the corruption of the U.S. legal 
system. As the court minutes reflect, the Court indicated that Plaintiff could file a motion to 
disqualify if he had concerns about this Court remaining on the case. Plaintiff indicated he would 
look into filing a motion to disqualify. and the Court stated it would take no further action at that 
time and would await the filing of such motion. On February 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Update and 
Rcspo1ise to Defendant's Memorandum, in which he indicated that he would not be filing a formal 
motion to disqualify, although he would leave it up to the judge as to whether the judge wished to 
recuse himself from the case. See Plaintiff Update and Response to Defendant's Memorandum at 
I, 3. At the status conference held on the record on February 12, 2015. the Court noted that it had 
reviewed the information provided by Plaintiff and indicated that Plaintiff had presented no grounds 
for disqualification. Accordingly, although no formal motion to disqualify had been previously 
filed by Plaintiff. the issue of disqualification of this Com1 had been previously addressed.5 
Plaintiff next asserts the Court's clerk "lied to me by claiming that the Judge was not going 
to be available until 8/4." PlaintifPs Affidavit at 3. In her July 22. 2015, email to Plaintiff, the 
Court's clerk indicated that the soonest date the Court could take up Plaintiffs motion to disqualify 
would be the hearing that had already been set for August 4.2015, ''as Judge Hansen is out for the 
last two weeks of July." See Exhibit to PlaintifPs Affidavit at 3. On the same day, Plaintiff 
responded by email and stated, "I just got from the Court a full copy of Judge I Iansen calendar from 
today until 8/4. It appears that he is presiding over several cases, are you telling me that if l was to 
5 The Court also notes that Plaintiffs motion for disqualification without cause was filed on .July 21, 2015. It is likely 
that when the Court·s clerk responded to Plaintiffs email the next day, July 22. 2015, that motion_had not ~ct bc~n m~dc 
a part of the courfs physical file, and the clerk therefore would not have been awa~c that the 11~011011 for d1squa_lifi~a_t1on 
to which Plaintiff referred was. in fact. a new motion which had been filed by 1111n the previous day. See Exh1b1t to 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at 3-4. 



















show up at those hearings that he won't be there?" See Exhibit to Plaintiff's Affidavit at 2. On 
July 23, 2015. the Court's clerk accurately replied, "You are coITect, Judge Hansen does have 
hearings scheduled on his calendar, however, he is out of the office and has other Judges covering 
those hearings. Judge l la11se11 will be back 011 August 3 and will be presiding at the hearing in your 
case on August 4 .. :· See Exhibit to Plaintiffs Affidavit at 2. 
Plaintiff next asserts that the Court's clerk told him Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment hearing would proceed as scheduled 011 August 4. 2015, and she "refused to issue a new 
notice or hearing"" for his motion to disqualify. See Plaintiff's Affidavit at 3. However, the email 
communications clearly demonstrate that the Court"s clerk simply indicated that a hearing date was 
set for August 4. 2015. am.I she accurately stated. more than once, that Plaintiff would be 
responsible for sending out a notice of hearing on his motion to disqualify. See Exhibit to 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at 1-3. 
As the allegations upon which Plaintiffs motion is based are plainly contradicted by the 
record in this matter, Plaintiff. has failed to set forth any grounds for disqualification for cause and 
his motion is therefore denied. The Court further finds that the motion was frivolous and without 
merit. 
Finally. due to the delay caused by the filing of Plaintiff's motions for disqualification. 
Defendants' motions. which were timely filed as noted above. have not yet been addressed. 
Accordingly, this matter cannot proceed to trial on September 8. 2015, and the trial date is therefore 
vacated. The Court will set a scheduling conference for the purpose of rescheduling the trial and 
setting a date for hearing on Defendants' summary judgment motion and motion to strike . 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above. Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge Timothy Hansen 
With Cause is denied. The trial which was scheduled for September 8.2015. is vacated. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this~ day of September, 2015. 
TI MOTi IY HANSEN 
District Judge 
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